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OFFICE and DUTY OF *John Adams* EXECUTORS:

Or, A *TREATISE* of

Wills and Executors, directed
to *Testators*, in the choice of their
Executors, and Contrivance of
their *Wills*.

With Direction for *Executors* in the Exe-
cution of their Office according to the Law; and
for *Creditors* in the recovery of their Debts.

With divers other particulars, very usefull
and profitable for all persons, be they either
Executors, Creditors, or Debtors.

Compiled out of the Body of the Common
Law, by *THOMAS WENTWORTH*,
late Bencher of *Lincoln's Inne*.

L O N D O N,

Printed by *John Streater, James Fleisher, and Henry*
Twysford, Assigns of *Richard Atkyns and Edward*
Atkyns, Esquires. 1668.

Cum Gratia & Privilegio Regiæ Majestatis.

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The P R E F A C E.

A Midst the Readers of these Discourses, some not yet unfriendly may ask, perhaps, *Quorsum hæc?* or *Quorsum sic?* Why have we a Tractate and Discourse Legal? or, Why in *English*, and not rather in the Law-language? To whom, yea also to others, perhaps lesse inquisitive, it will be, as I think, a thing not unpleasing, to hear some reason rendred, why I have set my head and hands to this work so little in use with those of our Profession; why also in *English* rather then in the Language wherein our Volumes of Law are for the most part and well-nigh wholly written.

First, for the matter, *viz.* my thus Commenting or making a Tractate upon a Legal Theme.

The Preface.

1. I have long and strongly conceived, that the more Nobles, Gentlemen, and others, shall be acquainted with the Law of the Land, and the Justness, Equity, Prudence and Providence thereof, the more they will love it and affect it. *Ignoti nullo cupido*, The want of knowledge of it causeth the leanness of love to it. Therefore to bring Nobles and Gentlemen into acquaintance with the Law, is a means as well to advance it in their estimation, as to advantage them by it.

2. I have long thought, that we who are the Professors of our Law have been more wanting to it than the Civilians and Canonists to theirs; who have written very many Volumes. *Spartam quam nactus es, hanc exorna*, hath been said of old, and should be assayed anew.

3. More wanting then others before us of our own Profession have we also been, as I think: yet, as of old *Britton, Glanvill, Bracton*, besides not printed,

The Preface.

printed, *Fleta* and *Ingham*, did lead the way ; so since, Master *Littleton*, and, more lately, Sir *Germin Perkins*, *Fitzherbert*, *Stanford*, *Crompton*, *Lambert*, *Kitchin*, Sir *Henry Finch*, *Dalton* , have trodden this path ; so as it cannot be taxed with Novelty or Singularity. I mention not Relaters or Reporters of Judgments and Resolutions , nor meer Abridgers, nor Authours of Books of Entries, expressing forms of Declarations and Pleadings,&c. because these have trodden another, (though for the Students and Professors of the Law a very profitable) path.

The tax and increpation of our late learned and judicious Sovereign upon us the Professors of the *English* Law , as being wholly in effect addicted to our own private gain and advantage, with neglect of the publick, had some strong operation upon me , howsoever upon others; setting for divers years past

4.
King *Jam.*
in his Preface to his Book against Tobacco.

The Preface.

my pen on work, especially in Summer Vacations, upon divers particular Subjects, whereof this is one and the first-born.

5. To this I may adde the Crown's expectation of somewhat Legal to be published and set forth from time to time, as appears by the special Patents successively granted and renewed for the sole Printing of Books of Law. There is one such in force at this present, and another long hath been in Remainder and expectancy to take effect upon the expiration thereof.

6. And now to adjoin *Sic* to *Hæc* viz, the reason of my *English*-writing, to that of my writing upon Law-Theme. First, receive the said late King's judgment touching both expressed in one of his Speeches printed. "Thus I wish, saith he, that Law written in our vulgar Language: For now it is an old mixt and corrupt Language, onely understood by Lawyers; whereas
"ever

March
1609.

Note.

The Preface.

every Subject ought to understand the Law under which he lives, &c.

Herein *Andrew Horn*, one sometime of our Profession, agreeth with the said late King, saying, *Abusio est que les Leges ovesque lour enchesons ne soient scaus & connus del touts*: It is an abuse, saith he, that the Laws with the grounds be not known by all. *Ergo*, to be in a Tongue understood by all.

More plainly and fully doth that our both well-learned and well-descended Sir *Germin* sing in consort with our said late scientious King. For he first brings in the Doctor of Divinity, saying that henceforth he will take more pains then before he had done to know the Laws of *England*; for that knowledge is *multum necessaria & Clericis & Laicis, imò omnibus in hoc Regno commorantibus, etiam in foro Conscientiæ*. And this being in his first Book written in *Latin*; after writing

7.
In his Mir-
rour of Ju-
stice.

8.

Lib. 1. c.
24.

The Preface.

writing his second Book in *English*, he expresseth that he so did for this reason, *viz.* To the end that it might be understood by all.

9.

Which of us hath not heard it objected, that we the Professors of the Law seek to hide and secret the knowledge thereof under that dark and distasted Language wherein the Law is for the most part written? Not that I hold it any just excuse for the nescience or negligence of any, that our Books are not in *English*: since, first, it were easie for any diligent and intelligent man, specially if acquainted with the right *French* Language, to understand our broken or brackish *French* in a few days. Secondly, There be both Statutes and some other Law-books in *English*, which are neglected by the most. Thirdly, Though care hath been taken in Parliament in *Edw.* the third's time, that Lawyers should plead, that is, argue and debate Causes,

The Preface.

Causes, in *English*, which was often desired by the Nobles and Commons, till at last assented and enacted; and in Q. *Marie's* time care was taken, that the Commissions of Purveyors should be in *English*, to the end that all Subjects from or of whom they would take might both see them to be persons authorized, and so also in what manner they are directed to use their Authority, according to the Prince's pious and princely care, that his Subjects should not be abused by his Officers: Yet for this Affair, of having all the Law-volumes speak *English*, I have not heard nor read of any desire or endeavour in Parliament.

Fourthly, If the Annals and Reports were in *English*, they are so replete with Debates about forms of Writs, Returns, Pleadings, Essoigns, Imparlances, Protections, Vouchers, Aid-priers, and Counterpleas of both, and the like, as would easily distaste and discourage any,

2 & 3 Ph.
& Ma. 6. 6.
in fine.

The Preface.

not intending to profess and practise the Law, from versing much in them, or passing through them. This therefore, as I think, would not much effect the expressed desire.

10.

The thing (in my judgment) fit and fruitfull to produce that good effect would be, to have Extracts of the Materials of the Law, and that not without some good choice and selection, composed in way of Discourse, or Tractate expository, and that in *English*.

11.

I cannot well see or comprehend how any one Legal part or Theme may be more usefull to and for the generality of men, and consequently more generally expetible and wished for, then the *Office of Executors*. For who almost is there, who either is not, or may not be an Executor or Administrator; or at least hath not, or may not have to doe with them, either to receive from them, or to pay to them Debts or Legacies? Or who is there above

Forma

The Preface.

Forma pauperis, that may not be a Testator or Will-maker, to the guidance of whom, even in the choice of his Executors and contrivance of his Will, it cannot but be material to know the Office and Duty, the Right and Interest, the Power and Authority of *Executors*; yea of each one Executor, where there be divers; yea, to know who may be made an Executor, who not; who can make one, who not; how he may be fashioned, generally or specially; what shall come to him, what cannot be given from him; yea, what Goods or Chattels shall go from him, though not given from him? Besides the knowledge for those others necessary, of the safest Wards or Locks for Executors, their *Scylla* and *Charybdis*, and the best advantage for Creditors, &c. towards or against them. To me, considering what parts of Law were most behovefull to be communicated to all willing Readers,

The Preface.

ders, none appeared which could challenge of this the precedence, and therefore I gave it the first and leading place. Thus mine own thoughts. But how far this Discourse may be profitable to any, and to how many, *aliorum sit judicium*. How many know no more of these, then of the way of a Ship upon the Sea?

12.

Lastly, These are not intended for the Learned of our Profession, who have drawn, or can draw, out of the same Fountain which I did, and so need not my help; but for their sakes who are not Professors of the Law: yet so, as if any young Students may in any part receive fruit by my Labour, I shall not grudge or repine at their so doing. *Bonum quò communius, eò melius.*

The End of the Preface.

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
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THE
OFFICE
OF AN
EXECUTOR.

THE INTRODUCTION.



THE things considerable
touching Executors may
all, in effect, be reduced
to these three Heads,
viz.

1. Their *Being*.
2. Their *Having*.
3. Their *Doing*.

By the first I intend their Creation
or Constitution, with the incidents there-
of. By the second, their Interest, Frui-
tion, or Possession. By the third, their
Managing and execution of their Office.
This last was and is the thing principally

B

in

The Office of

in my intention, and the chief aim of this Discourse; but necessarily it must have some *Ingredients*, some *Concomitants*, and some *Consequents*: as he that travelleth from *London* to *York* to speak with *J S* must needs pass by and through other *Towns* and *Villages*, and speak with divers other persons in his *Journey* and *Return*. To come first to the first; therein we will consider these six things.

CHAP. I.

1. **W**Hether an *Executor* and a *Will* be such *Relatives*, that one cannot be without the other; and therein of the several kinds of *Wills*.
2. How and in what words an *Executor* may be made and created.
3. How he may be in special manner, different from the general, fashioned, limited, or qualified.
4. Who may make, or be made an *Executor*, who not.
5. What one may give or bequeath by *Will*, what not.

6. How

6. *How a Will or Executor once made may be unmade, and what shall amount thereto, viz. a Revocation total or partial; what to new Publication.*

Of the Relation between a Will and an Executor.



AS to the first; the very name of *Executor* purporteth in general one to *execute* somewhat, or to whom the *execution* of somewhat is committed or recommended. In one particular therefore an Executor of a Will must needs be such a one to whom the execution and performance of another man's Will after his death is commended or committed; or who is constituted or authorized by the Will-maker to doe him that friendly office. Hence it followeth necessarily, that a Will is the onely Bed where an Executor can be begotten or conceived; for where

no Will is, there can be no Executor : and this is so conspicuous and evident to every low capacity, that it needs no proof or illustration. On the other side, though much may be written in the name of a Will, many Legacies bequeathed, and many things appointed to be done ; yet if no Executor be named, there is no Will : for these two be so relative and reciprocal, as that one cannot be without the other ; if no Will, no Executor ; if no Executor, no Will. Yet here are two Cautions to be affixed : 1. That a man's Mind, Will and Intent touching the disposition of his Goods being declared, although for want of naming an Executor he die intestate, so as Administration is to be committed ; yet for that here is not onely an inchoation or inception of a Testament , but so far a progression therein as *testatio mentis*, that is, the manifestation of the mind of the party deceased, and owner of Goods ; therefore this mind and intention of the Intestate being notified and made known to the Judge, who is to commit Administration, is usually annexed (as I take it) to the Letters of Administration ; and meet so to be, for a direction for and to the Administrator,

Plow.Com.
185. in Wood
and Darcie's
Case, so ex-
pressly said.

Testamen-
tum, quasi
testatio men-
tis.

ministrator, as well as to the Will fully and perfectly made, but refused to be proved by the Executor, which is usual. Another Caution is; Where a man seised of Land in Fee-simple disposeth the same, or part thereof, by his Will in writing, this standeth good for the whole or part, according to the difference of the Tenure, although no Executor be named: so as the party dieth intestate, and Administration is to be committed, as touching his Goods; and yet hath a Will, as touching his Lands. This may seem strange: but the reason thereof is an Act of Parliament, inabling to dispose of Land by Will in writing; and for that, Land is not properly Testamentary; neither hath the Executor (if any be) any thing to do or intermeddle therewith: and therefore is the making or not making of an Executor, nothing pertinent to the validity or invalidity of this devise or disposition of Lands by Will. So as, though where there is not *Testatio mentis*, there is not *Testamentum*; yet may there be the first without the latter. Having now seen that Bequests of Legacies, without making of Executors, doth not amount to a Will: let us now consider whether the sole making of Executors, in the name of a Will,

without giving any Legacy, or appointing any thing to be done by Executors, whether, I say, this be or amount unto a Will or not; since here, upon the matter, nothing is willed, and consequently nothing rests to be executed by the Executors, whose office is, as hath been said, to execute the mind, will and intent of their Testator; and, *Ubi non est testatio mentis, non est Testamentum*, say the Canonists. For answer hereunto, confessing that indeed to be the office of an Executor, I yet conceive confidently, that in the case above put there is a good Will, and as a Will it is to be proved, and approved, for these reasons. First, for that the main part and principal part of an Executor's office, and that which concerns the soul of a Testator, (as our Books speak) is the payment of his Debts: now who knows not that the very making of an Executor is the constituting of such a person who is to pay all Debts? and for that cause and end is principally to have and enjoy all the Goods and Chattels of the Testators, and all sums of money to him owing. So as the naming of *A* and *B* Executors, is by implication a gift or donation unto them of all the goods and

*Sum. Silv.
fol. 32, b.*

and chattels, credits and personal estate of the Testator, and the laying upon them an Obligation to pay all his Debts, and making them subject to every man's Action for the same. And if the Law speak thus much, since *Quod necessario subintelligitur non deest*, what need then the party express it in his Will? If he had willed more then this, as to have given this or that in way of Legacy, it had been needful for him so to have set down in his Will; but there is no meer necessity that every man should give Legacies in his Will: the Estates of many will not doe more then pay their Debts, nor oftentimes doe so much; so as if they should give any Legacies, it must be a dead and a void gift. And suppose a man hath much more, and intendeth all to his Wife, Brother, or Sister, or other Friend, his Debts being by such persons paid; since the very making of the party Executor without any more amounteth to thus much, and effecteth this, what needeth then more words; *Frustrà fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora*; as we often speak touching Legal passages, It is needless to write four lines, where two be sufficient. Nor is *testatio*

The Office of

mentis here wanting, since the Testator hath made known who shall have the Administration of his goods for payment of his Debts : and it is to be presumed he had no more special Will, since he did not declare more, and left his Executors farther to have and to doe *prout Lex postulat*. And who can say here is nothing to execute? Is the suing for and collecting of Debts due to the Testator, and paying of Debts by him, nothing? Nay, it is, *in hoc negotio*, the *unum necessarium*. Besides, the making of an Executor is a designment of a person to be the Testator's Assign, to whom and by whom divers things may be feasible, by virtue of Covenants, Bonds, or other Assurances ; as after, where we come to shew how the Executor represents the person of the Testator, will appear : also of one who, as our Books often speak, is to dispose the Testator's goods for the best advantage of his Soul ; but instead of that, (since as the Tree falleth, so it will lie or rest) I will say, as is most for the honour and reputation of the Testator.

Of the kinds of Wills.

NOW Wills are of two kinds, or may be two ways made, *viz.* either by writing, or nuncupative, that is, by words not put in writing during the Testator's life; for after the Testator's death this verbal Will must be reduced to writing, and have the Seal of the Ordinary, or Judge Spiritual, thereto affixed: and then it is as effectual, and of as good validity, as if it had been in writing in the Testator's life-time; and so doth the Common Law allow and approve thereof.

4 Hen. 6. 10
E. 4. 1.
If it be written, and brought to & approved by the Testator in his life, it is a Will in writing.

14 H. 6. 5.
Vid. 5 H. 5.
1. M. 15. and
16 Eliz.

But I advise all to make Wills by writing, and not to leave them to the doubtful fidelity or slippery memory of Witnesses. For as of Leases parol hath been said, that they be Leases perjured, or of perjury; so of Wills parol may be feared. Besides, many times a man doth speak and declare this or that part of his Will, which his wife, child, or friend dissuading, he letteth that purpose and part of his Will to fall, and departs from it: yet Witnesses, wishing it to stand, will perhaps affirm it as part of the Will. As for a Will-gift, and disposition of Land of inheritance, if it be not fully written

written before the death of the Testator, or done so far (at least) as concerns the disposition of Lands, it cannot be for that part made good by reducing it to writing after his death. As for Goods and Chattels, it may. Yet if it be written before the death of the Testator, if it be never brought to him, or read to him after the writing thereof, it is good enough; and that not onely for Land, as the Case resolved in King *Edm. 6.* his time was, but also for Goods and Chattels, so as there be an Executor named. But whether shall we say this is a Will nuncupative, or in writing? And, surely, I think that this is a Will in writing, and not onely verbal, though it want subscribing: for we know that many cannot write their names, but onely marks, and what is that? Nay, suppose one wants hands, and cannot write so much as his name; yet doubtless this man may make a Will in writing, it being written by his direction, as his Will which he dictated: nor is the subscribing of the name of the maker any essential part of a Deed, much less of a Will, which needs not sealing, as a Deed doth. Now put we the case, on the other side, that many Bequests or Legacies be
named

8 E. 1. 6. Dy.

32.

named in a Wil, and many things expref-
fed to be done, and no Executor is named
in the Writing, onely by word of mouth
A and *B* be named Executors : This I
think confidently is no Will in writing ,
but nuncupative onely ; for that one effen-
tial part of the Will, *viz.* making of Exe-
cutors, is wanting in the writing. Nay ,
the appointing of him Executor who is na-
med in a Note left with *A B*, is no suf-
ficient making of an Executor , faith the
Summist. And of fuch nuncupative Wills
Mr. *Perkins* reasonably faith, that it pro-
perly hath place when one , fuddenly ta-
ken with ficknefs violent , dares not ftay
the writing of his Will, for fear of pre-
vention by death ; and therefore prays
his Curate and others to witnefs what his
Will is. To this Will not written there
muft be feven Witneffes , and fuch as
come not by chance , but are efpecially
called for that purpofe , faith the *Sum-*
mift.

Tit. de Teft.
Sum. Silv. f.
443. b.
If he furvive
and live a
long time,
not caufing
it to be
writ or atte-
fted by Wit-
neffes , me-
thinks it
fhould not
ftand as his
Will.
Id. fupra, fo.
444. b.

*What fhall amount to a making one Execu-
tor, or what words are requifite thereunto.*

HAVING before made to appear, that
the being of an Executor is an ef-
fential

sential part of a Will, and so *de esse*, and
 not *de bene esse* onely, of a Will and Te-
 stament: let us now see, first, by what
 words an Executor may be made; se-
 condly, *de modo*, in what manner it may
 be done, how the power and authority of
 Executors may be limited and di-
 vided. As to the first, though one do
 expressly by Will name or appoint any to
 be Executor; yet if by any word or cir-
 cumlocation he recommend or commit
 to one or more the charge and office
 which pertains to an Executor, it amount-
 eth to as much as the ordaining or con-
 stituting of him or them to be Executors:
 As if he declare by his Will that *A B*
 shall have his Goods after his death, to
 pay his Debts, and otherwise to dispose at
 his pleasure, or to that effect; by this is
A B made Executor, as was concei-
 ved by the Judges in the late Queen's
 time. And long before that it was held,
 That if one do will onely that *A B* shall
 have the Administration of Goods, he is
 thereby made Executor: yea, in the said
 late Queen's time, one giving divers Le-
 gacies, and then appointing that, his Debts
 and Legacies being paid, his Wife should
 have the residue of his Goods, so that she
 put

If *A B* be
 made Exe-
 cutor, and
 to him and
D some
 goods are
 devised to
 be disposed
 for his Soul,
D is by this
 an Execu-
 tor for
 these.

39 H.6. Dy.
 290.

M. 15 & 16
 Eliz.

21 H.6.6,7.

put in security for the performance of his Will ; by this, without more, was she an Executor , as was held by three Justices , (viz.) *Manwood* , *Harper* and *Moun-son* , in the Lord *Dyer*'s absence. And so also where an Infant was made Executor , and *A* and *B* Overseers , with this condition , That they should have the rule and disposition of his Goods , and payment and receipt of Debts , unto the full age of the Infant ; by this were they held to be Executors in the mean time. And if *A* be made Executor , and the Testator after in his Will expresseth that *B* shall Administer also with him , and in aid of him ; here *B* is an Executor as well as *A* , and if *A* refuse , *B* alone may prove the Will as Executor , notwithstanding it be onely said , he shall Administer with *A* , and in aid of him. Thus many ways , and by divers words of implication , one may be made Executor , although not expressly so named by the Will. But if *A* be made an Executor , and *B* a Co-adjutor , without more , he is not by this an Executor with *A* , as in *K.H.6.* his time was held : nor hath such Coadjutor or Overseer any power to Administer , or intermeddle otherwise then to counsel , persuade , and advise ;
yet

21 H. 6.6. yet I think he may, and in Conscience
 24 Ed. 3. should so doe. And if that will not pre-
 F. Exec. 121. vail to rectifie negligence or miscarryings
 29 Ed. 3. 39. in Executors, he shall well perform the
 trust reposed in him, if he complain in
 the Spiritual Court, or Court of Consci-
 ence: and it is reason, I think, that so do-
 ing upon just cause, his charges be born
 out of the Testator's estate, or the Execu-
 tor's purse who otherwise would not be
 reformed.

*How an Executor, or his Executorship, may
 be limited or qualified in special manner,
 different from the general.*

NOW let us see how this making of an
 Executor may be specially qualified.
 And first, the time may be limited when he
 shall first begin to be Executor; and that
 either certainly, or with some contingen-
 cy. Secondly, the creation may be con-
 ditional. Thirdly, it may be partial, or
 dividedly, and not intirely.

As to the first, one may appoint
 J S to be his Executor a year or
 more time after his death; this is good.

Sc

So also if *A* appoint *B* his Son to be his Executor when he shall come to full age, and in the mean time he dieth intestate. Again, one may appoint the Executor of *A* to be his Executor: and then if he die before *A*, he is Intestate untill *A* die. This creation may also be conditional, and the condition may either be precedent or subsequent. In the time of King *H. 6.* one did name *A* and *B* his Executors, and if they would not take it upon them, then *C* and *D* should be his Executors, and then there *A* and *B* refused, and the question was, whether in Suit against the Debtors of the Testator, *A* and *B* should join with *C* and *D*; as where four Executors be named, and two refuse, and the other two prove the Will, yet all four must be named in Suit against the Testator's Debtors, as was there admitted: but in the principal Case it was resolved, That the Suit should be onely in the name of *C* and *D*, for that the appointment of them Executors if *A* and *B* did refuse, did imply that then they onely should be Executors; and here all four were never made, nor intended to be Executors, but *A* and *B*, upon a condition subsequent

*Vide Gros-
brook &
Fox. Plowd.
A and B
made Exe-
cutors, but
not B to in-
termeddle
during the
life of A;
and good.
32 H.8. Bre.
155.
3 H.6. fo. 6.*

sequent, that they should not refuse; and *C* and *D*, upon a condition precedent, *viz.* if *A* and *B* did refuse. It is usual to make one or more Executors conditionally, that they put in security to pay Legacies, or, in general, to perform the Will; nor was it ever doubted, as I think, but that this was good: yet I should advise that such Condition be plainly thus expressed, *viz.* either thus, that if *J S* do put in security, &c. by such a day; then he shall be Executor, else not; or thus, *viz.* to make him Executor conditionally, that before he do Administer (Funeral perhaps excepted) he shall put in such security; else, perhaps, he being Executor till the Condition broken, in that mean time he may have disposed of all or most part of the Testator's estate. In the late Queen's time there was a Case remarkable to this purpose: One Willed, that if his Wife suffered *J S* to enjoy *Black-Acre* (being be-like part of a Joynture) for three years, then she should be his Executor, or else *A B* should: and the question was in the *Common Pleas*, Whether presently, before the end of the three years, she were Executor; or not till she suffered the

P. 33 Eliz.
Alice Francis
her Case.

the Land to be enjoyed three years; and it was held by all the Judges but the Lord *Anderson*, that she was presently Executor, untill she should disturb *I S.* &c. For upon that done, it was agreed that the Executorship would by virtue of the Condition be transferred from the wife to *A B*. But now during these three years might she have disposed of all the goods of her husband, yea, within one of these three years, and less time, and then have broken the Condition, and have left to *A B* a dry Executorship.

Now to the third Point, one may divide his Executor's power three ways, *viz.* Really, Locally, or Temporally. Really thus: He may make *A* his Executor for his Plate and Household-stuff, *B* for his Sheep and Cattel, *C* for his Leases and States by extent, *D* for his Debts due unto him; and so divide the Power and Administration of his Executors at his pleasure. He may divide them also or their power Locally: *viz.* *A* for his goods in *Com. Buck.* *B* for those in *Com. Oxon.* and *C* for those in *Com. Berk.* He may also divide them in Time: *viz.* his Wife or any other person to be Executor during her life, or during the mi-

19 H. 8. 3.
19 H. 8. Dy.
4. Hil. 33
Eliz. in com.
ban.

32 H. 8 Bro.
115.

C

nority

nority of his Son, or so long as she continues Widow, and after his Son to be Executor. So of like limitations or divisions, either for time, place, or things, where-with they shall intermeddle. Nay doubtless, one may be made Executor for one particular thing onely, as touching such a Statute, or Bond, and no more; and thereof good use may be made, as I think, thus. Many have Bonds, Statutes and Recognizances, for warranty or enjoying of Land, or freeing or saving harmless from incumbrances, in general or particular. Now he which hath these, selling the Land, may by Letter of Attorney lawfully assign them to the party who buieth the Land or Lease: but this notwithstanding, the interest remains in him who selleth, and by his Outlawry they may be forfeited, or by him released, any Bond to the contrary notwithstanding; and if he die, the interest in Law will be in and go to his Executors, and in their names onely Suit or Execution may be had and maintained.

Quer. If not
Assets in
Law, when
obtained.

Now then, if the Vendor, besides assignment, make, as to the Statute, Recognizance, or Obligation, onely the Vendee Executor: by this the interest, after death

death of the party, will be in him actually and really to his more safety, since none but he can release or discharge, nor any other name need to be used to sue, or take benefit thereof. But *Quar.* if the Vendee, his Heirs and Assigns, may be made Executors, so as that security shall go to them one after another, without renewed making of Executors. Thus if the party make no other Executor, he dieth Intestate as to the rest of his estate; and as to this specialty onely shall have an Executor, and must have a Will proved: And in case he do make another Will for his estate residue, there must be two Wills proved. But in the other case, where by one onely Will one is Executor for one part of the estate, and another for another, there being but one Will to be proved, one proving of it sufficeth. And though in the premises of a Will two be made Executors jointly and equally; yet there may be a *Proviso*, that one shall not meddle during the others life, so as they shall be Executors successively, and not jointly. And thus also to other purposes aforesaid, a subsequent Cause or *Proviso* may make the partition and division of authority. But if the *Proviso* or

19 H. 8. Dy.
6, 4.

clause subsequent be meerly contrary to the premisses, it will be void : as where two were made Executors with a *Proviso* or Clause, that one of them should not Administer his Goods ; this was, held void for repugnancy by *Brudenel* and *Englefield* Justices. But *Fitzherbert* Justice was of mind that it was not void, nor utterly repugnant : for the other might join in Suits, though not administer. And Justice *Shelly* was of a third opinion different from all the rest, *viz.* That here was a repugnancy ; but the last Clause should controll the Premisses : and so this one onely should be Executor.

Who may make an Executor.

SOME persons may be unable to make Wills, and consequently Executors. for that is all one : whosoever may make a Will, may make an Executor. There be nineteen several kinds of persons unable, as the *Canonists* say, to make Wills : but with many of them we will not intermeddle, because we find no mention of them in our Law. The persons principally and most usefully to be consider'd of by us are either the defective in understanding.

as

as Infants, Idiots, Lunaticks, and the like; or defective in power or Interest, as women covert or married, persons outlawed, attainted, convict, or excommunicate. Some touch we will give of others; as Aliens, Corporations, Villains, Monks and Friars. As for Infants and women covert, because much is to be said of each of them and their Administrations, we will forbear to treat of them in this place, but after will do it of each severally.

To begin with an Idiot; naturally he is not able to make a Will, as was resolved in the Spiritual Court, because he wants the use of Reason to conceive what it is fit for him to will: nor doth the Common Law oppose this, as I think.

3 Eliz. D.
203, 204.

A Lunatick, having *Lucida intervalla*, that is, some seasons of enjoying his right mind, and freedom from his Lunacy, may in those times of his right mind make a will & Executors, else not; for even one by age or sickness become of *non sana memoria* is unable to dispose of lands or goods.

One deaf and dumb born may make a Grant, saith Mr. *Perk.* if he have understanding, which is hard, as he confesseth, consequently much more a Will; but in the time of King *Hen. 1.* it is left a

Vide plus in
Perk. 5. 6.
33 H. 8.
Dy. 55, 56.
Vide 26 Ed.
3. 63. Lib.
Intr. 396.

18 Ed. 3. 53.
 26 Ed. 3. 63.
 So in effect
 44 Aff. p. 36.
 P. 31 Eliz.
 Pascalia de
 Fountain's
 Case.

Demurrer, whether a Deed by such be good or not. If but mute, he may wage his Law, and atturn by signs, and so perhaps by signs declare his Will. 44 Aff. p. 36.

An Alien may make or be an Executor, so as he be not an Alien enemy, for such cannot sue, as in the late Queen's time was held: but there the doubt was, whether a Subject of *Spain* were at that time to be held an enemy, no war being proclaimed between the Kingdomes, though hostility exercised.

As for persons Attainted, Convicted, or Out-lawed, it will be said, that these can have no Goods of their own; and consequently they can make no Wills, nor Executors; and it is not to be denied, that we find it pleaded sometimes by Executors, that their Testators stood out-lawed. But first it is clear, that all and every of these may have Goods as Executors to others, which neither are forfeited by Attainder or Out-lawry, nor devested by marriage or Villainage. Therefore, as touching them, they may make Testaments. And that all these sorts of persons may be Executors, is also evident. So also touching Villains, Monks; and
 Friars,

Friars, who can have no goods to their own uses. And that one attainted of Felony may have an Executor, appears by the Case in the late Queen's time wherein it was long debated, Whether such an Executor might maintain a Writ of Errour, or not, to reverse the Attainder of the Testator. And as for other Out-lawries, the Plea thereof by the Executors, that their Testator was and died out-lawed, proves not a nullity of the Will, or Executorship; for then they might have pleaded, that they were never Executors. But it tends to this, that no goods did or could come to them for satisfaction of the Debts, by reason of Out-lawry; yet it hath been delivered, not of old onely in many Books, but by some of late, that Debts upon Contract, where the Defendant may wage his Law, are not forfeited by Out-lawry, nor uncertain Damages for Trespas in Battery, or false Imprisonment, &c. *Quer.* of breach of Covenant. But goods taken away by a Trespasser, may yet be forfeited by the Attainder or Out-lawry of him from whom they were taken; for that the property in right still appertained to him, and he might have taken

29 *Aff.* p.¹
63. 49 *Ed.*
3. 5. 50
Aff. p. 15.
33 *H.* 6. 27.
9 *Eliz.* D.
26. 2. *Contra*,
Co. lib. 4.
fol. 95.
19 *H.* 6. 47.
30 *Ed.* 3. 4.
16 *Ed.* 4. 7.
5 *Ed.* 3. 53.
6 *H.* 7.

them again wheresoever he found them : therefore the Action for this shall not come to his Executor, but for the other not forfeited it may.

15 H.7. fo.7. Whether an Excommunicated person be able to make a Will or not, may be some doubt, since *Keble* denieth him ability to present to a Church; and in the very point anciently the opinion of *Canonists* hath been negative, but more lately grew affirmative.

*Summ. Silv.
tit. Testam.*

Who may be Executor, more.

42 E. 3.1.

AN Excommunicate person cannot sue, that is, proceed in Suit as Executor, till he be absolved, there being danger of Excommunication to all that converse with him; but this makes not a nullity of his Executorship, nor overthrows the Suit, but stays it onely from proceeding untill Absolution. As for persons attainted or outlawed, we have before spoken affirmatively in way of proof that they may make Executors, for continuation of the Executorship; so of Aliens and others before. Recusants convicted at the time of the death of any Testator are disabled to be his Executors.

21 H. 6.39.
A Clark attainted may be an Executor by-past.
Just.

Pascat. de Fountain.

But an Alien Enemy cannot sue as Executor.

P. 31 Eliz.

3 Jac. 64p.5.

Whether Corporations compound,
or

or consisting of divers persons, may be made Executors or not, I doubt. First, because they cannot be Feoffees in trust to others use. Secondly, they are a body framed for a special purpose. Thirdly, they cannot come to prove a Will, or at least to take an Oath as others do.

What a man may give or dispose by his Will.

HAVING considered of the makers of Executors by Will, and of them so made; let us now consider what by this Will may be disposed, given or bequeathed. And first, he who himself is an Executor cannot by his Will give or bequeath to any other the Goods, Chattels, or Credits he hath as Executor, the property not being altered; for that he hath not them properly as his own or to his own use: onely he may make a continuation of the Executorship, and his Executor shall have them as Executor to the first Testator, as was resolved by the Judges of both Benches in the late Queen's time. And if he be Administrator, the Bequest is then also void, nor then will they go to his Executor, but to a new Administrator; but on his Death-

*Bransby
vers. Gran-
tham. Plow.
Com. f. 525.*

*Hil. 20
Eliz.*

At any time
in his life
he may alter
the proper-
ty.

So 48 E. 3.
fol. 14, 15.
where the
Bequest was
to one of the
Executors, it
was held,
that the o-
ther Execu-
tor might
release it.

If sufficient,
otherwise to
pay all one
as if none.

48 E. 3. p.
14, 15.
11 E. 3.
Fitz. Tit.
Cond. 9.
where both
stated joint-
ly by one
Grant.
Differences
between
joint Te-
nants and
Tenants in
common,
holding by
several
Grants.

Death-bed he may give them by Word or Deed, though not by Will. Next, if a man have Debts owing to him, as many have much, it is considerable, whether by way of Bequest in his Will he can give away these to any from his Executors. And doubtless he cannot effectually in Law; they being not subject to Assignment unto any, except the King. So as if he give such a Debt to *A*, and such to *B*, yet must the Suit for them be in the name of the Executor; and so also the Release or Acquittance for them; and not in their names to whom the Bequest is. But when they be received, if there be no Debts to pay, the Executor ought to deliver them to the party to whom the Bequest is, and thereunto may be compelled in Court of Conscience, or in the Spiritual Court. Therefore the Case of the bequeathing money payable upon a Mortgage is in this manner to be understood to be good, and not otherwise, as I take it. He that is jointly with any other estated in Lands or Goods, can give no part by his Will, but all will survive: but by Act in his life he may dispose of his part; and the Assignee may dispose of his moiety by Will, yea, though

it be half an Horse or Oxe, that cannot be divided. So of a Lease of Lands, or Tithes, or Grant of Goods to two, *Habendum*, one moiety to the one, and the other moiety to the other; each may give his moiety by Will. But if one be possessed or estated for years, by Lease, Wardship, or Extent, &c. in the right of his Wife, or have the next avoidance of a Church in her right, he cannot by Will give or bequeath any of these; but, notwithstanding, they will remain unto his Wife upon his death: but yet his Gift or Grant of them taking effect in his life-time would bind his wife, and carry away the interest from her. If one be Tenant for the lives of one or more others, (as oft-times men take Leases for lives of younger persons then themselves) this cannot be by Will disposed of; for that it is no Chattel, nor is it within the Statutes of Wills, for that it is no state of Inheritance. Therefore let the party look to convey it in his life-time, lest it go to an Occupant, *viz.* him who first shall enter. If it be an estate in Land, he must either make Livery, have a Bargain and Sale enrolled, or Covenant to stand seized to the use of his Wife, or some of his

Another
kind of Tenants in
common.

his blood, or make a Lease for years determinable upon those lives. Good it be by bargain and sale for years, if the thing be in Lease; that so without Inrollment or Attornment the Rent may pass: else a bargain and sale may be made for a month or suchlike time, and then a Release or Grant of the Reversion in stead of Livery and Seisin. But if a man have a Lease for never so many years, determinable upon life or lives, that is, if such or such live so long, (which unskilled persons call a Lease for lives) this State may well enough be given and disposed by Will, because it is but a Chattel. If a man be seized in Fee or in Tail of Land having Corn growing upon it, and by his Will do give the Corn, and die before severance, this is a good Bequest; because the Corn should have gone to the Executor. So it is also of a Parson touching his Glebe, and a man seized in the right of his wife or his own right but for life. But as for Trees growing upon the ground, these can no otherwise be given by Will, then as the Land it self upon which they grow may be given; of which matter, as not pertaining to the Office of Executors, *viz.* how and in what manner Lands may be given by Will.

*Sta. Merton.
cap. 2. Vidue
possunt lega-
re tam de
dotibus quam
de aliis, &c.*

Quer. If the trees may be devised by the Statute of Wills, without giving the Land it self.

Will, I intend not to treat in these Discourses.

Of the Revocation and Countermand of Wills, and new Publication.

HAVING considered of the making of Wills and Executors, let us, before we come to the Probate, consider of Revocation; for that may take away the force of a Will rightly made. A Will therefore having two parts, viz. Inception, which is the making, and Consummation, which is the death of the Testator or maker of the Will, there is power in him at any time before death to revoke or alter his Will at his pleasure. Consider we therefore of Revocations, and also of new Publications or Re-affirmance of Wills, in whole or in part. As therefore a Will may be made by word, so also may a Will made in writing be by word revoked or disannulled: for since every making of a later Will is a Countermand and suppression of the former Will; and since a Will may be made Nuncupatively or by word, and so

Omne testamentum morte consumatur.

See the pleading of it by making a later Will.

Lib. Intra. f. 323. b. & 641. a.

so by making a verbal Will one may revoke a written Will : it will thereupon follow, that one by Word may express the alteration of his Mind thus far, that the Will by him formerly made shall not stand, but be revoked and annulled ; and this will stand, and be effectual ; so as if he after die, without making any new Will, or new Publication, or re-affirmance of the former, he dieth intestate, or without Will. As a Will may be wholly revoked, so also in part. Hereabout a good resolution was in a *Kentish* Case, where one *Ryete* by his Will in writing did give some Gavel-kind Land to one *Harrison*, and five dayes before his death, said, in the presence of Witnesses, that this Gift should not stand, and that he would alter it when he came home ; desiring them to bear witness of his Revocation. Now before he came home, he was killed by the said *Harrison*, who caused the Will in writing to be proved ; and after he was attainted and hanged for the murther, and his Son, by the Custome of *Kent*, (*viz.* the Father to the Bough, and the Son to the Plough) entred into the Land. And this manner of Revocation by word onely

only was held sufficient, although the Will in writing were not cancelled, nor defaced. And the like Resolution, for verbal Revocation, is implied in the Case of *Forse* and *Hembling*; where it being resolved, that a *Feme Covert*, or married woman, by word Counterman- ding and Revoking her Will formerly made, when she was a sole or unmarried woman, this was not effectual, nor of force, by reason of her Coverture taking away the freedom of her Will. Hereby it is implied, that another who hath freedom of Will may by word sufficiently revoke a Will in writing; and so was it since also admitted in the Case between Sir *Edward Mountague* and *Ieoffries*, touching the Will of Sir *Io. Ieoffries*: but where a difference was conceived betwixt saying, *I will revoke my will*, (which only expressed a purpose or intent, and therefore was no present Revocation,) and saying, *I do revoke it*, or, *It shall not stand*, or, *My Heir shall have my Land*; which crossed the gift of it by the Will. And as Wills may be wholly or in part revoked; so may also the Executorship of one or more of the Executors, and yet the Will may stand in all the other parts,

M. 28 & 29
Eliz. Co. lib.
 4. fol. 60.

7 *H. 6. fo. 13.*
M. 38, 39
Eliz.

parts, so as there be any one Executor or more unrevoked: but if all be revoked, then the whole Will is revoked, because no Will can stand without Executors: and this Revocation may be by word onely, without being expressed in the will, or any other writing. But I could wish all to express such Revocation in the foot of the Will, or that the name or names of the Executor or Executors so revoked be expunged or blotted out of the Will; and that this be done in the presence of some Witnesses, to testifie the act and intent of the Testator.

Again, Revocations may be by act in Law as well as in fact, or by direct and express terms: as in the said Case of *Mountague and Ieffries*, where Land being devised by Will, and the Devisor after making a Feoffment, though there were some defect in the Livery to make it effectual; or if he made a bargain and sale that was never inrolled, or granted the Reversion, but no Attornment had so as the Land passed not; yet in all these Cases the Will or Gift of Land stood revoked. But in case he had onely covenanted that he would have made such an estate, and not done it; this was hel

Vide 6 E. 6.
Dy. 74. &
3. & 47. &
Ma. 42. 2.

to be no Revocation. And so by some, in case he do but make a Lease, leaving the Fee-simple as it was: But of this *Quare*; And, if a difference may not be betwixt making a Lease for years and a Lease for life, which altereth the Free-hold. If a Lease for twenty years be bequeathed to *J S*, and after the Testator maketh a Lease for fifteen years, reserving a Rent; I take this to be no Revocation of the Bequest: but if the Testator, after this Will made, take a new Lease for a longer term, so as the former Lease is surrendred in Fact, or in Law; this must needs be a Revocation of the Bequest, or at least an Adnullation thereof; and that although the Bequest were generally of his Lease, not mentioning the number of years: for this which he now hath is another Lease, and not that which he had at the time of the making of the Will. So, if one give his black Gelding by Will, and after, before his death, he selleth or giveth away that Horse, and buieth another black one; this new-gotten Horse shall not pass by the Will, because it was not the Testator's at the time of making his Will. So also, if the Crop in the Barn be bequea-

D

thed,

thed in *October*, and the party lives till that time twelvemonth, having sold that Crop, and inned a new; this latter Crop shall not pass by the Will, and the former cannot.

Again, as Revocation may be by Alteration of the state of the Devisor in the Land devised; so may it also be by Alteration, in some case, of the state or quality of the person of the Devisor. As if a Woman sole make a Will, and after take a Husband, this, without any more, as is resolved in the Said Case of *Forse* and *Hembling*, doth work a Revocation or Adnullation of the Will; for that else it should be irrecoverable, since she, having lost the freedom of her Will, cannot actually and directly make a Revocation, as we before have shewed. But notwithstanding her Will be revoked; yet in case her Husband before or after marriage with her were bound or covenanted to perform this Woman's Will, if he so do not, by payment of the Legacies therein bequeathed, his Bond or Covenant will stand good, and be suitable against him: as was adjudged touching the Will of *Elizabeth Smaleman*, married after her Will made to one *Wood*, who first was bound to perform it. Yet another Case there is

of Alteration in the state of the Testator's person, which makes no Revocation of his Will; as if he being of sound mind and ability make a Will, and after becometh frantick. In this case this is no Revocation; so as his Will stands till his death irrevocable, if he recover not. Now of a Will revoked there may be a Reviver by a new Publication; and thereof now.

Of new Publications.

HAVING shewed how a Will may be revoked, and so lose its force; let us now see how, without making a new Will, that so revoked may be revived and set on foot again. And that is divers ways. As first, by a *Codicill* annexed after thereunto; as was resolved between *Betford* and *Barnecot* in the *King's Bench*. Secondly, by adding any thing to the Will, or making a new Executor. Thirdly, by express speech or word that it should stand, or be his Will: as I conceive to have been the better Opinion in the said Case of *Mountague* and *Jeoffries*; wherein yet was much difference of Opinion, both touching

M. 38. 29
Eliz. in Ba.
reg.

Revocation, and new Publication. If a man, having made a former Will, do make a latter, which is more then a bare Revocation; yet if afterward, lying upon his death-bed and speechless, both these Wills be delivered into his hand, and he required to deliver to one of his Friends about him that Will which he would have to stand, and to keep in his hands the other, and he thereupon delivereth to the Minister, or other his Neighbours, the first-made Will, retaining in his hands the latter, as was done in the time of *Edward* the third; here the former Will, though made void many years before by the latter, is revived, and shall stand as the partie's Will. But now put the case that a Bequest at the first is void; yet by Publication after it may be good: as if one give to *Sarah* his Wife a piece of Plate, or other thing, and hath no such Wife at the time, but after marrieth one of that name, and then publisheth his Will again; now this shall be a good Bequest. So if one devise Lands or Goods which one hath not; if he after do purchase the same, and then say, that his Will before made shall stand, or be his Will, it shall be

44 Aff. p. 36.

44 Ed. 3. fol.
33.

be a good Will and Bequest; for this, in effect, is a new making. And though most of the precedent Cases be of Revocation of particular parts of the Will, and not of the total; yet first, be it considered, that that part so revoked was, in effect, the substance of the Will; next, it is easily discerned, that if one part be revocable, so is another also. And thus Revocation may spread it self over the whole: Nay doubtless, the whole *uno flatu* may be revoked, as well as by parts; even as a Faggot may be put wholly into the fire, as well as stick by stick. And as the *Velleities* or disposing parts of the Will are revocable and revivable by new Publication, as afore said; so is also the constitution of Executors. As if one of the Executors names be stricken out, and afterwards a *Stet* be written over his head by the Testator or by his appointment, now is he a revived Executor. So if the Testator express by word, in the presence of Witnesses, that the party put out shall yet be Executor. But now I mean, where the Executor's name is not so blotted out but that it may be read and discerned;

for else the *Stet* is upon nothing: and if the verbal Re-affirmance should renew his Executorship, then must the Will be partly in writing, and partly Nuncupative, his name not being to be found in the written VWill.

CHAP. II.

Of the state of things instantly upon the Testator's Death, before any Will proved,

Here we will consider these several things.

1. *What is wrought by a Gift of a thing certain and known; as the White Horse, the Red Cow, &c.*
2. *What by a Bequest to an Executor.*
3. *What wrought by a Release in the Will to a Debtor.*
4. *What by making a Debtor or Creditor an Executor.*

AS touching the first, *viz.* the Bequest of a Chattel, real or personal, which the

the Testator had in possession: notwithstanding that, if the said Testator had by his Deed or writing, or but by word on his death-bed, or before, given these his goods, and died before they had been taken, he to whom they so were given might have taken them; yet in this case of Gift by Will, neither can the Legatee, *viz.* he to whom they are bequeathed, either take them or recover them from the Executor, or a stranger take them by any Suit at the Law, for that he hath no property in them; yea, if the Bequest be to himself who is made Executor, be it of Lease, Plate, Cattel, &c. they shall not vest nor settle in him as Legatee, but as Executor, untill express or implied election; but he is to have and take the same by way of Legacy. And the reason in both Cases is this, *viz.* That the Law prefers Debts and the satisfaction of them before Legacies, and ties Executors also to that rule; and therefore will transfer nothing from or out of the Executor, till he, having considered of the state of the Debts to be paid, & Goods out of which the same are to be paid, shall find that safely this or that Legacy may take effect without making any defect in payment of Debts, or drawing

1 & 2 P. &
Ma. Dy. 110.
a. & 139. b.
Vide Co. 8. f.
95 & 96.

Of the second, see
Co. 10. f. 47.
652.
So resolved
Pas. Trin. 37
El. in b. a. m.
onely Gaw.
contra Port-
man Pl. &
Simes Def.
See more of
this Tit. Le-
gacy; and
of the assent
of one Exe-
cutor onely.

upon him and his own Goods any Damage or loss, as a Waster, and thereupon shall assent to such Legacy. Thus now is the Law taken; but heretofore some Opinion hath run otherwise, *viz.* That he to whom any Bequest was made of a thing known and certain, might take it without any assent of the Executor; and that when to the Executor himself any Goods or Cattel, movable or immovable, was bequeathed, in case there were otherwise sufficient goods for satisfaction of Debts, the same should instantly upon the Testator's death, without any act or election by the Executor, be transferred into and unto him in his own right as a Legacy, and not remain in him as Executor. As for sums of money bequeathed, or so much in Plate or Rings, it is evident that they must be had by the delivery of the Executor: Yet hath the Legatee such an interest before delivery, as that, dying before payment, it will not go to his Executors. But, as I take it, no such person, to whom any thing certain is given by Will, can make any Gift or Grant of it before the Executor have assented to his having thereof: nor, perhaps, will the Executor's assent after the Grant

27 H. 6. 8.

Of late, perhaps, some single or sudden opinions may also have run that way: but in *Fortman's* Case the Point was divers times argued, and then adjudged as before.

To be bought.

Grant have such relation as to make good the Grant precedent: Why so yet, *Quere.* Of more then an Attornment of a Lessee, this see more after, which is a like Assent to the Grant of a *Tm. Legacy,* other? And *Quar.* if by the Outlawry thereabout. of the Legatee before the Executor's Assent this thing bequeathed be forfeited.

If without just cause an Executor will refuse to assent, he is compellable by Law spiritual, or Court of Conscience: yet if spiritual Court press to do, where is just cause to stay, a *Prohibit* lieth, *ut credo* for since Executors stand liable to recovery of Debts against them by Common Law, it is reason that Law enable them to keep wherewith to pay. And here yet note some seeming opposition in the Law: For where before great difference was shewed between a Devise or Bequest, and a Gift or Alienation executed in one's life-time; yet the Lord *Dyer* reports it to be resolved, That where a Lease for years was made upon condition that the Lessee should not alien in his life-time, yet a Bequest of this Lease by his Will was a breach of the Condition, as being an Alienation in his life-time.

3. Of a discharge by Will to a Debtor some question may be, whether to per-

perfect and make good this, so as the Debtor may plead it in Bar, there be no requisite, as in the former, an assent of the Executor. On the one side, since this giving is a forgiving, for he to whom it is bequeathed cannot otherwise have it then by way of Retainer, it may probably be said, that here needs no such assent of the Executors, as in the Case where any thing is to be transferred; for here is rather an Extinguishment and an Exoneratation, then a passage of a Chattel by way of Donation. On the other side, it is probable that, it being but a Bequest, and so a Legacy, since Debts are in Law and Conscience to be satisfied before any Legacies, therefore the Executor, having not sufficient otherwise to satisfy his Testator's Debts, may sue for this Debt, and refuse to suffer it to pass away as a Legacy. And to this Opinion do I encline as best for Creditors; and satisfaction of Debts is by Law respected as an act greatly concerning the Testator's Soul. But some will, perhaps, make a contrary doubt, that although there be an assent of the Executors to this discharge, yet it will not amount to a Legal Release; for that a Debt, at least if it be by Specialty, cannot

cannot be released but by Deed, and a Will is no Deed; for a Seal is not necessarily thereunto, though it be fit and convenient. Whereto I give this answer, that Will, though it be not properly and legally a Deed, for it may be good enough without a Seal, which is an essential part of a Deed; yet hath it the force and effect of a Deed: for as a Release cannot be made but by Deed; so neither can an Estate or Interest, though but for years, in Tithes, Advowsons, Commons, Fairs, and like things, be granted or assigned otherwise than by Deed: yet it is clear that such a state for years in any of these may be given by Will, as well as a Lease of Land; which proves a Will to have the force and effect of a Deed.

Not *de effe*,
but *de bene*
effe.

*Of making a Debtor or Creditor Executor;
and first of the Debtor made Executor.*

SUPPOSE we then that *A* and *B* being made Executors, the Testator was indebted to *A* twenty pounds, and *B* was indebted to the Testator twenty pounds, how do things stand presently upon death? First, it is clear that the Debt of

B to

21 H. 7. 31.
Plow. Com.
185. contr.
Danby &
Chake, 8 E.
4. 3.

And may be granted, that he should account before the Ordinary for it.

Yet it seems *Plowd.* 186. a. the Law was taken to be *ut supra.* 8 E. 4.

Though he never administer. 21 E. 4. 3. 81. 11 H. 6. 38.

2 R. 3. 20. per *Starkey*, & 22. per *Vavafor.* 9 H. 5. 13. Left a Demurrer in Trespass by all, against the Executor, who was Trespasser.

B to the Testator stands in Law extinct this making of him Executor being a Release in Law.

Therefore let Creditors take heed in making their Debtors Executors. And yet doubtless (methinks) such a Debtor made Executor should hold himself restrained in Conscience from taking benefit thereof, if (the Debt remitted) there should want to satisfie either Debt or Legacy of the Testator. And I doubt whether Court of Conscience may not justly find order, the Testator being perhaps ignorant of this point in Law, that this Debtor should be released by making the Debtor Executor.

And what is spoken of making the Debtor Executor, generally the same is to be understood of making any one of the Debtors Executor, where there be many joynt-Debtors: and so where many Executors be made, and but one of them is Debtor to the Testator; for they cannot sue without making him who is the Debtor also a Plaintiff, which he cannot be against himself. The like Law touching Actions of Trespass or Account. Yet of old, where one made his Bayliff one of his Executors together with *A* and *B*, who brought

brought an Action of Account against the
 dayliff in their two names onely, Justice
Merle held the Action well brought. This 3 E. 3. 23.
 was in the beginning of King *Edward* the
 third his time; but the contrary hath been 6 H. 4. 3.
 since resolved. Some also have held, that 8 E. 4. 3.
 though in the life of this Executor who Cook.
 was a Debtor he could not be sued; yet
 after his death, the surviving Executors 21 H. 7. 31.
 might sue his Executor. But that cannot be, 20 E. 4. 17.
 as I take it, for that the Debt was utterly 21 E. 4. 3.
 extinct by the making of him Executor, as 61.
 if the Testator had released it to him; yea, Plowd. Com.
 though his Executor died before he did 36.
 ever Administer or prove the Will. And Plowd. Com.
 like extinguishment of the Debt, if the 185.
 Creditor marry with one of the Executors 11 H. 4.
 of the Debtor: yet was there an Action of f. 83, 84.
 Debt maintained *temp. Ed. 3.* by the Hus-
 band and Wife against the Husband and 31 E. 3. Fitz.
 other Executors, upon an Obligation by Ex. 82.
 the Testator to the Wife before her mar-
 riage. But if a Debtor take Administration
 of the goods of his Creditor, this, me-
 thinks, should not discharge him, but that
 his Debt should stand as *Assets* in his hand,
 because the Intestate did no act to free him
 from the Debt.

The Debtee or Creditor made Executor.

Plow. Com.
185. By all
the Judges,
but Brook
Chief Just.
Plow. 185. b.
where the
goods be of
more value,
which shall
be so alte-
red?

See Plow.
Com. 544.
the like of a
Legacy of
20 l. given
to the Exe-
cutor.

Or if the
goods a-
mount in all
to no more
then this
Debt.

THis making of the Debtee Executor and so the party who both should pay and be paid the Debt, giveth him clearly power to pay himself before any other, if his Debt be by Specialty, or upon Record. Nay, some have held, that so much of the goods of the Testator shall be altered in property out of the Executor as Executor, into him as Creditor; but how that can be I cannot see: For whether it shall be satisfied out of the Lease and Chattels; real or personal, whether out of the Corn in the Barns, Cattle in the Fields, Plate, or Household-stuff this, till some election made by the Debtee Executor, cannot be known nor shall be effected by any operation of Law preventing the Executor's election in taking his satisfaction where and how he will. For certainly, as a Debtee Executor hath election to pay which Creditor he will first, so hath he election to pay and satisfy himself by what part of the Testator's goods he will yet, perhaps, if there be ready money in the Executor's hands, there shall be an alteration

ation of the property of so much there-
as was owing by the Testator to the
xecutor. And if there come not to the
nds of such Executor sufficient to pay
nself, he may have an Action of Debt
ainst the other Executors, or the
eir, as by some hath been conceived :
et let it be well advised of, whether, if
do Administer at all, and specially
he pay himself any part, he have not
ereby barred or disabled his Suit for the
fidue. But if he refuse to Administer
all, it were very unreasonable that
e should not be able to sue the other
xecutors : for so a Debtor might by sub-
ty make his Creditor an Executor with
hers, and take a course that his goods
ould come onely into the hands of those
hers, so as the Creditor could not
y himself; and consequently, if he could
t sue the other Executors, he should
us be stripped of his Debt by a sleight.
Quer. if he may bring the Action in
e name of the other Executors onely,
e Will being proved in his name as well
in the names of the rest; or whether the
ction shall be brought in his name
o, and then he be severed at his own
ayer. But against the Heir there is
none

See *Flow.*
Com. 185.
13 *H.* 8. 15.
11 *H.* 4. 83.
12 *H.* 4. 21.
20 *E.* 4. 17.
21 *E.* 4. 3.

Flow. 184. b.
& 185. b.
He is bar-
red; for he
cannot ap-
portion his
Debt.

12 H. 4. 21.
He may sue
the Heir, if
the Heir be
bound, and
he have not
sufficient
goods as
Executor.

none to join with him ; and him may he sue, if he have not Administred as Executor ; this admitted, that the Bond extendeth to the Heir, which without expresse words it doth not, though for the Executor it be otherwise.

Thus having considered of the state of things before and without any Will proved, or other act done by Executors ; we should now come to the point of the proof, but two things pertinent to it are in order precedent.

CHAP. III.

1. *What may be done by or to an Executor before proving of the Will.*
2. *Of refusal, and the things incident thereunto.*

Before Probate what may be done by or Executors.

AS to this, it is clear, that before proving of a Will by the Executor he may seise and take into his hands any of the goods of the Testator ; yea, enter in

into the house of the Heir (if not locked) to do, and to take the Specialties of Debts; and generally he may do all things which to the Office of an Executor pertain; (except onely bringing of Actions and prosecution of Suits.) He may pay Debts, receive Debts, make Acquittances and Releases of Debts due to the Testator, and take Leases or Acquittances of Debts owing by the Testator: yea, if before such proving the day occur for payment upon Bond made by or to the Testator, payment must be made to or by this Executor, though no Will be proved, upon like pain of forfeiture as if the Will were proved. Also an Executor may before Probate sell or give away any of the goods or catels of the Testator. And whereas the Assent of an Executor is necessary to the settling and execution of a Legacy, as before hath bin shewed; so as if one give me his white Horse or black Cow by Will; or any other well-known thing, I cannot after his death take it, though I come where it is, but am punishable by Action of Trespass at the Executor's Suit, if he do not assent: yet an Executor before the Will proved may give his Assent, and it will stand good. Yea, although

E . he

9 E. 4. f. 33.
47. 7 H. 4.
18. They
cannot sue
till they
have the
Will under
the Seal of
the Ordina-
ry.

Wray. 23 El.

he die after any of these acts done, the Will being never proved by him; yet these Acts so done stand firm and good as I take it. Yet (as I find) an Executor making his Will, and dying before he hath proved the Will of his Testator, his Executor may not prove both the Wills, and so become Executor to both the Testators. But in case the goods were after Debts paid, bequeathed to the Executor, his Executor may take Administration of the first Testator's goods with the Will annexed; as by Doctor *Drury* was in the late Queen's time declared to be the Law and course of the Court Spiritual; to which credit was given by the Judges of our Law and the Court *Star-Chamber*: for though the Book does not mention it to have been in *Star-Chamber*, it is else-where so reported. Yea an Executor, for goods of the Testator taken from him, or a Trespass done upon the Lease-Land, or a Distraint or Impounding of Goods or Cattel, may maintain, before the Will be proved, Actions of Trespass, or Replevin, or Detinue; for these Actions are upon the Executor's own Possession.

22 *Co.* 23 *E.*
Dy. 372.

Dy. in Plow.
Com. 281.
Case of
Greysbrook
and Fox.

But before the proving of a Will, an Executor cannot maintain a Suit or Action of Debt, or the like. And the reason is, for that therein he must shew forth the Will proved under the Seal of the Ordinary. And so, as I take it, must it be if he bring any Action for Trespass done or Goods taken in the Testators life-time; so as the Testator himself was intit'led to the Action, and it grows not upon the Executor's Possession. I find that an Executor granting the next Avoidance of a Church which to him came from the Testator, the Grantee maintained a *Quare impedit* without shewing forth the Will: But the Executor himself might so have done of his own Possession before the Will proved, and so without shewing it under the Seal of the Spiritual Court, as well as Actions of Trespass or Replevin, for goods taken after the death of the Testator: yet in the principal Case of *Greysbrook and Fox*, which was an Action of Detinue by the Executor for goods taken or detained after the Testator's death, the Plaintiff did shew forth the Will proved. But that proves not any necessity hereof; or that, if the Will had not been

34 P. & M.
Dy. 135. a.
Dy. in Plow.
Com. 281. a.

Plow. Com.
275. b.

proved, it could be no hurt to shew it forth. So upon his own Contract for the Testator's goods : as if the Executor sell Cattel or other goods of the Testator before the Will proved, he may for the money payable maintain an Action for Debt before he have proved any Will: and in this, and the Action of Trespass, there is no necessity of naming him Executor. Also, on the other side, an Executor may well enough be sued for Debts of the Testator before the Will be proved ; for he may not by his own act of delaying the Probate of the Will keep off Suits, except he will refuse in due manner, that so Administration being granted, there may be some body suable by the Testator's Creditors for Debts by him owing. And the usual Plea of the Defendant, to estrange himself from the Testament, is to say, that he neither is Executor, nor hath Administred as Executor. So as if he either be Executor *de jure*, or *de facto*, by his own Act of Administring, it sufficeth.

Of refusal to prove the Will, and therein of Administration, fore-cluding Refusal.

NOW touching this other point fit to be thought of before we meddle with the Probate, *viz.* Refusal to prove; we will thereabout consider these several parts. *viz.* First, how and in what manner Refusal may or must be. Secondly, in what cases or in respect of what Acts one named Executor hath lost or determined his election of Refusal or Acceptance. Thirdly, of what effect and operation the Refusal is; what difference where all the Executors refuse, and where but some or one of them. Fourthly, what Relation it hath.

Now touching the first: the Ordinary, before committing Administration, where Will is made and Executors named, if he know of it, must send out Process against the Executors, to come in and prove it: and if they do not come, they are to be excommunicate; but if they do come, if they, nor any of them, will prove, by reason of such Refusal the Ordinary may commit Administration: perhaps also they may be appointed Executors at a time future, and not presently.

3 H. 7. 14.

9 Ed. 4. 47.
3 Hen. 7. 14.
Plow. Com.
281.

9 Ed. 4. 33.
See Pl. 184. a.
If Debtee
made Exe-
cutor sue
the Ordina-
ry for the
Debt, this
amounts to
a Refusal of
the Execu-
torship.
M. 28 & 29
Eli. inter
Brooker &
Carter, in
ba. com.

Now Refusal cannot be verbally, or by word, but it must be by some Act entred or recorded in the Spiritual Court, and therefore must be done before some Judge Spiritual, and not before Neighbours in the Countrey; for that is not effectual. Yet Sir *Ralph Rowlet* making the Lord Keeper *Bacon*, *Catlin* Chief Justice, and the Master of the Rolls, Executors; they wrote a Letter to the Ordinary, that they could not attend the Executorship, and therefore wished him to commit Administration to one who did so, making every of their Refusals to be recorded: and this was held good. So as a Lease being by that Will bequeathed to *Catlin*, and he, after this Refusal, entring and assigning it to one, and the Administrator assigning it to another; it came in question between them whether had best right; and Judgement was given for the Assignee of the Administrator against *Catlin's* Assignee: whereas if the Refusal had been void, *Catlin* had continued Executor, and so his Title had been better. For in case the Ordinary himself be made Executor, there (saith the Book) he may refuse before his Commissary: and so was it there pleaded for the Arch-bishop of *Canterbury*, who was made Executor to Sir *Will. O'dha'le*.

9 Ed. 4. 33.
The Book
calls him
Cardinal of
Canterbury.

What

*What shall be such a meddling or Admin-
istring by an Executor, that he cannot
refuse after.*

AS to the second, where an Executor
hath Administred he cannot after-
wards refuse, because he hath already ac-
cepted of the Executorship, and so de-
termined his election: at least the Or-
dinary ought not to accept of such Refu-
sal, but should compell him to take upon
him the Executorship, as the Law was
taken both in the time of *Ed. 4.* and of
Queen Elizabeth. Yet if the Ordinary
do admit one to refuse, notwithstanding
that he have Administred, this stan-
deth good, as it seemeth conceived by
the Judges in the time of *Henry 6.* For
there the Executor commanded one to
take goods of the Testator out of the
hands of *J S*, who did accordingly, and
afterward the Executor refused before
the Ordinary, and Administration was
committed to the said *J S*, who brought
an Action of Trespass against the party
so taking the goods from him; and there

9 *Ed. 4.* 47.
Selling Land
as Executor
is Admin.
Dyer in Case
of *Greys-*
brook & Fox.
Pl. Com.
280. b.
Fas. 7 Eliz.
36 *Hen. 6.*
J. 7. 8.

the Refusal and committing Administration were admitted to be good: so perhaps, *Factum valet quod fieri non debuit*. And it well may be that the Ordinary did not know of the Executor's such intermeddling at the time when he did admit of his Refusal. After Refusal, and Administration committed, the Executor cannot go back to prove the Will and assume the Executorship: but if onely upon the Executor's making Default to come in upon Process to prove the Will, the Administration be committed; here the Executor may yet at any time after come and prove the Will, and so undo the Administration: as was in the late Queen's time resolved between *Bale* and *Baxter*.

Mich. 27,
28 Eliz.

But what if after Refusal it shall appear to the Ordinary, that the Executor hath Administred before his Refusal, so as had it been then known, the Ordinary should not have admitted him to refuse? whether now may he revoke his Administration, (for it is revokable) and inforce the Executor to proceed to proving of the Will? And surely, methinks he may; for that the Executor by Administring had determined his election, and accepted the office of Executorship:

Boxel's Case
in com. Ban.

Now he cannot both accept and refuse. Besides, we know that Creditors may maintain their Suits against him having once Administred; the Common Plea to free himself, and shew that he is not the party suable for the Testator's Debt, being that he neither is Executor, nor ever did Administer as Executor; therefore he having Administred, it will be found against him. Now it is not congruous that in the Spiritual Court there should be no Executor, and yet in the Courts of *Westminster* there should be an Executor. But since this point of Administring is so material to the point of being admitted or not admitted to refuse, we will here consider in this place briefly what shall be said to be an Administration by an Executor determining his election, and disabling his Refusal, and what not. Some will, perhaps, conceive, that the Act of the Executor in the fore-mention'd Case, where he onely commanded *J S* to take goods of the Testator's out of a stranger's hands, was no Administration; and it is true that in that Book it is passed in silence, and not expressly said to be an Administration. But the *L. Dyer*, in the Case of *Greisbrook* and *Fox*, speaking of that Case,

A being Executor did administer, and yet would not prove the Will. *B* took Administration; and being sued for Debt, did plead the matter *supra*, and it was held a good Plea; and it was found for him before Just. *Dothe-ridge ad Ox.* in a Stat. 2 *Carol. Reg.*

32 H. 6.7.

Case, saith expressly, that the Ordinar might there have rejected the Executor Refusal; for, saith he, when the Executor had once intermeddled, he should not have been suffered to refuse: so as he doth clearly admit that to have been an Administration. And elsewhere it is held, That if an Executor take goods of the Testator, and convert them to his own use, this is an Administration; yet if he do but take them into his hands, for some, without converting of them. If the Wife take more Apparel of her own than is necessary, this is an Administration; as the Book admits: but if by the assent and delivery of the Executor, it is not. More clearly, If one do either pay Debts of the Testator, or receive Debts, or make Acquittances for them, or demand the Testator's Debts as Executor, or give away goods which were the Testator's, or deliver money of the Testator's for Fees about proving the Will; all these be full and clear Administrations as Executor. But, saith *Fitzherbert*, if he onely lay out his own money for Fees, this is no Administration; so saith *Frowick*, if he pay Debts with his own money, and if he do it about the Funerals. But some difference

20 Ed. 4.
17. 6. 21
E. 4. 5.

21 Ed. 4. 5.
21 H. 6. 19.
20. 33 H. 6.
31. 8.
1 El. Dy.
166. 13 Ed.
5. Exec. 91.
334 M. 1. Dy.
135. 26 H.
8. 7, 8. 20 H.
7. Kelw. 63.
21 Ed. 4. 5.
20 H. 7. f. 5.
a.

may be between Acts done by one named Executor and by a stranger, *viz.* to make him an Executor of his own wrong; whereof we shall speak after, not in this place. If one being sued as Executor take upon him, and plead in Bar as an Executor; this is an Administration.

9 Ed. 14.2,
13. 33 H.6.
31. a.

Of the force and effect of Refusal.

AS to the third Point, *viz.* The force or effect of Refusal; first, it is clear that if there be but one Executor, and he do refuse, or being many, if they do all refuse, then is the party dead Intestate, and Administration is to be committed with the Will annexed, as is before said, nor can any after meddle as Executors. But in case there be divers Executors, *viz.* A, B, and C, and A onely refuseth, and the Will is proved by the others, there A continueth Executor notwithstanding his Refusal; so as he still may release Debts of the Testator, and Debts owing by the Testator may be released to him: yea, if Suit be to be had by or against the Executors, it shall not be in the name of B and C onely, but A also must be named as a Plaintiff or Defendant,

Cook l.3.f.
28. Cont. 18
E.2. Bro.8.
37.

22 Ed. 3.19.
15 Ed. 3.
Exec. 8.
41 Ed. 3. f.
22. 21 Ed. 4.
f. 24.

fendant, else the Action may be overthrown. For the Will being proved, the Executors therein named stand and continue Executors, notwithstanding any of their Refusals; as it was resolved in the latter end of the late Queen's time, according to divers former Resolutions. And therefore this Executor which hath refused may afterwards administer at his pleasure, and intermeddle with the goods as well as the others: yet, saith *Brooke*, Chief Justice, after the death of his Companion he cannot so doe; but then the Executor of him who proved is onely to administer. *Quod non est Lex.* There may be some difference between Suits by Executors and Suits against Executors: For when they themselves sue, they being privy to the Will and having the custody of it, must bring their Action in the name of all the Executors, according to the Will; but he that is to bring an Action against them need not, perhaps, take notice of more Executors than those that have proved the Will, or otherwise do administer: for it is no good Plea for themselves in an Action against them to say there is another Executor, without saying also that he hath administered, as it seem

42 El. Co. 9.
Jol. 36, 37.

4 & 5 Ph.
& M. Dyer
163. c. 6.
Contra 21
E. 4. 23, 24.

by divers Books. Nay, one Book in the time of *Henry 8.* goeth farther, viz. that if the Suit be brought against all, that one of them not intermeddling with the proving of the Will may plead that he was never Executor, nor administered as Executor. By this it should seem that Executors refusing, (I mean all of them, as no Will is proved) they in an Action against them may say that they were never Executors: but, methinks, they should not so plead, but shew the special matter, as was done in the time of *Edward 4.* the fourth.

33 H. 6. 38.
2 Co. 9. 37. 6.
32 H. 6. 25.
27 H. 8. 11.
per totam Curiam.

As for Relation, I will forbear to speak, till I come to proving; for that Probate and Refusal stand in the same state as touching Relation.

9 Ed. 4. 33.
Cc. 9. f. 36.

CHAP. IV.

Of Proving Wills.

NOW let us see touching the Probate of Wills what is considerable; and wherein, of these three or four parts:

1. *Where, and before whom, and how the Proof must be.*

2. *What*

2. *What shall be Bona notabilia, to intire to Probate.*
3. *What force or validity either a right or erroneous Probate hath.*
4. *What relation either Probate or Falsal hath.*

As touching the first Point, viz. How and where, and before whom, Wills are to be proved, briefly thus :

The proving is in the Spiritual Court yet in some Mannors, by Prescription Wills are to be proved before the Steward, though no Lands thereby pass, as appears by divers Books : and in the Mannor of *Mannsfield* is this Prescription ; and others, whereof *Tremaile* was Steward King *Richard* the third his time, as he declared. And the like I may tell of my own knowledge touching the Mannors *Comly* and *Caversham* in the County of *Oxford*, where I have kept the Courts for the Lord Vicount *Wallingford*, and found in present and frequent use. And it is said by the Judges in the time of King *Richard* 7. That this proving of Wills in the Court Spiritual is not ancient, but of later time. Yea it is acknowledged by *Linwood*, the Dean of the Arches, that it pertains not to the Spiritual Court of common right ; n

2 R.3.Fitz.
Co. lib.9.
fol. 43.

11 H.7.12.

so in use in other Kingdoms. The reason
 by the Law of *England* hath herein given
 way to the Ordinary and Court Spiritual, Plow. Com. 279.
 said by *Walsh* in *Greysbrook* and *Fox's*
 case to be the Piety and Integrity which
 presumed to be in those of that Functi-
 on, having charge of Souls. Indeed they
 are, as it seems to me, Executors of the
 New Testament, or last Will and Testa-
 ment of *Jesus Christ*, whereby great Le-
 gacies and Gifts are given to men, and by
 Executors to be dispensed and distributed:
 of which Distributers it is required, as 1 Cor. 4. 2.
Paul saith, *That they be found Faithful.* Acts 20. 27.
 And happy are they who with him can
 read *Plene Administravit, viz.* that they
 have fully Administred, as he did; much
 depending thereupon, *viz.* God's honour,
 the Blessing, Prosperity and Safety of the
 Countrey, the Piety, Justice, Conscience,
 Contentation and Salvation of men. As
 for Wills proved in *London* and *Oxford*
 before the Mayor, that is onely in respect
 of the Burgages within those places devi-
 able; but they were to be proved also
 before the Ordinaries in respect of the
 goods, and there onely where no Lands
 are bequeathed.

The proving then is to be before the
 Ordi-

*Vide fol.
proxim. Of
Bona Notab.
both in
Canterbury
and York.*

Ordinary, General, Particular, or Special. By General I mean the Metropolitan or Arch-bishop, before whom it is to be proved; in case the Testator have good valuable, called *Bona Notabilia*, in divers Diocesses whereof he is Superiour.

Of Bona Notabilia.

WHat shall be said to be *Bona Notabilia* is considerable; for thereabout hath been much diversity of opinion: Some holding that they must be of forty shillings value, some five pound, some ten pound; yea, some, that the value of a peny sufficeth to draw it to the Arch-bishop from the particular Bishop. But that difference of opinion conceive to be now cleared by a Canon made in the first year of King *Charles* his Reign at a Convocation then held whereby it is established, that five pound shall be the sum or value of *Bona Notabilia*; yet therein is this *Proviso*, that where by Composition or Custom in any Diocesses *Bona Notabilia* are rated at an greater sum, the same shall continue not altered. It is likewise thereby provided that if any man die *in Itinere*, viz. in his Jour

Canon 92,
93.

journey or travel, the goods which he then hath about him shall not cause that Administration shall be committed, or the Will proved before the Metropolitane.

Having considered of the value, now another Point observable is, what things shall be said to be *Bona Notabilia*. And as to that, Debts owing to the Testator are *Bona Notabilia* as well as Goods in possession, their value being answerable: yet, I think, if the Penal Sum of the Bond be but five pound for payment of a less Sum, although the Bond be forfeited, yet in the Spiritual Court, where respect to Conscience suppresseth the favouring of Executors, this will not be taken to be *Bona Notabilia*, viz. of five pound value, although in Law the whole Penal Sum be a duty. But if the Debt be five pound or more, though it be desperate, or due from the King, against whom no Suit can be, but onely by Petition, yet this will stand for and as *Bona Notabilia*, as I take it, in the Court Spiritual; though thereabout I can but conjecture, since the Rules of our Law determine it not. And this Point, touching the King's being Debtor, I find debated

21 Eliz.

ted in the late Queen's time, but not resolved, so far as I find. But there *Poham* at the Bar urged that no Debt should be *Bona Notabilia*; and if it should, yet not such for which no remedy by Suit, in that Case, the Queen being Debtor. Yet a farther Question Local is touching these Debts or things in Action, in what Place or Diocess they shall be said to be as *Bona Notabilia*, viz. whether the place where the Debtors be, or where the Obligations or other Specialties be. And as to this, the Law hath been taken. That because the persons of the Debtors be moveable, passant and transitory; therefore these Debts shall be said to be as *Bona Notabilia* where the Bonds or other Specialties be, and not where the Debtors inhabit and dwell. And so was not long since conceived by Justice *Walley* and Justice *Beaumont* in one *Preman's* Case, no other contradicting. Herein therefore many are mistaken, not only in respect that the persons of the Debtors do dwell in forein Diocess other then the places of the death of the Testator, or where his other goods were do take Administration in the Prerogative Court, though the Specialties remain

Goods considerable, or conspicuous.

Hil. 17 Eliz.
M. Com. Da.
Vide 13 and
14 Eliz. Dy.
305.

d where the party died, or his goods
fidue were. But in case the Debts be
ely by Contract, without Specialty,
en indeed they are to be esteemed *Bona*
Notabilia there and in that place where
e Debtor is; as the said Judges well con-
ived the difference. But in case Land
given to Executors for payment of
ebts or Legacies, this shall not be *Bona*
Notabilia, as I take it, though it be *Assets*.

*Of the validity and invalidity of
Probates.*

S to the third Point, we will first
see of what validity an erroneous
proof is, and thereabout we shall find
s difference. Admitting that one hath
e *Bona Notabilia* in divers Diocesses,
as of right the proving of the Will ap-
taineth not to the Metropolitan, and
the Will is proved before him; this
not meerly void, but stands in force till
e reversed by some Sentence upon Ap-
al; as was resolved between *Vear* and
ffries, in the late Queen's time. But
the other side, in case one have *Bona*
Notabilia in divers Diocesses, or a Pecu-
and a Diocess, and yet the Will is

22 Eliz.

proved before the particular Bishop within whose Diocess part of the Goods are; this is meerly and utterly void, without any Reversal. So also of proving some Peculiar. And in case one have *Bona Notabilia* both in the Diocess of *Cathbury* and in the Diocess of *York*; the Will must be proved either before both Metropolitans, if within each of their Jurisdictions there be *Bona Notabilia*, in divers Diocesses; or else, as I take it, there so be not in any of the places, then before the particular Bishops in those several Diocesses where the goods are. Or if within the one Jurisdiction Metropolitan the Testator had goods in divers Diocesses, and in the other but in one Diocess; then in the one place is the Will to be proved before the Arch-bishop, and in the other place before the particular Bishop, as I conceive. And so also of peculiar Jurisdictions. And in some places Arch-deacons have peculiar Jurisdiction ordinary, and power to test and Probates of Wills, and grant Administrations. But where any like error or mistake in proving is in these respects, it is cause for Reversal or of Nullity, according to the former difference: so also if there be false
h

ood in the proof, were it *communi for-*
â, that is, without Witnesses, or by exa-
 mination of Witnesses; yet may it in the
 spiritual Court be undone, if either dis-
 proof can be made, or proof of Revoca-
 tion of that Will once made, or of the ma-
 king of a latter.

Now, admitting the Will true and
 right, and also rightly proved; let us yet
 see the force and strength of the Proof or
 Will so proved. It being under the Seal
 of the Ordinary cannot be denied, saith
 the Book, to wit, whether this shewed
 forth be a Will proved or not; no,
 though the Proof be but indorsed on the
 back, *viz.* that it is so proved, saith the
 book. But notwithstanding the Defen-
 dant so sued may deny that the Plaintiff
 Executor, as not being concluded nor
 stopped by the Probate so to say. And
 the reason is, because the Seal of the Or-
 dinary is but matter in Fact, and not mat-
 ter of Record: nor are the Sentences of
 divorce and the like, in the Spiritual
 Court, Judgments or matters of Record,
 hath been often held.

9 Ed. 4. 47.
 22 Ed. 4. 50.
 22 H. 6. 52.

Plowd. Com.
 282. 44 Ed.
 3. 32. 19
 Ass. p. 29.

Of the Relation of Probate and Refusal.

Plow. Com.
281, 283.

AS for this last Point, both the Proving and the Refusal shall have Relation to the death of the Testator, as take it, to divers purposes. So as to Proving, saith the L. Dyer expressly and confidently in *Greislrook* and *Fox's Case* and the resolution also of the Case prove it. For there Administration being committed before any Will proved or notified to the Ordinary, as it should see, the Administrator sold some of the goods to *J S*, and after the Executors (proving the Will) brought an Action of *Detinue* for those goods against *J S*, who pleaded this Administration and Sale: and the judgment was given for him, as having the proving of the Will disproved Administration *ab initio*. But it is true that Judgment was given onely by 10 Judges; one being absent, and the other dissenting in opinion: yet I think it was right and according to Law, and the Refusal shall have the like relation; could not the Administration relate to the death of the Intestate, as it doth to the

18 H. 6. 12.
2. 9 E. 4. 33.
47. Not to
make good
a Release
made be-
fore.
Co. lib. 5. 18.

purposes, expressed in divers Books, viz.
 to have an Action of Trespass for goods ^{39 H.6.8.}
 taken before Administration committed, ^{2 Mz.Dyer}
 and to have a Rent growing payable in ^{110.}
 that mean time, &c.

What Fees to be paid upon Probate, or
 for Copies of Wills or Inventories.

Per Stat. 21 Hen. 8. Cap. 5.

*Where the goods amount not to above five
 pound, onely six pence to the Scribe.*

*Where they be above five pound, but under
 forty pound, 2 s. 6 d. to the BB. 12 d.
 to the Scribe.*

*Where above forty pound, to be taken but
 2 s. 6 d. to the BB. 2 s. 6 d. to the
 Scribe, or 1 d. for each ten lines of ten
 inches long, at the Scribe's choice.*

[These Sums are to satisfie both for
 Proving, Registring, Sealing, Wri-
 ting, Praising, making of Inventories, gi-
 ving Acquittances, Fines, and all other
 things concerning the same.

Where Land is given to be sold, neither
 F 4 the

the money raised nor the profits thereof shall be accounted as any of the Testator's Goods or Chattels; saith the Statute.

Note, that the Will is to be brought with Wax thereunto ready to be sealed and proof to be made of the Will, according to common Custom.

For making the Inventory, the Executor is to take or call to him two Creditors or Legatees of the Testator, and do so in their presence; or, in their absence or refusal, two honest persons, being the nearest of his kin; or, in their default, two other honest persons.

The Inventory is to be indented, and one part left with the Ordinary, and the other to remain with the Executor.

The Executor is to make Oath for the truth of it.

For a Copy desired by any, either of the Will or Inventory, no more is to be paid than before is allowed: for the Register, with the like election to the Secretary or Register, as is above said.

Mr. *Swinborn* saith, That an Executor is to swear, and, if it should be thought fit to be bound to make a true Account, when he shall be thereunto lawfully called

the Ordinary. Of this Account see in
page 274. And of Accounting some Books
of the Common Law make mention, as
3 *Edw.* the third, *Fitzherbert Exec.* 91.
Where *Trew* saith, that of a thing in Ac-
tion no Account shall be before the Or-
dinary; but *Parn* seems of a contrary opi-
nion. And elsewhere it is said, that where
Debtor is made Executor to the Debtee,
he shall yet account before the Ordinary
for this Debt: yea, as of money in posses-
sion, saith one; which others denied.

An Executor by wrong shall be drawn
to account before the Ordinary, saith
Moyle Justice. But saith *S. German*, he
may not force any to account against the
Order of the Common Law; (not shew-
ing what that is.) And *temp. Edw.* the 4.
it is said, at least by the Reporter, that
after the Will proved, the Ordinary hath
no more to doe: *quod non credo.*

Also of the Oath of an Executor di-
vers Books tell, but not to such purpose
as *Swinb.* but truly to perform the Will.

See also 31
E. 3. cap. 11.
An Admini-
strator shall
account as
an Executor,
Fitz. Ex. 91.
6 837. viz.
18 *E. 2. Tn.*
Brief.

48 *E. 3. 14,*
15. Of a du-
ty resting in
account it is
said, the Le-
gatee shall
have reme-
dy by Ac-
count in the
Spiritual
Court.

18 *E. 1. 4. f. 3.*
Moyle.

4 *H. 7. 15.*
per Wold.

9 *Ed. 4. 47.*
Doct. & Stu.
78. b.

21 *E. 4. 22.*

Plowd. Com.

544. 4 *H. 7.*

16. *Kelw.*

Rep. 64. a.

CHAP. V.

What things shall come unto Executors, and be Assets in their hands, and what not.

THE things which shall come to Executors are of great multiplicity, and would make a large and confused heap if tied together in one bundle or lump. I will therefore divide and sort them out in parts, after the best manner I can. First we will divide them into things Possessory, or actually in the Testator; and things in Action, or not actually in the Testator. Secondly, the Possessory into Chattels real, and personal; or (as some less properly express it) movable, and immovable.

Of Chattels real possessory.

These may be divided into two kinds, viz. living, and not living. The living are not many and various. 1. The Wardship of the body of another (be it by reason of a Tenure of the present Owner, or by Assignment from the King or other Lord of whom the Tenure was) is a Chat-

Chattel real, not personal, though it be
an interest in the person of another ; but
is in respect of a Tenure of Land or
other Hereditament, and is for years, *viz.*
during the Minority, or till Marriage had,
and so is real. Next, a Villain for years (as
by Grant for a term from him that had
the Inheritance) is a Chattel real. As for
an Apprentice for years, it is by Custom,
as I take it, that he goeth or is derived to
Executors : But, for reason after shewed, I
think this Interest be not in the reality,
but in the personality rather. So of a
Debtor in Execution for Debt, the Inte-
rest in him , or perhaps more properly in
his Liberty, is not, as I conceive, (for rea-
sons which after I shall express) a real,
but a personal Chattel. The like Law of
a Prisoner taken in Wars. As for Fishes
in a Pond , Conies in a Warren , Deer
in a Park , Pigeons in a Dove-house,
where the Testator had the Inheritance,
or but for life, in the Pond, Warren,
Park and Dove-house , they are not
Chattels at all, nor to go to the Execu-
tors, but to the Heir , with the Inheri-
tance. If the Testator were but a Ter-
mer, they are to go to the Executor but
as accessory Chattels , following the state
of

of their principal, *viz.* the Warren, Park, Dove-house, Pond, &c.

The real Chattels not living are either in Houses or Lands most usually, and that three ways. First, by Lease for years. Secondly, by Wardship of Lands held by Knight's-Service. Thirdly, by Extent upon Judgments, Statutes, or Recognizances; or in things issuing out of Houses or Lands, as Rents, Commons, Estovers, or such like. But where an Inheritor reserves a Rent upon a Lease for years, this shall not go to the Executor, but to the Heir, with the Reversion, other then Arrerages of it behind at the death of the Testator. Also Commons, Corodies for years, Advowsons, Tithes, Fairs, Markets, Profits of Leets, and such like, which the Testator had for years, all which may accrue any of these ways as the first, are Chattels real. Yea, one simple Presentation to a Church, upon the next Avoidance is a real, and not personal, Chattel, before it come to be void; and what then it is we shall after shew. And the title accrued to the Crown upon Attainder of Felony, where the party held not of the King, *viz.* the *Annum, Diem & Vastum*, that is,

is, power not onely to take the profits for a year, but to waste and demolish Houses, and to extirpate and eradicate Trees and Woods, is but a Chattel ; and therefore though granted to one and his Heirs by the King, yet shall go to the Executor, and not to the Heir.

Temp. E.1.
Assize 124.
Fitz.

Some doubtfull or less clear Cases touching Chattels real.

First, where we speak of Wardship, it is not to be understood of Wardship by reason of Soccage tenure, for that goeth not to the Executor, but he shall be next Guardian who now after the death of the first Guardian shall be next of kin, if the Ward continue under fourteen years old ; else he is out of Wardship. Secondly, if one have a Lease for three lives to him and his Assignes, this is no Chattel, nor shall go to the Executor, nor to the Heir, but to him who first enters and claims it as an Occupant, if no Assignment be in the life of the Lessee made : Contrarily of a Lease for many years, if three, or more or lesse, so long live, this is a Chattel, and shall go to the Executor. So an Extent upon

37 Ass. p. 11.

4 E.3. Aff.
166. Bro.
Chat. 15.

upon a Statute, yet it is delivered to the party as a Free-hold, *viz. ut liberum tenementum*; but that onely makes it to be *quasi liberum tenementum* as to the maintaining of an Assise, if wrongfully put out. Where one is seised in the right of his Wife of Land or other Hereditament, and is attainted of Treason or Felony, the profit thereof accruing unto the Crown is but a Chattel; and though the King grant it to one and his Heirs, yet it shall go to his Executors: And if one having a Lease for many years, *viz. 100, 500, or more or less*, doth devise and bequeath the same to *A* and the Heirs-males of his body, and for want of such Issue to *B* and the Heirs-males of his body, and dieth, having Issue a Son, the Term shall not go to his Son, but to his Executor or Administrator; for it cannot be made a matter of Inheritance. So if *A* had died without Issue Male, the Term should not have gone or remained to *B*, but to the Executor or Administrator of *A*; as was lately adjudged in the Exchequer between Sir Robert Lemknor and Mrs. Hammond. So of an Advowson, or any other Hereditament, granted or devised to one and his Heirs

for

r 100 years : or if such a Termer grant
 Rent out of the Land to *A* and his
 heirs, or the Heirs or Heirs-males of his
 body ; yet shall the same go to the Exe-
 cutor , and not to any Heir ; for it being
 derived out of a Chattel , cannot be any
 free-hold or Inheritance, but is it self a
 meer Chattel. *Partus sequitur ventrem.*

39 E.3.37.
 So Man-
 wood, if
 granted for
 life, it is but
 a Chattel.
 Plow.Com.
 524.

Of Chattels personal.

PERSONAL Chattels, or goods moveable,
 are also in like manner to be divided
 into quick or dead. The quick are
 Cattel of all kinds ; as Sheep, Horses,
 Kine, Bullocks, Swine, Goats, Geese,
 Ducks, Poultry, &c. There may be
 also in living Creatures reasonable an
 interest as in a Chattel personal ; as
 in the person of a man taken in Execution
 for Debt. And this I hold to be in na-
 ture not a real, but a personal Chat-
 tel, (as before was touched) for that Debt
 is the root of it, and the body is but a
 pledge or gage, dischargeable instantly
 upon Payment, Release, or other Dis-
 charge of the Debt. Like Law of a Priso-
 ner taken in the Wars ; for thereof and
 there-

No. na. br.
88. Reg. o-
rig. f. 102.
There is
mentioned,
that the pri-
soner was to
have 159 l.
for his ran-
som. Bro. no.
ca. 295. &
tit. Property
38.

1 H. 6. c. 5.

therein, as in a Chattel, hath the party a legal interest: as appears by a Writ of Trespass in that Register for taking away a Prisoner, viz. *Quare quendam Scutum Prisonarium suum cepit, &c.* And note lately, viz. in the time of King Hen. the 8th, the King himself; upon the winning of *Bullen*, bought divers Prisoners of his Subjects. And by a Statute in the beginning of Hen. the 6. his time the Interest in a Prisoner is mentioned: valuable, and coming from one King unto another; therefore, doubtless, shall go from Testator to Executor by death; and not to be infranchised or freed thereby. The interest which one hath in an Apprentice I take to be rather personal than real, though for years, because not springing out of any real Root, as Wardship and Villainage do, but out of a meer Contract. As for a Servant whose Master is dead, doubtless he is legally discharged, and is not Servant either to Heir or Executor: but meet and honest it is that one of them continue him in service, till a fit time of providing for him a new Master; and fit for him not to depart suddenly.

Now for things personal without life these

These are evident, viz. all Household-stuff, complements and Utensils, Money, Plate, Jewels, Corn, Pulse, Hay, Wood felled and severed from the ground, Wares, Merchandize, Carts, Plows, Coaches, Saddles, and such like moveable things.

More doubtfull Cases touching things Personal.

First touching things living. If the Testator had any tame Pigeons, or Deer, or Conies, or Pheasants, or Partridges; these, as well as Chickens, shall go to the Executors: so, though not tame, if they were taken and kept alive in any Room, Cage, or like Receptacle, as Pheasants and Partridges often be; so Fish in a Trunk, as also young Pigeons, though not tame, being in the Dove-house, not able to fly out; yet their Dams, the old ones, shall go to the Heir with the Dove-house. And if the Testator had any reclaimed Hawks, they also as Chattels personal shall go to the Executor, because they are things commonly vendible. And whereas Hounds, Grey-hounds and Spaniels be not so commonly bought and sold, nor so anciently have been; yet are they now grown to be

10 E. 4. 14,
15. Come of
wild ones.
22 H. 7.
Kelw. Rep. f.
88. 118. Co.
1. l. 11. f. 50.
18 H. 8. 2.

10 E. 4. 14,
15, and 18.
So of young
Hawks in
the nest. It
is Felony to
steal these;
ergo, they be
goods.

So an Hunter's Horn, a Faulkoner's Lure.

Hares, Deer, Pheasants, Partridges, wild Ducks, &c. are good meat.

a Merchandise, and why not ? for though they be for the most part but things of pleasure, that hindereth not but they may be valuable, as well as Instruments of Musick, both tending to delight and exhilarate the spirits ; a cry of Hounds hath, to my sense, more spirit and vivacity then any other Musick. Add here, that there may be some profit and advantage gotten by them, both *quoad adeptum boni, & ademptionem mali*, the getting of some good food, and the preventing of others, as Lambs, Conies, Fish, Poultry, by killing Foxes, wild Cats, and others, which destroy them. And we know that money is recoverable in Damages for taking away such, or a Master serving to keep an house ; so of Ferrets, to catch Conies, &c. Therefore they are valuable. But it may, perhaps, be objected, that none of these above are Cattel, and therefore not replevisable, consequently, no property in them ; for where more then one living Cattel is distrained, the Replevin is to be by the name of *Averia*, signifying Cattel. For answer, not to insist that one may have property in divers things whereof no Replevin lieth, as Corn or Hay not in Sacks nor in Carts.

Carts, Money not shut in bag nor box, &c. farther say, that even the word *Averia* may be applied to these: for so I find to Hens and Capons in the Book of Entries, viz. in the Writ of *Curia claudenda*, where Fol. 142^b the Plaintiff complains of the Defendant's not making his Mounds, *per quod Averia ipsius A, viz. Capones, Gallinae, & alia Averia ipsius A*, that is, whereby his Cattel, viz. Capons and Hens, and other his Cattel, came into the Plaintiff's house and garden to his damage, &c. And both *Newbert* and *Newdigate* hold that a Writ of Replevin lieth of such things. Though *Brudenel* were of contrary opinion, yet he Hen. 3. f. 3^a also held an Action of Trespass maintainable for taking of them, and therefore admitted a valuable property in them. Now come we to things without life; and first, to those abroad in the fields. Put the case that a man dies in *July* (before Harvest I mean) seized for life, or in Fee or Tail, in his own right or his wife's, or estated for years of Land in the right of his Wife being sown with Corn or any manner of Grain, the common saying is, *Quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit*: yet this shall go to the Executor of the Husband, and not to the Wife or Heir, who shall

G 2

have

Roots of
Carrots,
Parsnips,
Land sown
whereon is
ripe Corn.

have the Land, but Hay growing, *vi.* Grassie ready to be cut down, Apples Pears, and other Fruit upon the Tree shall go to the Wife; as also if there had been upon a man's own Land of Inheritance, they should go to the Heir, though the Corn should go to the Executor. The reason of difference is, because this latter comes not meerly from the Soil without the industry and manurance of man, as the other do: and I take Hop though not sown, if planted, and Saffron and Hemp, because sown, to pertain to the Corn to the Executor. All those yet that pass to one to whom the Land is sold or conveyed, if not excepted, though never so near reaping, felling, or gathering. But what if the Wife had the Lease for years as Executor to some former Husband or other Friend, and the Husband after sowing dies? who then shall have the Corn? Certainly the Corn shall go to the Executor of the last Husband, at least so much as is more then the year's value of the Land, or the making it up by addition of other things; for the value is to be *Assessed* for payment of Debts and Legacies. Put the case again, that the Husband and Wife were joynt-tenants of the Land then

For he was
Tenant for
life in effect.

When the very Corn growing shall survive to her together with the Land; and though the Husband sowed it, yet shall it not go to his Executor. Being in consideration of things growing on the ground, let us not forget to think of Trees sold by S seised of the Inheritance of the Land to J D, who dieth before felling; this interest is a Chattel, which shall go to the Executor, and not to the Heir of J D: but some colour may be that these, because fixed to the Soil and Free-hold, are real Chattels, as the interest in Land is, and not personal. So also of Trees excepted by him who selleth the Inheritance of the Land. But in both Cases I conceive this Interest to be personal, and not real; for that, as it is a propriety of Chattel in the Vendee or Vendor with exception, it stands in consideration severed and abstracted from the Soil or Ground where the Trees grow, though the Trees be not actually severed by the Axe from their Mother Earth. But if the Lessee for years or life do except the Trees, these continue parcel of the Free-hold and Inheritance. And after Corn reaped, and before Tithe set out, the Inheritor of the Tithe dying, I think the

The Wife also shall have convenient apparel. 33 H.6. 31. 2 Eliz. Dyer.

Co. li. 1. f. 48.

Executor; and not the Heir, shall have the Tithe after set out.

Of Houses,
or things a-
bout the
House, 42 E.
2. 6.

Now let us come home to the Testator's House, and see in and about it. Some doubt what pertains to the Heir and what to the Executor. Question hath been of old, and of late, touching Coppers, Leads, Furnaces, Fats for Dyers or Brewers, Pales, Rails, Glass in Windows, Tables, Dormants, Wainscots, Doors, Locks, Keys, and such like, to whom these should go, whether to the Heir or Executors. And in the latter end of *Henry* the seventh his time, an Executor taking a Furnace which was set in the middle of a house and not fixed to any Wall, the Heir brought an Action of Trespass against him for so doing; and it was adjudged for the Heir, *viz.* that this was to go as part of the Free-hold and Inheritance to the Heir. And long before, in *Edward* the third his time, it was debated, whether it were Waste in a Lessee to remove or take away a Furnace, or not: But I find no opinion delivered by the Judges. But in the late Queen's time, Justice *Walmesley* said that the Lord *Dere's* opinion was, that where the Furnace is not fixed to the Wall,

21 H.7.f.21.

42 E. 3. f.6.

Wall, the Lessee might within his Term
 take it away. Contrarily, if it were fixed
 to the Wall; for then it strengthneth the
 house. And yet, notwithstanding it might
 be in the one Case so removed by the
 Lessee, yet it is not there, as he said, a
 Chattel personal or moveable, so as it
 is detachable. And there the Case being,
 that a Clothier, being a Termor of an
 house, had fixed a Copper to the Wall,
 with Looms and Pricks necessary for
 his Occupation; a Judgment being had
 against him, the Sheriff delivered the
 Copper in Execution as a Chattel, and
 after the Lessee took it up, and it was
 taken from him by virtue of the Exe-
 cution: whereupon he brought an Acti-
 on of Trespas, and by all the Judges
 the Action was maintainable. And
 whereas it was found by the Jury, that
 by the Custom of *Kent* the Lessee might
 remove such a Copper; Justice *Beau-*
mont said, that without any Custome a
 Lessee might so doe at any time during his
 Term. But it is to be noted in the said
 Case, that the Furnace was by it self deli-
 vered as a movable Chattel, and not as part
 of the house; for that was not meddled
 withall, nor at all delivered in Extent, (as

*H. 37. Eliz.
 Austin's
 Case.*

in the Case between *Miles* and *Pra* where both House and Copper were delivered upon a Statute) the House belik being held upon such a rack-rent, as th the party did not desire to have it, for h might have had the whole being a Chat tel, and so have used the Copper durin the term. And as touching all other fixe things, the Law was taken in the sa case in *H. 7.* his time to be all one as i the case of the Furnace, *viz.* that the should go to the Heir; save onely that fo Glass in the windows, *Pollard* said it wa otherwise, *viz.* that that should go t the Executors, which none there denied. But since, in the late Queen's time, it wa otherwise resolved touching Glass, th it should not go to the Executors, and th like was there said touching Wainscots and so also by the Lord *Anderson* in th said case of *Austin*. And touching Poss fixed, for that they be parcel of th Free-hold, so also of Mill-stones, An vils, Doors, Keys, Windows, none of thes be Chattels, but parcel of the Free-hold or thereto pertaining, therefore not th Executor's.

Co. lib. 4. fo.
93, 94.

Things in
Gardens.

Now to come to Gardens also whereas I before laid down a difference be

etwixt things sowed, or not arising from the Earth without manuring, and such grow of themselves; it will thence be concluded that the Roots of Carrots, Parsnips, Turnips, Skerrets, and such like, coming and arising from yearly sowing, must go to the Executor, and not to the Heir; the case being so, that the Gardner and Sower had the Inheritance of the Garden or Soil. Now though in most places this can rarely be a question of value, yet about *London* and some great Towns it may, and therefore is not unworthy of a line or two, a thought or two, the rather, for that the reason of this case may give light touching right in other cases. And, in my opinion, these (notwithstanding there is a sowing and manurance to generate them and cause their being) shall go to the Heir, and not to the Executor. My reason is, for that the thing of profit is the Root which is hidden in the ground, and I hold it no reason, nor agreeable to Law, that the Executor should dig and break the soil and ground to search for her entralls: he is to content himself with that which is above ground, as Melons of all kinds, and the like, whose fruit is above the ground; but
as

as for Artichokes, though the fruit be above the ground, yet I think they have not such yearly setting or manurance as should sever them in interest from the Soil, therefore they shall go with it to the Heir.

Let us now consider of things, though not fixed to, yet usually kept in houses, *viz.* Writings and Evidences, whereabout generally no doubt can be, but that they follow the interest of the Land: so as if they touch Inheritance, they pertain to the Heir; if but Terms of years, Goods, Chattels, or Debts, they pertain to the Executor: yea so do Statutes and Bonds in Law, (howsoever otherwise in equity) though they concern the assurance and enjoying of Inheritance purchased. What if *A* mortgage the Inheritance of Lands to *B*, upon condition of redemption by payment of five hundred pound to *B*, his Heir, or Executor, and *B* dieth, the Deeds being delivered into his hands? now the Heir, not the Executor, shall have them: for though the money may be payd to the Executor, yet (mean-time) the Land descends to the Heir, nor is there any Debt to the Executor, for *A* may chuse to pay, or not. Put it
on

the other side, that the Land had been
 d for five hundred pound not paid to
 , but a Condition, that if not paid to
 n, his Heir or Executor, by such a day,
 en to re-enter; and *A* dieth: here is a
 ebt to the Executor, and no Land de-
 ended. to the Heir of *A*, yet shall the
 heir have the Deeds, for that a Condi-
 on is descended to him. Question hath
 en touching Boxes and Chests wherein
 e Evidences concerning Inheritance
 e: and although the better opinion in
 ur Books doth pitch upon this diffe-
 nce, that where they are sealed up,
 ey shall pertain to the Heir, other-
 ise, where not sealed; I cannot con-
 eive that difference to be grounded on
 ood reason, but rather think that Boxes,
 hich have their very creation to be the
 ouses or habitations of Deeds, should,
 ; appurtenant to them, go to the
 heir, whether sealed or not. On the
 ther side, Chests made for other uses,
 iz. the keeping of Napery or Ap-
 arel, shall not, as I conceive, be taken
 s appurtenant to Evidences. because some
 e in them, for so may other things also
 e: Nor as touching them can sealing be
 f any effect, but rather locking and not
 locking

41 E.3.2.
 36 H.6.26.
 18 Ed.3.4.
 3 H.7.15.

Que. If sole
 use that way
 make a dif-
 ference or
 not.

locking must make the difference touching them, if any difference by inclosure.

CHAP. VI.

Of things not actually in the Testator, but accruing to the Executors by or after the Testator's death.

THESE be of divers sorts : the first and chief whereof are things gotten and acquired by Action or Suit ; secondly, by Condition or Covenant without Suit ; thirdly, by Remainder.

Of things in Action.

TO speak first of the first, it is clear that Debts due to the Testator, be it by Bond, Statute, or Judgement, or for Arrerages of Rent, are not *Assets* to charge the Executor untill receipt of them : and it is clear that the Action to recover these doth pertain to the Executor, and that the Debt and damages recovered shall be *Assets* to charge the Executor. So also of Actions of *Detinue* and

of

f Covenant for any thing personal, or a-
y Chattel real, Lease, Wardship, or the
ke. But perhaps some will doubt of
Covenant touching Inheritance, viz. the
Insurance of Lands, or enjoying thereof
free from this or that incumbrance, or the
ke: Yet even in those cases, if the Co-
venant were broken in the Testator's life-
time, I think clearly the Action is ac-
rued to the Executor, for that his Testa-
tor was to recover damages in the Acti-
on of Covenant for that breach; and he be-
ing intitled to these damages as princi-
pal, and not any accessory thing in that
Action, the Law hath cast that Action upon
the Executor. And that is the cause why,
if Waste be committed in the life of the
Lessor by his Lessee, and then the Lessor
dieth, his Heir can have no Action for
his Waste, viz. because he cannot reco-
ver the treble damage; so neither can the
Executor have it, for that he cannot reco-
ver *locum vastatum*, the place wasted, the
inheritance whereof is in the Heir.

That the Executor at the Common
Law could not maintain an Action of
Trespas for goods of his Testator taken
away in his life-time, seems to be impli-
ed by the Statute in the time of K. Edward
the

A Church of
the Testat.
Inher. be-
come void
in his life
comes to
the Exec. as
a thing in
Action; but
is not *Assets*,
for not ven-
dible.

II H.4.32.
43 E.3.3.
No. na. br. 59.
4 E.3. c.7.

And the like
given to
Executors of
Executors
per Stat. 25
E. 3. c. 5.
17 E. 3. Fit.
106.

the third, which gives such Action. Y
it seems that a Replevin was maintain
able by the Executor, at least in some ca
ses, for goods taken or distrained in th
Testator's life-time. But in case the D
stresses were for Rent or Service, it is sa
a little after the making of that Statute
that the Lord may not now avow for h
Rent or Service, because his Tenant
dead, but must set forth the matter, an
thereupon justifie to excuse himself fro
answering damages ; and the Executo
shall by this Action recover the Catt
or Goods, and that by the Common Law
saith the Book , though the Statute

c. 21. meant,
ut credo.
21 H. 6. 1.
But Mark-
ham è con-
tra.

Marlebridge had never been made, fo
that the propriety remained in the Testa
tor. Note, it speaks not at all of th
said Statute of 4 *Edward* the third. B
Newton in the time of King *Henry* the
would have it, that the Executor in th
case should not have a Replevin, but a
Action of Trespass grounded upon th
said Statute, viz. 4 *Edw.* 3. which m
thinks cannot be by any means, by re
son of the Statute of *Marlebridge*, cap.
Non ideo puniatur dominus, &c. for th
Executor, as well as his Testator, is ther
by restrained, as I think, from the Act

21 H. 8. c. 19.
4 E. 3.

of Trespass against the Lord. As for
 that no Avowry can be made upon the
 tenant, that is now remedied by a late
 statute. The other Statute hath been ta-
 ken to extend to other things then goods
 moveable: for where a Church becom-
 ing void, a stranger presented thereun-
 wrongfully, and the Patron died; it was
 resolved in the late Queen's time, that
 the Executor might by the equity of the
 said Statute maintain a *Quare impedit*.
 But whether an Action of Trespass lieth
 against an Executor against him who spoiled
 the Testator's Corn, Grasse, or Wood
 growing, hath been questioned, but no-
 where resolved to my knowledge. I
 think it may lie with some difference.
 First, for that the Statute of 4 Edward
 the third doth not onely speak of
 goods carried away, as limiting the
 law to that Trespass solely and particu-
 larly, but speaks generally of Trespass
 done to Testators; and then brings in
 that particular of goods, as one Instance.
 Now there be many Cases of instances
 or ensamples given in Acts of Parlia-
 ment, which yet do not restrain the
 remedy or Purview to that particular, or
 from extending to other Cases of like na-
 ture.

The B. of
 Coven. & L.
 and Sale's
 Case M. 32
 & 33 Eli. in
 com. ba. So of
 Ravilth-
 ment. Pl.
 gard. 7 H. 4.
 2. & 7 H. 4.
 6. Eject.
 Firm. & Tild.
 De clauso
 fracto
 meerly it li-
 eth not.
 II H. 4. 3.
 This Periam
 Just. did ve-
 ry judici-
 ously urge in
 Sale's Case
 supra.

ture. Thirdly, the Stat. speaks of Trespass remaining unpunished, which it meant redresse: But it should still leave man unpunished, if it should have no large extent then to that one singular Trespass of Goods taken away, *viz.* movables. Again, the Testator was clearly intitled to a recovery of damages for this other Trespass, which if he had recovered, should have come to his Executor: Yea, the things themselves, all felled in the Testator's life, and partly though not felled, should have come to the Executor; therefore also the damages recoverable in lieu thereof, out of which (recovered) the Debts and Legacies of the Testator are to be satisfied. Beside, this Action of Trespass is a thing severed from the state of the Land, so that if the owner thereof had, after this Trespass done, aliened the Land, yet had not this Action remained to him, as we take it clearly. And why not, as well where a Trespass is done upon the Lands of the Lessee, and then the term expires? this doubtless doth not take away his Action, nor his Executor's. It methinks here may be some difference probably taken: as first, between a Trespass

pass in destroying or taking away Corn growing, and a Trespass in Grass or Wood growing. For the first being of that nature, as that, though the Owner had a state of Inheritance in the Land whereon it groweth, and should have died before severance and felling, yet it should have gone to the Executor, and not with the Land to the Heir; therefore doubtless doth the Action for destroying or taking away thereof accrue by the operation of Law to the Executor, in lieu of the thing taken or destroyed. Otherwise, perhaps, of Wood or Grass, which by the Owner's death should have gone to the Heir, and not to the Executor. And yet here again another difference, methinks, may be betwixt Grass and Grass, *viz.* betwixt that in Pasture and that in Meadow; yearly mowed and turned into Hay, not left to be consumed by the mouths of Beasts, as that growing in Pasture: For as the Law distinguisheth between these Soils, it gives precedency to Meadow, and makes it waste for a Lessee to plow it up, not so for Pasture. Yea, Tithe is paid of Hay, but not of Grass growing in Pastures: so the Meadow-grass, being in the Owner's pur-
H pose

pose and intention as a thing severe from the Soil, should, methinks, so be all in the eye and estimation of the Law, and therefore stand in a different state and account from Pasture-grass.

A third difference may be in the manner of the Trespass, *viz.* Where Meadow grass is eaten up with Cattel by a Trespasser, and where by him mowed and carried away as Hay : for in this latter case an Action of *Trespass* and *Conversion* for so many Loads of Hay is doubtless maintainable by the Executor ; though it should be admitted that in the other case, of consumption by the mouths of Beasts without severance, no Action should be maintainable by the Executor ; which yet I admit not, but think the contrary probable.

For when Meadow-ground, which yearly conceiveth, (*Sol sine homine generat herbam*) shall be ready to be delivered of her burthen, if a stranger put in a herd of Cattel, which swallow up and tread down this fruit of her Womb before the Mower with his Sithe come as a Midwife to help her delivery, if then by the hasty death of the Owner, before Action brought, this great Trespass should be dispunishable, it were

At least, methinks, Action upon the Case here and before should be maintainable.

ere, contrary, as methinks, to the purpose of the said Statute, and a great defect in the Law.

Yet here, perhaps, touching this fourth difference may be or arise out of the time of the death of the Owner, *viz.* where he dieth before time of Mowing, and where not; for *dato* that in the former case, because, if such destruction or consumption had not been, yet the Owner dying before severance, this should not have come to the Executor, but have gone with the Soil to the Heir, that therefore the Executor, who is not damaged, should recover no damages: yet in the other case, the Owner living till after Hay-time clearly passed, *viz.* till the end of *August*, methinks now, since his fruit of the Meadow's Womb should have been a Chattel severed, had not this Trespasser made unlawfull prevention; therefore the Executor, to whom the same should have come towards the performance of the Will, should have, out of the said Statute, an action and remedy reached unto him, to recover recompence in damages for this wrong done *in retardationem Executionis testamenti.*

A fifth and last difference may perhaps be in the state of the Owner : for *Posito* that where the Land is his Freehold or Copyhold Inheritance, no Action should be given to his Executor for Wood or Grass taken or destroyed in his lifetime ; yet where he is but Tenant for years, Gardian, or Tenant by Extent, so as the very state in the Land was to come and is come to the Executor , (together with *quicquid plantatur solo*) methinks the Executor should have , together with the state in the Soil, the Action to punish the Robber of or Trespasser upon the Soil. Thus having scanned and sifted , to the best of my ability , all differences and circumstances of this Point , how far I am wide and wherein right *Aliorum sit judicium*, or rather, *Altioris esto judicii*. But this is clear, that wheresoever Executors do recover any damages for Trespass or other wrong done to their Testator, the money recovered (at least if Execution be had, or money received) will be *Assets* in their hands, as well as Debts recovered upon Bonds, or Bills, or Lands by them taken in Extent upon Statutes, Recognizances, or Judgments. Yea, without ever having these moneys, Executors may mak

3 H. 6. 3.
Littleton, fo.
42. a.
So held in
Sale's Case
of damages in *Qua.*
imped. re-
covered.
Contr. of the
Present-
ment, Re-
leasing.
13 E. 3.
Tit. 91.

make them *Assets* in their hands, *viz.* by making Releases or Acquittances, or acknowledgment of Satisfaction; for this amounteth to a Receipt, and chargeth the Executors towards the Creditors with the whole penal sum, though haply they receive but part, as the principal, or some like proportion.

Therefore there is great caution to be used by Executors in this kind, that unless they be sure they have Goods sufficient to pay all Debts and Legacies, they make no Release, Acquittance, or Acknowledgment of satisfaction, for more then they receive, be it Debt or Damgages.

And the like caution is to be used by them touching submission of Debts or damages to Arbitrement, whereby discharges of the same may grow: for the submission to the Arbitrement being their voluntary act, although the Arbitrators by their judgment do discharge the Debt or damage in part, or in whole; yet shall the Creditors have like remedy thereupon against the Executors as if they had released, or, which is more, received the same.

Other Actions there be of Discharge, which as the Testator himself in his life-

H 3

time

Error 13 H.
4. 6.

46 E. 3.

Yet upon a

Verdict in

Quare im-

ped. the

Wife, not

the Execu-

tor of the

Husband,

did seize.

9 H. 6. c. 4.

time might have had, so may his Executor after his death, *viz.* Writs of Error Attaint, Disceit, *Audita Querela*, *Identitate nominis*. But this last is given by Statute. Whatsoever is regained by any of these ways as unduly lost by the Testator, shall also be *Assets*.

Special Cases pertinent to the Premises.

1. *Chattels come to the Executors from the Testators, yet not Assets.*
2. *Assets which be no Chattels.*
3. *Things in Action, and in the Personall turned into Chattels real, & e contra.*

AS to the first, I exemplifie thus : **A** makes *B* his Executor, and dies ; **A** makes *C* his Executor, and dies : the Goods left by *A* to *B* as Executor shall exceed his Debts and Legacies. Or let us suppose no Debts nor Legacies of *A*, at that *B* dieth much in debt above the Goods he leaveth, and did make no alteration of the property of the Goods of *A*, but meerly left them to *C* his Executor.

No

Now shall not the Goods which came to
 as Executor of *A*, and so from *B* to *C*, be
 able in Law to pay the Debts of *B* : yet
 Conscience methinks they should, and
 that *C* should not receive them to his own
 use, as in Law he may, where *A* left no
 Debts. But if *A*, making *B* Executor, did
 also by his Will give him all his Goods,
 and he in his life-time made election to
 have them as Legatee, or by his Will did
 dispose of them, or appoint them to go,
 as the Goods he had as Executor; they
 could not be otherwise given or disposed.
 Now by this election they were altered
 in property from being his as Executor,
 and so as his own Goods should be liable
 to his Debts. But things in Action could
 not be so given or disposed, *viz.* Debts,
 &c. Yet if *D* were indebted to *A* one
 hundred pound, and *B* his Executor took
 new Bond of him, or another for it, giving
 up the old Bond; now was it become his
 own Debt, and so shall stand in his Exe-
 cutor.

Another instance of this, thus : If *A*,
 Patron of the Church of *D*, grant to *B* the
 next Avoidance, the Church becomes
 void, *A* dies before he presents, his
 Executor presents, and hath the benefit

Or if a
 stranger u-
 surp in his
 life, and be
 dying, his
 Executor

recovers in
a *Qua. imp.*
as by Sale
was done
infra. Mich.
32 & 33 E-
liz. So held
in Sale's
Case, in com.
ban. Vendere
jure potest,
emerat ipse
prim.

of preferring his Son or Friend ; yet shall
this make no *Assets* in his hands for pay-
ment of Debts , for that he could not
lawfully take money to present. But if
B had died before the Church had be-
come void , then, because the Executors
might lawfully have sold it , the value
should be *Assets* in his hands , as I con-
ceive ; except perhaps the Incumbent had
died so hastily after *B* , that the Executors
had not time convenient to find out
Chapman and to sell it.

It in the other Case a stranger had pre-
sented, and got his Clark admitted, and
the Executors of *B* had in a *Qua. imp.*
recovered damages; the money so recove-
red should have been *Assets*. Thus much
of the first, *viz.* that some things of the na-
ture of Chattels may come to Executors
and yet not be *Assets*.

Touching the second, *viz.* that some
things may be *Assets* in the hands of Exe-
cutors which yet are no Chattels , I
shall give but two instances. First,
where a man leaveth a Villain for years
to his Executors , and the Villain pur-
chaseth Land in Fee-simple, and the Exe-
cutor entreth into the Land ; now hath
he Fee-simple therein, and this Land is
Assets

22 H.8. Br.
Villainage
46. If he die,
how shall
this be *As-*
sets in the
Heir ?

Assets for payment of the Testator's Debts. So if a man by his Will give Lands in Fee to his Executors, to be sold for performance of his Will; these (before the money thereby raised) are *Assets* both for payment of Debts and Legacies. But if the Lands had been given to be sold onely for payment of Debts, they should onely be *Assets* for that purpose, and not for payment of Legacies: and so if it were expressed to be for payment of Legacies singularly, this should not be *Assets* for Debts, as I take it. For since these are not *Assets* of their own nature, but so made by the Will and disposition of the Testator; methinks they cannot be otherwise nor farther *Assets* then as the Testator hath willed and disposed. But though Lands thus given were *Assets* before the Stat. 21 Hen. 8. cap. 5. yet how can it be so, since the very words of the Statute be, that if one do will by his Testament or last Will any Lands, &c. to be sold, neither the money thereof coming nor the profits taken shall be accounted as any of the Goods or Chattels of the Testator's; which I conceive to be all one as to say, that they should not be *Assets*?

for

3 H. 3. 63.
and so 2 H.
4. 21. If by
Feoffment.
Per Mark-
ham cap.
Just. con.
Rickhill.

See 9 Eliz.
Dyer 234.

9 H.D. 264.

14 H.D. 33.

for when an Executor denieth himself have *Assets*, the form of his Plea is *Quòd nulla habet bona nec catalla*, &c. Yet since that Statute, *viz.* in the last Queen's time, the Law was twice admitted or conceived still to be according to the third of *Hen. 6. viz.* that the Lands devised to be sold, or the money there coming, should be *Assets*. Indeed in neither of those Books is there any mention of the clause in the said Statute; and it is possible that it might be forgotten as in other Cases sometimes hath happened. But casting about how to reconcile those Books with the said Statute, and not to suppose the same forgotten at both times, both at the Barre and Bench (though, being but a short clause in the middle of a large Statute to other purpose, it might well so have been) at the last, though not hastily, I grew to conceive, that the said Clause being in an Act which limiteth the Fees of Ordinaries, and their Scribes, according to the value of the Goods of the deceased, and then bringeth in this Clause, that the Lands willed to be sold shall not be accounted as any of the Goods, &c. the Parliament meant thereby onely to exclude

clude them to this purpose, that they should not be accounted as part of the goods in the valuation, according to which the said Fees were to be rated: and though the words be general, that they shall not be accounted as any of the goods, &c. yet is it the more probable that the Parl. intended no farther then as foresaid, because that Clause after the Fees limited in answerableness to the values is brought in by a *Proviso*, viz. Provided always, that if the deceased will any Lands to be sold, the money nor profits shall not, &c. And thus perhaps it was understood and construed in the said late Queen's time; though no mention be of any remembrance of that Clause or Provision in either of those Cases reported by the Lord *Dyer*.

As for the third, viz. the changing of things out of the Personalty into the Realty, & *è contra*, I shew it thus: If a Debt were due to the Executor as Executor, by Statute, Recognizance, or Judgment, and he sue Execution, and have Land of the Debtor's in Extent; now is the personal duty turned into a Chattelreal. On the other side, if such an Estate by Extent, or a Lease for years mortga-

mortgaged, come to an Executor, and the Debtor or Mortgager payeth the mone due; now are these real Chattels turned into *Assets* personal.

Another special Case of Equity opposing Law

IF *A* be bound to *B* by Bond, Statute or Recognizance, for assurance of Land, &c. dieth, and the Land descends to his Heir; or be it that *B* sold the Land to *C*, and assigned to him the Bond, Statute, &c. yet must the Suit or taking out be in the name of the Executor of *B*, and neither of the Heir nor Assignee. And that which is recovered or gotten in Extent will be *Assets* in Law to charge the Executor, as I take it; yet in Equity it pertains to the Heir or Assignee. *Quære*, if the Executor meddle not, but onely suffer his name to be used.

Of things come to Executors by Condition.

First, we will consider of Conditions bringing back to Executors Goods or Chattels granted away by their Testators. Touching which there is no doubt, but if the Condition be any other then for payment of money, or other things

valuable by the Testator or his Executor, the Chattels returning to the Executor are *Assets* in his hands: as put the Case a Lease for years, Horses, Sheep, Plate, or other Chattel, were granted by the Testator to *A*, upon condition that if *A* did not pay such a summe of money or do such other act as the Testator appointed, &c. and this Condition is not performed after the Testator's death; now is the Chattel come back to the Executor, and his *Assets*. But the question hath been, (and perhaps may be) where the Condition is, that the Testator or his Executors shall pay the money to make void the Grant, and accordingly the Executor after the Testator's death payeth the summe out of his own purse, not having any money of the Testator's in his hands: in this Case coming in question *Impore Hen. 7.* it was resolved at the last, that this redeemed Chattel should not be *Assets*, but be to the Executor as his own proper Goods; though at the first three Judges were of contrary opinion, viz. that the Goods redeemed should be in the Executor as Goods of the Testator. And truly I must confess, that I cannot yet finde good satisfacti-

on

21 Hen. 7.

on in that Book's resolution, except we shall take the Case there to be such that which is put and reported by the Lord *Dyer*, *tempore Hen. 8. viz.* that the money paid for redemption was as much as the full value of the Good pledged or mortgaged; or else shall admit the Case to be, that this redemption was not by payment at the day conditioned. As to the first, it were rare if any should lend money upon a Mortgage, where the thing mortgaged is not of better value then the money lent; rare also that an Executor should take care to redeem with his own money that which should yield no benefit or advantage to him, or his Testator. Let us therefore scan and examine the Point, since the same may come frequently in use: and thus we may the more decently do, because the Lord *Dyer* in the Margent of the Case by him reported, as aforesaid saith expressly, that the said other *tempore Henry* the seventh was not at all adjudged, himself having viewed the Roll which he there sets down, and the name of the parties. We will therefore put the Case thus: *A* possessed of a Lease for sixty years of one hundred pounds
 Lane

and mortgageth it for five hundred
pounds; or be it that the Mortgage or
Pledge be of a Jewel or piece of Plate
worth half the value; and now before the
debt is limited for payment and redempti-
on, *A*, having made *B* his Executor, dieth,
and *B* at the time and place maketh
payment as was conditioned: Now the
question is, whether this Lease, Plate, or
Jewel, being worth much more then the
sum for which it was mortgaged, shall
remain in him wholly in his own right and
for his own use, or partly, if not wholly,
as Executor to *A*, so as to be subject to
the payment of Debts and Legacies.
Here it must be clearly admitted, that
B was enabled to this redemption one-
ly and meerly by the Condition an-
nexed to the Mortgage or Pledging.
It must also be admitted, that this
Condition, and the power or interest to
enjoy the benefit thereof, came to him and
was derived onely as Executor of *A*. This
being premised, it must needs follow, (as
it seems) that the Condition wor-
king and having his operation in the re-
demption to destroy the Grant, Mort-
gage, or Pledging, it must needs make
the things again the Testator's Goods in
statu

in quo prius, and so to be in *B* as Executor; since in that right onely he intituled to take benefit of the Condition. For what is it which hindered, be this, from being the Testator's Good nothing certainly but onely the force and strength of the Mortgage or Pledge. Now by the Redemption that is become void, and hath lost its force; therefore the property of these things must needs be as if no such Mortgage or Pledge had been, or as if it had the first been void and of no force. Thus must the Condition work for him who made it, *viz.* *A* the Testator: and those of the contrary opinion in the time of King *Henry* seventh do yet say, that by this Redemption the Testator is so much indebted to the Executor as he disbursed the Redemption; which could stand with no reason, unless by it the property and Interest should be reduced to the Testator's behoof. That thus it is, also proved, as to me it seems, by the Case of Mortgage of Inheritance, upon which the Heir making payment, according to the Condition, is not new in as a new Purchaser, but as Heir

as he shall have his Age, and be in Ward even for this Land; yea, it shall be *Assets* in his hands for satisfaction of his Father's, as other Ancestors Debts: which in some respect is a harder Case than that of the Executor; for he hath means to satisfy himself of the money disbursed, either out of the thing redeemed, or other goods of his Testator, but the Heir hath no such means. Yet it will be asked, how the Executor can be free from mischief: for if this thing redeemed be intire, as the Cup or the Lease, the whole will be taken in Execution for the Testator's Debt. To admit this, yet here is one clear way of remedy, *viz.* The Executor may before such Execution sell the thing, and so pay himself, and retain the Surplusage to the Testator's use; and the like of this is frequent in use, *viz.* for Executors to pay off the Testator's Debt with their own money, and to make themselves satisfaction out of the Testator's goods. Besides, it is not impossible that this redeem'd thing should be thus in interest parted, that answerably and proportionably to the Sum disbursed for redemption, with reference to the value of the thing redeemed, a moyety,

or third part, or three parts thereof, should be to the Executor in his own right, as his own proper Goods, and the rest in him as Executor. As *posito* that *A* and *B* were Tenants in common of such an entire Chattel: *A* maketh *B* his Executor, and dieth. Now hath *B* one moiety as Executor, and another as his own proper, and upon a Judgment against him as Executor, that moiety onely which he hath as Executor must be taken in Execution. And here may be remembred, how in Execution of a Judgment, or levying of an Amerciament out of an entire Chattel of more value then the Sum to be levied, the whole is to be sold, and the Surplusage above the Debt or Amerciament is to be delivered back to the Owner. For in all this debate we must presume the thing redeemed by the Executor to be of better value then the Sum paid, else we may easily admit the whole to the Executor.

Again, the Lease for years is not so entire a thing, I mean the Land let, but thereof Partition may be made, yea, enforced by Action, between Joint-tenants and Tenants in common. But here will be objected the Case of Redemption by the

the Daughter and Heir, who though she hath a Brother born after, so as now she is no longer Heir, yet she shall, as the Book saith, retain the Land redeemed from the Heir as a Perquisite or Purchase. For this, (which I will not oppose) the Law so frameth to the favour of the Daughter, because of great mischief to her, if, being stripped of the rest of the Inheritance by the birth of a Brother, she should also lose that which her money had redeemed, without having any remedy to have her money again or any recompence for it. But in the other Case there is no such mischief, for that the Executor may pay himself, as hath been shewed.

Now on the other side, if the Case shall be understood that the Redemption is by payment after the day, then will easily admit that the property or interest is in the Executor to his own use; and that the Condition now having no power to reduce it back; or to operate any thing, it is rather a Re-emption than a Redemption, since it was at the Will of the Mortgagee to dispose it at his pleasure; and any Stranger, as well as the Executor, might thus have redeemed.

med, *viz.* repurchased it : therefore onely Equity, and not Law, in that Case can make any part of the value *Assets* in his hands. And so also, I think, if we should admit in the other Case of payment at the day that the property of the Chattel is to the Executor as his own, and not his Testator's goods, no part of Surplusage or value can in Law be *Assets*, howsoever in Equity.

Lastly, if the Executor redeem by payment at the day with the Testator's own money or goods, none will doubt but that the thing redeemed is in him as Executor, and the money by him paid for Redemption is well Administred, the goods redeemed being of better value. But this way it makes no difference whether the whole value of the goods redeemed shall be held *Assets*, and the money paid for Redemption stand drowned therein; or that that Sum be still adjudged in the hands of the Executor as *Assets*, and onely the Surplusage of the thing redeemed over and above the Sum paid for Redemption.

Things accrued by Covenant or Assumption.

If *A* covenants with *B* to make him a Lease of such or such Land by such a day, and *B* dieth before the day, and before any Lease made; now must *A* make the Lease to the Executor of *B*, and the Lease so made to him shall be in him as Executor, and consequently as *Assets*. This is proved by the Judgment in the Case between *Chapman* and *Milton* in the late Queen's time. Yet I confess that it is not expressed in the Resolution of this Case that this Lease should be *Assets*, but that the Executors should have the Term as Executors, which implieth as much in my understanding; and the Declaration whereupon the Defendant demurreth sets forth the breach of that Covenant to be *in retardatione executionis Testamenti*; so as the damages thereupon recovered, viz. 330*l*, were *Assets*, and consequently also should the Term have bin in lieu and recompence hereof these Damages were given. The like Law, if *A* assume upon good consideration to deliver in to *B* by such a day 10 quarters of Malt, or so many Loads of

I 3 Coals

Coals or Wood, or any other Wares or Merchandise, and this is not performed in the life of *B*, but after to his Executor; it shall be to him as Executor, and shall be *Assets* in his hands, as well as the money recovered in damages for not performing should have been.

Of things accrued by Remainder or Increase.

IF a Lease be made to one for life, the Remainder to his Executors for years, and he dieth; this will be *Assets* in the hands of his Executors, though it were never in the Testator, as was in the latter end of the late Queen's time resolved by three Justices, the Lord *Andersson* only being of a contrary opinion: and there it was said that *Cranmer's Case* wherein the contrary in effect was resolved, was of little Authority, for that there were first two Judges against two, till after *Mounson* changed his opinion, upon conceit that there the Estate was by way of use, which could make no difference. Like Law, where a Lease for years is by Will bequeathed to *A* for life, and after to *B*, who dieth before *A*; although *B* ne

had his term in him so as that he could grant or dispose it, yet shall it rest in his Executor as his Goods, and be *Assets*. As for a Remainder for years so the Testator that he might grant or dispose it at his pleasure, no doubt can be thereof; though the same fell not in possession to the Testator in his life-time, yet no scruple nor doubt can be but that it is *Assets* to the Executor, even whilst it continues a Remainder, and before it falleth into possession, because it is presently valuable and vendible.

Nor much of other nature to these are the Cases where the Executor merchandizing with the Goods of his Testator taketh gain thereof.

11 H.6.35.
per Babington.

So if the Sheep or other Cattel of the Testator do breed, *viz.* bear Lambs, Calves, Colts, &c. after the Testator's death, even these which were never in the Testator shall yet be *Assets*; and the Wool growing upon the Sheep after the Testator's death. But there is one Case worth the consideration, and worthy of some doubt, as I think, and that is this: One leaveth to the Executor a Lease for years of Land worth 20 pound by the year, and the Executor,

keeping this in his own hands one year after the Testator's death, doth make thereof thirty pound in clear gain above all charges; now whether, as to a Creditor, this whole thirty pound shall be *Assets*, or onely twenty pound. And this Case, simply thus put, shall be understood of an occupying and manuring without any stock of the Testator's; and therefore if the Executor did stock it with his own Sheep or other Cattel, as he must have borne the losse by rot or death, so is it reason that, if the Manurance prove gainfull, he reap the fruits thereof in recompence of his adventure, and of his industry, skill, and good Husbandry. But if the Testator's stock of Sheep and Cattel were (as of necessity, or for the better advantage of the Testator's Estate) continued upon the Lease-Land, then is it reason that the gain or losse, whatsoever of them God sendeth, do redound to the Testator's Estate. Like Law (as I think) if an Executor, finding that he cannot instantly after the Testator's death let the Lease, I, and near the value, shall therefore buy seed-Corn, and hire the Plowing &c. But it may be said, that the Lease hath one entire valuation at the first upon the Appraise-

Appraisement. To this I answer, first, that the value upon the Appraisement is not binding, nor much respected at the Common Law : if it be too high, it shall not prejudice the Executor ; if too low, shall not advantage him : but the very value stand by Jury, when it comes in question whether the Executor have fully Administered, or have *Assets* or not, is that which is binding. Next I say, that if a long lease come to Executors of Land worth a hundred pound by the year, and no sale made thereof by the space of a year or more ; now the term continuing of the like value as at first, it is no reason but this hundred pound raised the first year should go towards the payment of Debts and Legacies, rather than any of them should be unpay'd. These things, I mean the knowledge of them, are usefull two ways, *viz.* First, to give light to Executors, to discern what unto them of right pertains : Next, to shew unto Creditors and Legatees what, and how far, things shall be *Assets*, that is to say, Goods to enable, charge, and bind Executors to pay Debts and Legacies. For whatsoever any of these ways cometh to the Executors from their Testator, or
is

is recovered by any of these Actions, shall be in their hands *Assets*, the cost and charges of recovering deducted.

CHAP. VII.

What manner of Interest an Executor hath in his Testator's Goods and Chattels, and how different from the common Interest which they or others have in their own proper Goods.

THE Interest which an Executor hath (as Executor) in the Goods of his Testator is much different from the absolute, proper and ordinary Interest which every one hath in his own proper Goods, as may well appear in and by these Points. First, Although a Stranger take away these goods, the Action of Trespass for the Executor is of general form, *Quare bona sua cepit*, calling them his Goods; whereas a man outlawed in Debt, &c. or convicted or attainted of Felony or Treason, forfeiteth all his own Goods, yet these which he hath as Executor shall not be forfeited. If a Villain be made Executor, his Lord cannot

24 E.3.f.35.

32 H.6.34.

take these Goods, though he may take the Villain's own Goods: and for taking such goods, or for a Debt due to the Testator, a Villain may sue his Lord. Nay, if the Executor grant all his goods, the good opinion hath been, that these which he hath as Executor should not passe; yea the Lord *Dyer* so held in the late Queen's time, with this difference, viz. Where the Grantor is named Executor in the Grant, there the goods which he hath as Executor should passe; but otherwise, if he be not named Executor in the Grant. And that this opinion is probable, will farther appear by that which followeth.

Secondly, The Executor cannot by Will give or bequeath the Goods he hath as Executor; and if he die intestate, and Administration of all his Goods is committed to *J D*, yet hath he nothing to do with the goods which the Intestate had as Executor to his Testator: Thus *all his goods* reacheth not to his goods as Executor.

Thirdly, Whereas a man's goods stand liable to the payment of his Debts both in his life-time and after; the goods which a man hath as Executor are not to be taken

Lit. tit. Villainage 41, 42. 10 E. 4. f. 1. Yet 39 H. 6. f. 15. A release of all Actions by an Executor extinguishes Actions as Executor. But *Frowick* is against it in 26 Hen. 7. Kel. 64.

See these so resolved in Pl. Com. 5. 25. inter *Bransby & Grantham*, P. 20 Eliz.

taken in Execution for his own Debt either upon a Recognizance, Statute, or Judgment had against him. And if such a one die indebted, leaving to his Executor much goods which he had as Executor; these are not *Assets* in his hands liable to the payment of his Debts, but only for the payment of the first Testator's Debts or Legacies. Therefore

Quo minus brought by an Executor, shewing that he was not able to pay the King's Debt because the Defendant detained from him an hundred pound, which he owed him as Executor to *J S*, was overthrown; for that it could not be intended, saith the Book, that the King's Debt could be satisfied with that which the Plaintiff should recover and receive as Executor. Whereas a Woman being possessed of any Chattels personal, *viz.* moveable goods, all are devested out of her into her Husband by her Marriage, so as if he die, and she over-live, they be not her's again, but her Husband's Executor or Administrators; and if she die, all be the Husband's, without being Executor to his Wife. It is not so of the goods which she hath as Executor; these still remain in and to her, if her Husband die: and

the her self die, for that she hath them
it were in another's right, *viz.* as she
presents the person of her Testator, her
husband shall not have them, if he be
not his Wife's Executor, and so Executor
her Testator.

Lastly, Whereas the Writ of Trespass
seems to make no difference between
one's own goods and those he hath as
Executor, that being a possessory Action
: Suit grounded upon the Possession;
yet come to an Action of Debt, which
more tastes and participates of the right,
and there are they differenced: for
where for my own Debt, when I sue, the
Writ saith, *Debet & detinet, viz.* that the
Defendant owes me and detains from me
that Summe; yet when I sue as Execu-
tor, the Writ saith not *Debet*, he doth
owe me, but *Detinet* onely, he detains
from me, as admitting that he is not Deb-
tor to me, though he should pay me. And
so where I am sued as Executor, the
Writ makes me not a Debtor, but a De-
tainer; otherwise, where in my own
right I owe, and I am sued for a Debt.
Accordingly, where Judgment in an Acti-
on of Debt is given against one as Execu-
tor, it is not generally that the Plaintiff

This may be
in his name
onely out of
whose pos-
session the
goods were
taken.

Co. l. 5. f. 31.

shall

34 H.6.45.

shall recover against him, but he shall recover of the goods of the Testator; and therefore upon this Judgment no *Capias* lieth against him, to enforce him to pay by Arrest of his Body, because he is not properly Debtor. But if after it be returned, that he hath wasted the Testator's goods out of which the said Debt should be satisfied, then, he having made himself a Debtor, a *Capias ad satisfaciendum* shall be awarded against him, and then he shall be taken in Execution. So also in some Cases of false Plea pleaded; for when the Judgment is *de bonis propriis*, the Plaintiff may have a *Capias ad satisfaciendum*; and that Judgment is in divers Cases for the Damages, although not in many for the Principal. As for the *Capias* before Judgment, in the main Process against an Executor, that is because of his Contumacy in not appearing upon the former Process.

The reason of this different Interest between an Executor and another, or between the same man's having Goods as Executor and others in his own right, as also of the different manner of one being indebted as Executor and otherwise in his own right, is well expressed

the Lord Cook in *Pinchon's Case*, viz.
 first, that the Goods which one hath as
 Executor he hath not in his own right,
 but in *auter droit*, that is, in the right of
 another, meaning his Testator. Second-
 ly, that Executors are but the Ministers
 and Dispensers, or Distributers, of their
 Testators Goods.

Co. lib. 6. 88.
 b.
 See this also
 Plow. Com.
 5. 20. a.

*alteration of Property in the Executor's
 hands, so as some Goods become his own,
 which he had as Executor.*

TO this Head or Chapter, treating of
 the difference between the Interest in
 Goods as Executor, and others had meer-
 ly in one's own right and to his own use,
 it is not impertinent to consider how that
 which one hath at the first as Executor
 may be changed in Property, and become
 the Executor's own to his own use, as o-
 ver his Goods which he had not as Exe-
 cutor. Here let us first consider of ready
 money left by the Testator: for since
 pieces of money, viz. shillings, groats,
 pence and half pieces of Gold, cannot
 be known one from the other, it must
 needs follow, that these coming to an
 Executor from the Testator, must in some
 sort

fort be altered in Property, so as the Executor shall be said to have much in money or value, yet can it be discerned which money in his hands was his Testator's, and which his own. Consequently the Sheriff upon the *Faciās* for a Creditor, who hath recovered against the Executor a Debt owing to the Testator, cannot take away money in Execution as the Testator's, in my opinion. *Quære*, if thereupon a *Devastavit* be returned, or what shall be done.

2 El. Dy. 185.
This divers
Books affirm,
20 H. 7. 4.
& Kel. Rep.
59. & 2, 3
El. Dy. 117.
6 H. 8. Dyer
fol. 2. a.

But what if the Testator were indebted to the Executor, or if the Executor having ready money of the Testator's otherwise, shall pay a Debt of the Testator's with his own money, what shall be said of the Conversion or Alteration of some of the goods from being his as Executor, to be his meerly in his own right. Hereof I have shewed elsewhere conceiving, which is briefly thus; That except either he have in his hands more of the Testator's, (for of that it is easy to make a proportionable change) unless the summe to him owing from the Testator, or by him paid for his Testator, amount to the full value of all the Testator's Goods in his hands, or do

need the same, no Alteration can be, untill
 some Election or Declaration by the Exe-
 cutor made which of the goods, not ex-
 ceeding the Debt unto him, he will have
 to be his own: For where the Testator's
 goods exceed this Debt to him, the Pro-
 perty of all cannot be changed; and of
 that part shall the Law adjudge the
 change, till choice by the Executor? It
 is good therefore for him to doe as the
 Mother-Guardian in Socage, who is
 to endow her self, calling her Neighbours,
 and expressing to them which part of the
 land she will have for her Dower. So
 let the Executor doe. But let him take
 heed that his Election or Declaration ex-
 ceed not his Debt, lest it be void. And
 that such particular Election is to be
 made, seems to me proved by the Case of
 1 E. 4. fol. 21. where the payment of
 money, and detaining or taking of a Horse
 of the Testator's, is mentioned. But *Choke*
here says, this cannot be done without the
 Ordinary's Assent. And the Reporter
 thinks, though the Ordinary do assent, yet
 the Property shall not be turned into the
 Executor as his own.

Plow. 554. So
of a Legacy
in money
given to the
Executor.

See 2, 3 *Elz*
Dyer 187.

K

Another

Another Alteration is of the profits of the Lease come to the Executor from the Testator : For since no more thereof shall stand in the Executor as *Assets* than so much onely as exceeds the yearly value according to the resolution in *Hargrave's Case*, it must needs follow that the residue of the profits must be the Executor's, he paying the Rent out of his own purse ; as that Case resolves in consequence, viz. that he shall be sued for it in the *Debt* and in the *Detinet* onely as for the Rent due before the death of the Testator. Thus though he have the Lease as Executor, yet part of the profits are meerly his own, not as Executor.

And looking back upon this Case, we may discern a necessity sometimes of the Executor's paying with his own money for his Testator's Debt : as where the Testator being to pay a Rent at *Michaelmas* or our *Lady-day*, he dies a day or two before, or, to put it more clearly, a day or two after the Feast, not leaving any goods to pay the Rent, other than the future profits of the Lease. He must, unless that the Executor will forego the Lease, he must lay out of his own money.

Now if in this and other like Cases he could not doe this untill he had under Seal, or by act in the Court Spiritual, an Assent of the Ordinary, it would be an extraordinary trouble to Executors.

I finde also *tempore Hen. 7.* another 20 H. 7. 3. 6. mean of altering Property, to wit, where a *Fieri facias* comes to the Sheriff to sell or levy a Debt of the Testator's goods; now, saith the Book, may the Executor buy these goods of the Sheriff as well as another; and if he do, the Property which he had as Executor shall be turned into a Property *in jure proprio*.

If an Executor amongst his Testator's goods find and take some not his, and after, these being claimed by the Owner, who left them in the custody of the Testator, the Executor not crediting the claim, still keeps them, and the Owner hereupon recovers damages in an Action of Trespass, or of Trover and Conversion; now (and so in all other like Cases) are these goods become the Trespassor's in property, because he hath paid for them: 20 H. 7.
Kelw. Ca. 58. therefore it is not strange, if in like manner an Executor, paying out of his own purse for or in lieu of the Testator's

K 2

goods,

goods, have so much of them (where no certainty) changed in property, all become his own. This is but put as an instance understood with the exceptions and cautions precedent.

CHAP. VIII.

Of some cases and questions between the Executor and the Heir.

21 H.6.30.
If other
goods taken
among
them, he is
excused.

21 H.7.25.
Vid. Lib.

Inr. 640. It
is so plead-
ed.

THE Executor may in convenient time after the Testator's death enter into the House descended to the Heir, for the removing and taking away of the Goods, so as the door be open, or at least the key be in the door and this I understand of the door of each Room. For although the door of entrance into Hall and Parlour be open the Executor cannot by that justify the breaking open of the door of any Chamber to take goods there, but onely may take those in the Rooms which be open. And this is proved, as to me it seems by the Case of the Chest with Evidence which, saith the Book, the Executor may

may take and put out the Deeds, delivering them to the Heir, viz. the Chest being unlocked, as I understand it. Now 43 E.3.24.
Chamber or other Room within a house Bro. 145.
locked is an inclosure of better respect makes a
then a Chest. But if the goods be not 24. if it
removed within convenient time, the Heir be locked.
may distrain them as *damage feasant*. Plow, Com.
280.

Where the Testator recovers Land and damages, or a Deed and damages, dying before Execution, the Heir shall have execution for the Land or Deed, and the Executor for the damages: but 43 Ed. 3.2.
10 Ed. 4.5,6.
Of the Deed
Execution
first.
mp. Edward. 4. it is said, that untill the Heir sue a *Scire facias*, the Executor cannot sue Execution for the damages.

If a Creditor be made Executor by his debtor, and pay himself part out of the goods, he cannot sue the Heir for the rest, because the Debt cannot be apportioned; but otherwise he may, saith the Book: yet *Quære*, if he do take upon him the Executorship, and have goods sufficient to pay all. 12 H. 4.

If a Debt be recovered against one who dieth before Execution sued, leaving goods sufficient to satisfy; now shall not the land descended to the Heir be charged 7 H. 4. f. 31.
See Bro. Ex.
124.

ged therewith, nor by like reason an Land conveyed after Judgment.

Co. l. 3. f. 90,
91. To like
purpose see
more, Littl.
f. 77. b. 2 El.
Dyer 281.
Plow. Com.
291.
21 H. 7. 4.

See a good difference, where Land is conveyed upon condition of payment to the Vendor, his Heirs or Assigns, and he dieth before the time, and where it is to be paid to the Vendee, his Heirs or Assigns, and he dieth : in the first Case payment shall be to the Executors, but not in the other.

What things pertain to the Heir, and what to the Executor, is before shewed. As for *Frowick's* opinion, that where Goods be mortgaged upon condition, that if the Heir or Executor pay, &c. here if the Heir make payment, he should have the Goods, I see not, for my part, how this can be.

A Directory for the following Chapter

- A. All (as but one) represent the Testator's person, and must joyn and be joyned in Suit ; & è contrá.
- B. Where one alone must answer Suit, at how.
- C. When they differ in Plea, the best shall.

betaken, but one may confess alone.

. One, as well as all, may give Assent, or release the whole.

. One cannot give, nor release to another, nor divide.

. The possession of one is the possession of all, to what purpose.

. If the Survivour die Intestate, the Testator is Intestate, though the other Executor left an Executor.

. Executor included in the person of the Testator, and represents it, is his Assignee; all one: & *à contrá*.

. What change by death of the Testator, touching proceeding in Suit.

. Proceed to or in Execution; where without Scire facias.

I. Whether the Executor stand in his own quality, or his Testator's.

I. Where one alone may sue.

. In Suit for them, such as will not joyn shall be severed, and the other may sue and prosecute alone: Consequents indé.

. Death of one Executor, Plaintiff or Defendant, where abates Writ.

CHAP. IX.

How Executors stand between themselves, and in representation of or relation to the Testator, as his Assignee or Deputy, or as the same person with him; and where, and to what purpose, as to persons.

Are as one person; therefore cannot plead several Pleas in Abatement.

37 H.6.17.

39 H.6.44.

38 E.3.9.

Bro. Ex.13.

Bro. Ex.20,
21.

Therefore one Executor sued, if he pleads that there is another Executor not sued, must plead that he did Administer.

9 H.6.44.

Bro.1.33

H.6.38.

Bro.20.

32 E.3.

*Quid juris
clamat 5.*

First, all of them do represent the person of the Testator, and therefore must they all joyn in Suit against others, and in Suit by others they may be all made Defendants, or at least so many of them as do Administer: though the Executors themselves must take notice by the Will how many Executors there be, and must frame their Suit accordingly; Creditors and Strangers need not take notice of any more than do Administer, and execute the office of Executors. For this reason, as I take it, in the time of King Edward the third, where two Executors were of a Term, and the Reversion was granted by Fine, mentioning but one Term, and thereupon a *Quid juris clamat*

lamat accordingly brought against that one Executor; this was held good enough, though the other Executor was not named in the Suit: belike, because that one (who indeed was the Testator's Wife) did one-ly occupy the Land, and take the profits hereof; for else, since all the Executors do represent the Testator's person, all must have been named. Therefore did the Judges resolve in the time of *Hen. 4.* that where a Lessee for years made two Executors, and one of them was distrained by the Lord for Rent, who avowed upon the Lessor; that Executor should have Aid of his fellow-Executor, to the end that both might have Aid of the Lessor, which one alone could not. And upon this reason, *viz.* that the Executors represent the person of their Testator as one person, (for so speaks the Parliament) it was enacted in the time of *Edward* the third, that the Executors, though never so many, shall have but one Effoyne, either before appearance or after, because their Testator, whose person they represent, could have had no more.

13 H. 4.
Aid 186.

A.

9 Ed. 3. c. 3.
A.

It is farther also enacted by the said Statute, that where two or three Executors or more be, they being sued in an
Action

B.

But not, if
he appear at
the sum-
mons, 1 E. 4.

1. 14 H. 4. f.

11. But the
Plaintiff

must declare
against all.

He need not,
but he may

admit ano-
ther to ap-
pear and

plead after.

7 H. 4. 12.

But Process
must be con-
tinued a-
gainst all.

7 H. 6. 35.

Executors

of Executors

by Equity.

30 H. 6. 45.

Bro. Exec.

99. 28 H. 6.

J. 4. 14 H. 4.

23, 24. So

negatively.

22 H. 6. f. 1.

28 H. 6. f. 4.

3 H. 6. 35. a.

39 E. 3. 5.

There it is

not meerly

as Execu-

tors; it is out

of the Stat.

11 H. 4. 63.

as if in *Deb.*

& *det.*

Action of Debt, though all do not appear, yet such one of them or more as doth appear at the Grand Distress, shall answer alone without his or their Companions. And this Statute hath been taken to Equity in three respects.

First, touching the Persons; that it shall extend not to Executors onely, but also to Executors of Executors, yea to Administrators also; though the Stat. speak onely of Executors.

Secondly, touching the Action; where as the Stat. speaks onely of the Action of Debt, it is taken by Equity to extend to other Actions, as the Writ *De rationabilibus parte bonorum*, and *Detinue*: yet perhaps this latter Action will be said not to be maintainable against Executors for their Testator's act, but for their own onely. But we are not yet come so far as to determine what is maintainable, but whether, before all the Executors do appear, he or they which have appeared shall be put to answer; and so to bring it to Decision, whether the Action be maintainable or not. I think also that in the Action of Covenant, and all other Actions against Executors as Executors, he which appeareth must

It answer without his Companions ;
 though the greater opinion in the *Qua-*
gesimes were contrary touching the
 tion of Covenant. But as for the *Sub-*
na against the Executors , which is to
 ke them to answer to a Suit in Equity,
 it hath been *temp. E. 4.* taken to be out
 the reach and intent of the Statute. So
 o of the *Latitat* in the *King's Bench*, as
 is held in the same King's time ; ex-
 pt all the Executors , making up the
 hole representative Body of the Testa-
 r, be in the custody of the Marshall, one
 more of them who are there shall not
 e inforced to answer ; and so was it also
 tely held in the *King's Bench* , where
 after Justice *Houghton* gave an excel-
 nt reason that this Case is out of the
 id Statute, *viz.* for that this Writ doth
 ot mention any Debt, or name the De-
 endant's Executors.

Thirdly and lastly , that Statute is ex-
 ended by Equity to other Writs or Pro-
 ess : for where the Statute speaks onely
 f the grand Distresse , and the Execu-
 rs appearing thereupon ; it hath been
 many times ruled, that when he or they
 ppear upon the Attachment , *Capias*
 r *Exigent* , answer must be, though
 the

B.
Cont. 47 E.
 3. 22. So
 7 E. 4. 20,
 21. 3 H. 4.
 20. In *Sci.*
fac. upon a
 Pardon by a
 Defendant
 outlawed at
 their Suit.
 47 E. 3. 22.
 Onely *Fenold*
 in the affir-
 mative.
 8 E. 4. 5.
 9 E. 4. 12,
 13.
 B.
 20 vel 21
fac. Regis.

B.
 1 E. 4. 1.
 40 E. 3. 1.

B.

11 H.4.63.

C.

Or if but
one appear,

8 H.6.f.364

Judgment
against all.

See 9 E.4.

12, 13, 14.

Where B,
who is notExecutor, is
jointly suedwith A, and
B confelleth.

21 H.7.25.

Yet 7 E.4.7.

they may se-
ver in Pleasnot dilato-
ry.

C.

7 H.6.f.6.

per Cottel-
more. Ifthey reco-
ver, and one

of them

prays a *Cap.*ad *sat.* and
the other a*Fieri fac.*the first, as
best, shall be

granted,

3 H.4.10.

Bro. 44.

So where
the Defen-
dant Out-

lawed at the Suit of two Executors, and upon the *Scire facias* after his
Pardon but one appears, 21 H.7.25. 9 E.4.12, 14.

the rest appear not; for so the word *De-
stres* is taken for all compulsory mean,
or enforcement of Appearance. B
where the Statute reacheth not, *vi*
when the Process is determined again
one or more as by Outlawry, &c. the
the rest must answer by the rules of th
Common Law; except it be in the ca
of Husband and Wife Executors, fo
there the Wife cannot answer withou
her Husband, nor doubtless can he with
out her, where she and not he is Exe-
cutor; but where both be Executors
there he may answer without her, bu
not she without him. When Executor
as Defendants have appeared, if any on
of them will confess the Action, thi
binds and concludes the rest; but i
one will plead one Plea, and the othe
another, that (say some) shall be received
which is best for the Testator's state: so
where they sue, such as will not prosecute
shall be severed, and the rest without
them may proceed; and in like manner
where they pray to be received to defend
their Term, and one of them after makes

Default,

default, it shall not be the Default of all, at the rest; or he, if it be but one who appears, shall be received to uphold the sentence of the Term.

Thirdly, so where they plead a Release to the Testator or themselves, one after making Default; this shall not be nor make a total Default in the Executors, to produce a Judgment or Condemnation against them. Yet in truth, each Executor hath the whole of the Testator's Goods and Chattels, be they real or personal, and each may sell or give the whole. One of them cannot give nor release to the other his Interest; and if he do, it is void, and he who releaseth shall still have as much Interest as he to whom he released, because each had the whole before. Upon this reason long since, where one of the two Executors released but his part of a Debt, it was held that the whole was discharged. And so, if one Executor grant his part of the Testator's goods, all is lost, and nothing is left to the other; for that each hath the whole, and there be no parts or moyeties between Executors. Therefore also, though

Lease for a thousand years of a thousand Acres of Land come to two
Exe-

21 E.3.13.
27 H.8.21,
22.

D. E.

C.

If an Horse
come to
four Execu-
tors, each
hath an
Horse, and
yet all four
have but
one.

E. Executors or more, no Partition or Division can be made between them, because it is not between them as between joynr Lessees of Land, where each hath but a moyety in Interest, though Possession of or through the whole. Amidst E-

D. Executors each hath the whole, and therefore if he grant his part, he grants the whole. But one Executor may demise or grant the moyety of the Land for the whole term, and so may the other do, and this way they may settle in Friends or others trusted for them, a moyety for each, either in several or undivided, but one of them cannot make a Lease to the other of any part, for he hath the whole, nor can one sue the other as Executor. Yet if the Testator devise to one of his Executors all his Goods, after such Debts and Legacies satisfied, there, after those satisfied, the Executor may take the Goods, and maintain an Action of Trespasse against the other Executor if he take them from him, and consequently an Action of *Detinere*, for keeping or detaining them: but this as Legatee, his own assent perfecting the Legacy.

6 H. 7. 5.

The possession of one Executor is the pos

possession of all the rest: so as if one appearing to a Suit, and the other making default in whose hands all the goods be which are not administred, if, I say, here that appears pleads that he hath nothing in his hands, this shall be found against him; for whatsoever any of the co-executors hath he also hath, and is in his possession; and so shall the Creditor recover, and have Judgment to be satisfied out of the Testator's goods, as in his hands. And therefore if goods be taken from one, all may maintain an action of Trespass thereupon; for the possession of one is the possession of all. But the possession of one shall not be so the possession of all, as to charge the other's own goods, whereof more elsewhere.

Where two Executors be made, the one making a Will and Executors, and dying, the other die after Intestate; now shall not the Executor of him who first died be Executor to the first Testator, but he is dead Intestate, because the surviving Executor is so dead, and in him the Executorship was wholly and solely settled by the death of his fellow before him. So Administration *de bonis non admin.* shall be committed.

The

14 H.4.12.
Bro. 12.

F.

All must
sue. 19 H.6.
65. Cont. 24

E.3.40. &
42 E.3.26.

It may be in
his name
only from
whom taken,
nor need he be
named Executor.
Bro. Exec. 31.

39 H.6.45.

F.

G.

32 H.8. Bro.

Exec. 149.

39 H.6.45.

Co. 9. lib. 5. f. 97.

H.

Chapman &
Dalton's
Case. Plow.

Sir Edward
Phitton's
Case, Co. lib.
2. f. 80.

A.

So where
the Stat. of
W. 1. gives
time for
proof to
him whose
goods were
wrested, his
Executors
may doe it,
if he die be-
fore the
time.

Co. 1. 5. 137.
b. Co. lib. 6.
f. 80.

The Executors, or Executor, if but one, so represents the person of his Testator, that he is in Law his Assignee by the very making of him Executor: so as if he Covenant to make a Lease to *J S* at his Assigns by such a time, and *J S* dieth before that time, and before the Lease made; now must the Lease be made by his Executors as his Assignees, representing his person: so also in a condition to pay the Feoffor or his Assignee: yet if the Lease to *A* and his Assigns during the life of *B* shall not go to the Executors of *A*. So where in a general Pardon by Parliament there is an exception of persons Outlawed after Judgment, the person so outlawed shall satisfy the Creditor who hath outlawed him. If the Outlaw die before this done, his Executor, as representing his person, may make satisfaction, and so make the benefit of the Pardon to extend to his Testator, for saving his goods, as if himself had satisfied his Creditor, though he left him unsatisfied when he left the World. *Et diem obiit extremum*. Yet where a man sold Land to *B* upon *Proviso*, that if he died, *A* payed at the day to his Executor

tor

or, and it was doubted that it was not good ; for the word Assignee could not reach to him , being no Assignee of the land. And where the Executor brought an Action of Account upon a Receipt by the hands of the Testator, the Defendant could not be admitted to wage his law ; for that this was held a Receipt *per inter mains* : yet it is clear, that if one by Bond or Covenant tie himself to pay such a sum at such a day, not mentioning his Executor at all ; yet is the Executor bound , as included in the name of person of the Testator. And where the Statute 23 of *Hen. 8.* gives the Writ of Attaint (in the course there mentioned) against the party that had Judgment, it lieth against his Executors, if he be dead ; but thereof another reason is given. Where a man was bound that he should not sue upon such a Bond, and he died, and his Executor sued ; this was held to be no Forfeiture of the Bond. So where one was bound to pay ten pound within a moneth after request made to him, and he died before request ; it sufficed not to make it to the Executor , as *Tanwood* said. It was likewise held, that the Warrant of Attorney put in for the

L

Plain-

Also Executors may have restitution for stolen goods, and a Writ of Error ; yet the Statute speaks but of the party.

A.

2 *El. Dy.*
180. *Cont.*
where to A
the Feoffor,
his Heir or
Assign.
Co. lib. 5. f.
97. 2 *Eliz.*
Dy. 183.
3 *Eliz. Dy.*
201.

H.

25 *H. 8. 16.*

M. 15 & 16
Eliz.

L.
34 Eliz. vel
circiter, Ti-
therly &
Lexcor.
Walsh. in
ban. Reg.

I.
36 H. 8.
Bro. Stat.
Merchant
43.

K.
2 R. 3. 8.
H. I.
15 H. 7. 14.
F.
15 E. 3. Re-
spond. I. con.
upon a Stat.
Merchant.

K.
Com. Nat.
br. 267. up-
on a Recog.
I.

H.
30 El. rot.
31. in ba.
Reg.

Plaintiff in Debt, it sufficeth not for is
Executor to bring a *Scire facias* upon the
Judgment. And if Executors sue Exe-
cution upon a Statute in the name of a
Conusee, as if he were alive, this is void,
and they may sue out new Extent; and
this they may doe without any *Scire fa-
cias*, as well as the Conusee might if he
had been alive. But by *Hussey*, Justice.
If the Conusor in a Statute-staple be re-
turned dead by the Sheriff upon the Ex-
tent, a *Scire facias* must be sued out be-
fore Extent proceed; and upon a Judg-
ment had, if the Recoverer die before
Execution, his Executor cannot, as his
self might, sue out Execution without
Scire facias, as is there said. Yet if after
a *Capias ad sat.* awarded, the Plaintiff die
before it be executed, the Sheriff may
proceed to the taking of the party, and is
not subject to any Action of false Impri-
sonment: nay, if he suffer him to escape,
he is chargeable, as *temp. Elizabeth.* it was
resolved upon the motion of *Anderson*,
but withall it was held, that relief might
be by *Andita Querela.*

Like Resolution was in the *King's
Bench*, after some doubt by *Wray* and the
other Judges, where the Defendant died
after

fter a *Fieri facias* awarded, and before it was executed; that the Sheriff might proceed upon the Goods in the hands of the Executors.

But if the Defendant in an Action of Debt upon a Bond plead a Tender at the time and place of payment, and tenders the money in Court, where it rests, and then he dies; now shall not the Plaintiff have this money, because the property thereof is changed, and become the Executor's, as was held in the *Common Pleas*; but he is put to a new Suit against the Executor.

Yet where Judgment is once given in Writ of Partition for a Termor, or in a Writ of Account; if the Plaintiff die before the second Judgment needfull in both cases, the Executor is not put to a new suit, but may proceed by *Scire facias* upon the former Judgment: as the *L. Anderson* held, upon the motion of *Fenner*, Serjeant. Though before we found the Executor not in points penal all one with the Testator; yet in point beneficial the Testator includes him in some Cases: as where an Abbot granted to his Lessee to take Estovers in another's ground, it was held that his Executor, though

32 El. vel
circiter.
I.
Pasch. 28.
H.

not named, should enjoy this during the term, as well as himself should have done. And whereas the Statute 23.

Henry the 8. gives Costs to a Defendant against a Plaintiff suing for a wrong, or breach of promise, or the like, done to the Plaintiff, against whom it passeth the Verdict or Non-suit; it hath been resolved, that an Executor suing upon such wrong, or breach of Contract to his Testator made, should not pay Costs, because he is another person then the Testator and so is it usual in experience. But if in Suit the Attorney of the Executor misbehave himself towards him and for this the Executor sueth him here, if it pass against him in manner as aforesaid, he shall pay Costs, because this was a Suit for a wrong done to himself.

If *A* recover a Debt as Executor of *J S*; and makes *B* his Executor, and dies before Execution sued; *B* is not put to new Suit, but may have Execution upon that Judgment. But if *A* or *B* die Intestate, now could none as Administrator to either of them, nor as Administrator of *J S*, have Execution of this Judgment; for the former hath no interest

Trin. 36 El.
in ba. Reg.
H. M.

Pa. 41 Eliz.
in com. ba.

H.
28 H. 8.

in any thing pertaining to *J S*, and the latter cometh to Title above the Judgment, *viz.* as immediate Administrator to *J S*, who is now dead Intestate, and derives no Title from the Executor who recovered.

If a Conusee have a Certificate into the *Chancery* upon a Statute, and then dies before Extent taken out; his Executor is put to a new Certificate, and for obtaining of it must make *Affidavit* that no Extent hath yet been taken out.

² El. Dy.
180.
I.

If an Alien joyn with his Wife who is Executor in a Suit for Debt, and it cometh to Issue, he shall not have Trial *per medietatem alienig.* or *Lingua*; as should be if he otherwise were party to a Trial; as was held in the Case of Doctor *Julio*. Yet if a Nobleman sue as Executor to another not noble, he shall for his Non-suit be amerced five pound, as if he sued in his own right; as was conceived 21 E. 4. 77. By the same rule and reason, doubtless, a Nobleman sued as Executor shall not be arrested, nor shall any *Capias* be awarded against him for not appearing. And if any Trial shall be of any Issue, there shall be two Knights

M.

of the Jury, as in other Cases where Peer is party. Likewise where the Widow is to have her convenient Apparel, where of the Executor must not bereave her; she be a Noble-woman, it shall be answerable to her degree.

A.
38 E. 3. fo. 9.
N.

If one Executor onely sell Goods of the Testator, he alone may maintain an Action of Debt for the money. So if Goods be taken out of the possession of one Executor, he alone may maintain an Action, and that without naming himself Executor.

P.
O.
3 H. 7.
I.
5 E. 2.
Fitz. pro
302. Cont.
38 E. 3. 13.
20 E. 3.
11. Account
78.

Some touch hath been before of Summons and Severance, whereabout to this added: If one Executor will not or cannot conjoyn in Suit with the other so as he is summoned and severed; not by his death after the Suit is not abated 16 Ed. 2. Fitz. 111. Yet if he live till Judgment, he may sue Execution, say in other Books, 13 Ed. 3. Fitz. Exec. 9. 1 R. 2. Privilege 2. Yet *Quer.* of that, for he cannot acknowledge satisfaction, hath been since resolved. Mich. 14 & 15 Eliz. Dy. 319. And the reason thereof being, because he is no party to the Judgment, by the same reason can he not sue Execution upon it; for how can he

have Execution, for whom there is no Judgment given? now the Recovery is only in the name of the other Executor. Yea, by the said last Book it seems that after Judgment had he cannot release the Debt, because it is now altered in nature, and turned *in rem judicatum*; though at any time before Judgment he might have released it, as both that last Book saith, and the two precedent, *48 Ed. 3. Rich. 2.* Yea, in an Action Account, after Judgment had that the defendant shall account, the Release of him severed is a good Discharge to the defendant; as was resolved *48 Ed. 3. 14.* But this is not a plenary Judgment, for nothing is recovered thereby; but another Judgment is to be had after the account, which may be against the Plaintiff, so as this Release came before any Debt or Duty adjudged. What if the defendant be had in Execution at the suit of the Executor, who prosecutes and escapeth? whether may the severed Executor discharge the Sheriff or Gaoler by a Release? I think he may not.

By that above it is plain, that if any one of the Executors Plaintiffs die, the

Writ is abated; onely where he so dyin
 2 H.4.f.14. was before severed, Opinions have bee
 different, as above appears. So also
 it if one of the Defendants Executors
 die. Yea, if the Plaintiff Creditor su
 A, B, and C, as Executors, where onel
 A and B are Executors, there by th
 death of C the Writ abates, or falls t
 the ground: yet A and B (as I think
 might have pleaded in Abatement, th
 they onely were Executors; traversin
 that C was not Executor: but the Boo
 doth not so resolve. See 46 Eliz. 3. fo
 9, 10.

P.

9 E.4.12.
Bro. 34.

As A and B above might admit the
 Writ against them and C; so if the Wr
 or Suit had been against A onely, and h
 so admit it, not pleading in Abatement
 the Recovery against him alone is good
 9 E.4. 12.

A.

21 H.6.30.

M.

21 E.4.49.

69. 42 E.4.

13. 14 H.6.

14, 15.

One that is Out-lawed, or Attainted i
 his own person, may yet sue as Executor
 because this Suit is in another's right, viz
 the Testator's: But he that is Excommu
 nicate cannot proceed in Suit as Execu
 tor, because none can converse with him
 without being excommunicate, as a Bool
 says. Yet doth not this Excommuni
 cation pleaded abate or overthrow the

Suit.

it, but make that the Defendant may
 y from answering his Suit untill the
 aintiff be absolved and discharged from
 s Excommunication.

3 H.6.40.
 Littl. 44.
 Co. l. 81.69.
 11 R. 2.
 Excom. 256

CHAP. X.

f the Possession of Executors, or their
 actual Having.

*What shall be said so to come to their
 hands as to charge them.*

*What shall be such a getting or going
 from them as to excuse them.*

WE have before considered what
 things shall come to Executors,
 and, being come, shall be *Assets* in their
 hands. Now, for that it is said in *Reede's*
Case, that an Executor shall not be charged
 with or in respect of any other goods then Co. lib. 5.
 those which come to his hands after his
 taking upon him the charge of the Execu-
 torship; let us now examine what shall
 be said and accounted such a full and
 compleat coming to the hands of Exe-
 cutors, as shall make them within the
 reach

reach and charge of Creditors and Legatees, *viz.* for the payment of Debts and Legacies. As touching Debts due to the Testator, it hath before been shewed, that untill Judgment and Execution had there be not *Assets* in the Executor's hand. Now then as touching other Goods and Chattels possessory, which are of two kinds, *viz.* real and personal, let us put the case thus.

The Testator at the time of his death hath a flock of Sheep in *Cumberland*, Corn in the Barn in *Cornwall*, Bullock in *Wales*, fat Oxen in *Buck. shire*, Money Household-stuff and Plate in *London*, Lease for years in *Norfolk*, and his Executor dwells at *Coventry*, *viz.* far from all these places; what kind of Possession shall the Law judge this Executor to have in every of these instantly upon the Testator's death, and before he come where any of the things be, either to see or seise upon them? In all the particulars above mentioned the Law is all one, except the Case of the Lease for years; which if it be of Land, (as is most usual) then, because it is a settled and immoveable thing, the Law doth not reach to it the foot of the Executor, to put

him in actual possession, (for *Possessio quasi pedis positio*) untill himself or he for him do actually enter thereon. Nor indeed need the Law help supply the want of actual possession in this Case, as in the case of Moveables; for Land cannot be carried away as Goods may, and therefore is not subject to purloining or imbesilment as Moveables are. But if the Lease for years be of Tithes, the Executor, though never so remote a place from them, shall be instantly upon the setting out thereof in actual possession of them, so he may maintain an Action of Trespass against any Stranger which shall take the Tithes set out, though he nor any for him did ever before possess any of the said Tithes, or came near unto them. But if the Case were of a Lease for years of a Rectory, consisting not onely of Tithes, but also of Glebe-lands, into which Entry may be made, as also Livery of seisin taken; it; then it may perhaps be some question, whether such an actual possession in Tithes shall be given by the Law to an Executor neglecting to enter, or not entering into the Glebe-land. And so I leave the consideration of Chattels real.

45 E.3.27.
21 H.6.43.

Touch-

9 E. 4. 59.
 Plow. Com.
 281.
 32 H. 6. 13.
 14 H. 8. 22.

Touching things Personal, in which the Executor hath such an actual possession presently upon the Testator's death as that he may maintain an Action of Trespasse against any Stranger taking them away, or spoiling them, though he nor any for him ever came near them, whether yet this shall be such a possession in the Executors, and such a coming of these Goods to their hands, as to charge them with payment of Debts and Legacies, yea to make their own Goods liable in stead of these, is a Point worthy of consideration.

And, doubtless, this thoroughly sifted will prove a Case mischievous, whither way soever the Law be taken. For first it must be admitted, that without the Executor's laying his hands actually and particularly upon the Goods in the House or Fields of the Testator, whether the Executor hath resorted, he shall be said so in possession as to stand liable unto the Creditors, so far as they extend in value, though after others purloyn or imbesil them. Now then, if distance of place shall make difference, where shall be the bound and limit of that distance? and if the Executor may come after

er a Stranger's taking or possessing of the Goods, it is mischievous to Creditors.

On the other side, if it shall be laid on the Executors to answer for all the Goods whereof the Testator died possessed, it will be mischievous for them, and deterr them from taking Executorship upon them; since much purloyning may be even of Money, Jewels and Goods, by Servants and others about the Testator, or where these things

I think therefore, that if without any fraud, collusion, or voluntary conniving on the part of the Executors, they be prevented by others of laying hold on the Testator's Goods, so as that they may dispose of them, especially if it cannot be known by whom they are so purloyned and imbecilled, and if they be persons fled or insolvent; that then they shall not stand upon their defence, as Goods come to their hands, in respect whereof Creditors or Leases shall draw so much from them out of their own Goods, as in other Cases where they have no such excuse.

And of this mind I the rather am, because I finde the whole Realm in Parliament

23 H.6. c.1. liament taking notice of such prevention of Executors coming to the Goods of their Testator, by the wrongfull and imbesilment of others, without any default in themselves. And in this Case the Parliament hath given special remedy, *viz.* that Writs shall be directed to Sheriffs, to make open Proclamations for the appearance of the parties delinquent in the *King's Bench* at the day limited; and in default thereof they shall be attainted thereof Felony, the Writ being returned executed, *viz.* Proclamations made. But note, that this Proclamation is to be made two Market-days, with twelve days next after the delivery of the Writ, and the last Proclamation must be fifteen days before the day of Appearance. And these Proclamations must be made in such Cities, Boroughs, or Places, (as the Statute) not expressing what is meant by the word *such*, and therefore meaning doubtless those in which the act of offence is committed. So that if the fact be not committed within the limits of some City, Borough, or Market-Town, no remedy is to be had by the Statute for that the Proclamation is to be made upon Market-days in the place where

c. Now besides other Places, even the Boroughs, *viz.* Towns sending burgesses to the Parliament, have no markets, and so are no places within the Act. Also two Executors must receive this Writ; therefore where there is but one Executor, no relief is given by this Law, for it is penal, making Felony, and therefore shall not be extended by equity beyond the words. Lastly, it extends but to the Executors of Lords and persons of good Degree, and onely to the passing Servants of such persons, not other Strangers, purloyning the goods. It now who shall be said to be persons of good Degree, not being Lords, I will not much labour to decide; the rather, because I have not heard nor read, to my remembrance, of any Action brought uppon this Statute: but I think that good Degree must stay either at a Knight, being the lowest Dignity, or at a Gentleman, being a degree of Worship, as elsewhere is shewed, and not stop any further.

And the said Statute seems in some sort to imply an opinion this way which I incline to, in that it expresseth this purloyning to be an impediment of the Execution

cution of the Will, whereas if the Executors shall answer and make good to Creditors and Legatees out of their own state and goods, for these imbecillities the Execution of the Will is not hindered, but the Executors are damnified in their own private value. Yet it may be said, on the other side, that some things given *in specie* by the Will, such a piece of Plate, such a furniture of a Bed Chamber, such a Jewel, may be purloyned, so that the Legatees can never have them, and consequently, the Execution of the Will be hindered, though some recompence be made by the Executors: but here these Legatees shall recover recompence in such Cases, for that Legacies are not to be recovered by Suit at the Common Law, I must leave to the Professors of the Common or Civil Law to inform. But if the Executor be of secret assent to this imbecillment, whereof even the forbearance to sue for the recovery of the things, or the value of them in dammage if known where they or the imbecille be, is a shrewd evidence, or proof; then shall the Executor be adjudged an haver of them, and so stand charged as having them: for *Pro possessore habetur* q
do

olo desit possidere. And if in any Case the
 maker by prevention from the Executor,
 before his knowledge (perhaps) of the
 testator's death , or, at least, before his
 possibility of repair to the place where
 the goods were, to put them in sure custo-
 dy, if, I say, such Actor keep these goods
 from falling upon the shoulders of the
 executor, they shall surely fall upon him-
 self, and make him chargeable at the Cre-
 ator's Suit, as an Executor of his own
 wrong.

Of Goods lost by or gotten from Executors.

But put we the case (for thereunto
 shall be our next step) that Goods come
 fully into Executors possession and
 hands, but be again lost or gotten from
 them without any default in them, shall
 they yet stand answerable out of their own
 states for them? Surely hereabout two
 distinctions must be made, as I take it.

The first whereof I derive from our
 learning touching Escapes of persons ta-
 ken in Execution and imprisoned, if such
 be rescued by Alien enemies, the She-
 riff or Gaoler shall not answer out of
 his own goods for this Debt; otherwise,

33 H.6.14

10 E. 4.23.
 7 Eliz. Dyck

241.

M

if

if it be done by Subjects, against who
remedy is to be had by the course of Ju-
stice : and so should I think it to
touching Executors, *viz.* That if en-
emies landing (as near the Sea-coast
may easily and often happen) shall take
away Cattel or Goods from an Execu-
tor, hereby he shall be excused; contri-
wise ordinarily, if the ereption or d-
reption be by Subjects known, and there-
by actionable. Another difference
shall think may probably be taken from
the rules of our Learning touching Bail-
ment. If *A* deliver Goods to *B* to kee-
as his own, or generally, *viz.* without
any special undertaking by *B*, to kee-
them safely, and without any money or
other valuable consideration given for the
safe custody : here, if *B* be robbed of
them, he shall not make satisfaction to
A for them : and so if they be stolen
from a Servant or Factor. But if they
be taken away by a known Trespasser
not feloniously, some opinion hath been
that the Keeper shall make recompence
because he hath remedy for recompence
or satisfaction from the Trespasser. Yet
of this latter I should doubt, because *A*
himself as well as *B* may have this Acti-

Vide 29 Aff.
p. 28. 8 E. 2.
Fitz. Detin.
59. 9 E. 4.
90. 13 H. 7.
4. Co. lib. 4.
fol. 83, 84.

for dammages against the Trespasser.
 Now an Executor is of the nature of such
 one, having the custody of another
 man's goods; and I have seen in a Manu-
 script entire, the Writ of Trespass by the
 Executor, expressing goods of the Testa-
 tor in the custody of the Executor to be
 taken from him: therefore methinks he
 could no otherwise be charged then *B*,
 whom goods were, as above is said, de-
 livered to be kept. For the Executor
 shal have no benefit nor advan-
 ge by the Executorship: all the Goods
 not sufficing, perhaps, to pay Debts
 and Legacies, which is the state we
 most think of, viz. where goods want
 to pay Debts and Legacies; for where
 there wants not, the question needs not
 be made. Yet a Servant or Factor, who
 hath Wages for his Service, is not there-
 by made liable to satisfie for things in
 his custody stoln, because he hath not
 for this particular custody any com-
 pensation. So of an Executor, if
 perhaps benefit might accrue to him
 by the Executorship, as haply the dis-
 charge of a Debt owing by himself, &c.
 Other Cases there be wherein the Execu-
 tor will stand more clearly discharged. As

*In custodia
 sua existit*

if the Testator left a Lease for years, stat by Extent, Wardship, or other Goods whereto he had but a defeasible Title, and they be evicted after his death: so if he left a ship at the Sea with much Goods and Merchandises, which are drowned in the return, never arriving in safety: so also if he left a flock of Sheep tainted with the rot, which die shortly after him: In none of these three Cases, doubtless, shall the loss fall upon the Executor. But to put a Case of more doubt; What if a Lease for years come to an Executor subject to a Condition for payment of Rent, or a sum in gross, and the Executor fails in payment; whether shall this loss fall upon the Executor to be made good to Creditors or Legatees out of his own substance, or not?

To this I must answer by this distinction, *viz.* If the Executor had taken the profits of this Land so long as to furnish him with money for this payment, or if he had other goods of his Testator's in his hands to supply the payment, then is it his default that the money is not paid, and he must bear the smart thereof, otherwise not; for he is not bound to make payment out of his own goods: yet he is
a sul-

a cruel and unkind Executor who will
 it so doe, whenas he may repay and sa- Yet *Quere.*
 fie himself by the profits thereof after.
 ke Law, if the Executor suffer a Bond
 a hundred pound to be forfeit for not
 ying of fifty pound, having sufficient in
 hands. So also of a Recognizance,
 tute or Judgment, defeasanzed upon
 yment of a less sum. Yea, I less doubt
 all these cases, then of the Forfeiture
 the Lease for years : for haply the Ex-
 ator had time to have sold the Lease,
 and made money thereof, towards the
 yment of Debts ; the omission and neg-
 t whereof may be imputed unto him,
 a Default justly occasioning recom-
 nce to be by the Law required from
 n. But, perhaps, he may excuse him-
 that he could not find a Chapman who
 ould give him to the value thereof.
 ereunto yet reason can easily reply,
 t it had been much better to have sold
 under the value, then to have lost the
 ole value, by exposing or abandoning it
 a total Forfeiture.

CHAP. XI.

How far and where an Executor, having Assets, is chargeable or liable to Action

HAVING considered what things sh^e come to Executors, and be *Assets* their hands for the performance of a Will; let us now consider what thing the Executor is bound to pay, satisfy, perform, and what not, where he is chargeable, and where not, this being admitted that he hath *Assets*, viz. sufficient wherewith to perform.

Here we will consider of these parts.

1. *Of Debts by Specialty or Record.*
2. *Of Debts or Duties by Contract without Specialty.*
3. *Debts without either Contract or Specialty.*
4. *Covenants by Deed or Specialty.*
5. *Wrongs done by the Testators.*

TOUCHING Debts by Specialty, which are the most usual and common oblig

ligements, it will not be impertinent
 to give a little light touching the validity
 of a Specialty, and the extent of it to
 executors. The most doubt will arise
 upon Bills and such Writings Obliga-
 ry made, not by Scriveners or Clerks,
 in common form, but by others other-
 wise, for haste, or through simplicity.
 Thus, long since we finde a Writing
 made by *A* to *B*, *Memorand.* that I have
 received of *B* ten pound, which I pro-
 mise to pay, &c. This being sealed and 22 E. 4. 22.
 delivered, was held a good Obligation by
St. Michael and *Catesb.* So if the words had
 been onely, I shall pay to *B* ten pound;
 whether such words, or the like, as co-
 nant or grant to pay, be in the form of a
 Bill or Bond, or in an Indenture or Ar-
 ticles, it is a sufficient ground for an
 action of Debt. And though it should
 be mis-written, *Wigint* for *Vigint*, or fit-
 teen for fifteen; yet shall it be favoura-
 bly construed, and held a good Specialty 19 R. 2. F.
Det. 166.
9 H. 6. 7.
2 H. 4. 8.
23 El. M. 5.
 of Debt, as hath been resolved in these
 and like Cases, and so also notwithstanding
 false *Latine* in the Obligation, or the
 plural number for the singular number,
 or words of repugnancy or non-sense;
 yet if there be words whereby it appears
9 H. 7. 16.
2 H. 4. 8.

28 H. 8.
Dyer 22.

28 H. 8. Dy.
19 & 22.

40 E. 3. 1.

7 H. 7. 14.

8 H. 6. 36.

22 H. 6. 15.

21 E. 4. 81.

3 H. 4. 17.

11 H. 4. 76.

that *A* is a Debtor to *B*, and it be sealed and delivered, it is a good Writing Obligatory; yea, though it want the words of conclusion, *viz.* *In witness whereof*, as the Lord *Dyer* reports to have been resolved: although the contrary were held in four several Kings times before, as our Books shew.

Now any such Writing obligatory doth determine or drown any Duty by Contract, because Specialty is of a higher nature. So as if *A* and *B* do bargain with *C* to pay him a hundred pound for Corn or other thing, and after *C* take some such Writing obligatory as aforesaid of *A*: now by this is *B* discharged of the Debt because he stood charged onely by the Contract, which is extinguished by the said Specialty.

As for the extent and operation of these Specialties to and upon Executors, we must know that an Executor doth so represent the person of that Testator, and is so included in him, as that every Bond or Covenant by the Testator, made for payment of money or the like, reacheth to the Executor, although he be not named, *viz.* that he doth not Covenant for, nor bind him and his

So reservation of Rent,
grant of
Annuity.

28 H. 8.

Dy. 14, & 22.

47 E. 3. 22.

32 H. 6. 32.

10 H. 7. 18.

Ex-

Executors by exprefs words, (and yet the
 heir not named is not bound, though
 there be never fo great *Assets* or Land
 descend unto him.)

No mention
 of Executor
 in the Judg-
 ment, yet he
 charged.

Now touching Debts upon Record
 much need not to be faid, (except of
 thofe by Stat. Merchant:) for to Debts and
 Damages already recovered againft the
 Testator, and to Debts by Recognizance,
 the Executor's liablenefs is fomewhat
 clear and conspicuous. Yet other in-
 famous Debts upon Record may fitly be
 thought of, as Iflues forfeited, Fines im-
 pofed by Juftices at *Westm.* or at Affifes,
 Quarter-Seffions, Commissions of Sewers,
 Bankrupts, by Stewards in Leets, or
 the like; for all thefe are Debts of Re-
 cord, which Executors ftand charged
 withall. So alfo if the Testator were
 before Auditors found in Arrerages of
 Account, being a Bailiff or Receiver;
 for thefe Auditors are by Statute Judges
 of Record: but if the Account were
 made onely before the party to whom
 the Arrerage pertained, or but before
 the Auditor onely, it is out of the Sta-
 tute, which fpeaks of Accounts before
 Auditors in the plural number; therefore
 the Executor not chargeable, becaufe

9 H.6.f.11.
 11 H.4.64.
 92. Other-
 wife of a
 Gardian in
 Socage, he
 is out of the
 Stat. W.
 2.cap. 11.
 ut credo. Co.
 l. 10. 103.

the

the Testator might wage his Law in the Cases, not in the former.

36 H.8. Br.
Stat. Mer.
43.

And whereas exception was before made of a Debt by Statute-Merchant, was by reason that the Lord *Brook* tells us, that if the Conusor in that case be returned dead, no remedy appeareth for the Conusee to have Execution of the goods of the Conusor, but onely of his Land. If this should be thus, it were a very mischievous Case: for many bound in Statutes have no Lands but Leases, and Goods of great value, and if by their death their Goods and Chattels should be set free from this Statute, and the Creditor without remedy, the Law were defective and it were so much the more strange in this Case, because the Statutes of *Acton Burnell* and *Mercatoribus* seem to pitch principally upon Goods, and to tend unto assurance between Merchants, who usually are not Landed men. But that the Law doth give remedy in such Case, as well against the Goods as Lands of the deceased Conusor, appears by the Resolution of late made, in what Order and Precedence Statutes are to be satisfied by Executors, as after we shall see.

*of Debts by Contract without Deed, as
Leases parol, &c.*

Contracts are of divers kinds, and we will begin with those in the re-ty, as most worthy. If therefore one be lessee for years or for life, without any indenture or Deed, (as he may be) and, his Rent being behind, he dieth; now is the Executor liable to the payment of his Rent without any Specialty, for that his Testator, if he had been sued in his life-time, could not have Waged his Law. But if the Lessee for years in his life-time sell or grant away his Term or Lease, although he still lie at the stake for the Rent to grow due after, untill the Lessor accept the Assignee for his Tenant; yet if the Lessee die, his Executor shall not be charged for any Rent due after the death of his Testator. But what if the Lessee do not alien or assign his Term, but die thereof possessed, and the Executor, perceiving the Land not to be worth the Rent, waveth the same, yet the Lessor will not enter therein, nor intermeddle therewith, whether may he yet charge the Executor with the Rent

21 H. 6. 1.
44 E. 3. 42.

44 E. 3. 5.
7 E. 3. 11.
14 H. 7. 4.
per Keble.
Vide 8 E.
Dy. 247.

M. 32. &
33 Eliz. in
com. ba.

Do. & Stud.
121.

Rent during the Term? I answer, that if he have *Assets*, that is, sufficient for payment of this and other Debts, he cannot wave this Lease, but shall be tied to answer this Rent, though much more than the Land is worth, for the taking of the Lease is much of the nature of a Obligation to pay money: Yet because it is yearly Executory, the Executor may wave it, in case his Testator's Estate will not supply and bear that losse. But what if there be *Assets* to bear this yearly losse for some years, but not during the whole term? I think in this case the Executor must pay the Rent so long as these *Assets* will hold out, and then must wave the possession, giving notice to the Reversioner. And this I think he may doe well enough, notwithstanding his Occupation of the Land divers years after the Testator's death, because that was not voluntary, but as of necessity: yet this I leave as a *Quare*, to be well advised of with good counsel.

Of Contracts personal.

WHERE the Testator might wage his Law, there the Action lieth not against

against the Executor, as hath been touch-
 ed; and therefore he is not chargeable
 in an Action of Debt upon a simple
 Contract, as by reason of this or that, to
 the Testator; yea, though it were the In-
 heritance of Land which was sold, so as
 the Sale were without Deed; or though
 with Deed, yet if no Counterpart were un-
 der the hand of him to whom the Sale
 was made. And the Custom of *London*
 to the contrary, *viz.* that an Action of
 Debt should be maintained against Execu-
 tors upon a Contract, was held void, at
 least if no good Plea against other Credi-
 tors, that such a Debt was recovered against
 the Executor, or paid by him; as was to-
 wards the latter end of the late Queen's
 time resolved, though in the beginning of
 her time it was a Demurrer. Yea, though
 such a Debt grew for the most necessary
 living, *viz.* meat and drink, which bind-
 ed even an Infant to payment, yet will it
 not charge the Executor of a man of full
 age. But this is meant where the Con-
 tract was onely by word: for where the
 Testator putteth his Seal to any Deed or
 Writing made upon such Sale, this is more
 than a simple Contract, and taketh from the
 vendee his wager of Law, and so chargeth
 the

41 E. 3. 13.
 15 E. 4. 25.
 Except by a
Quo minus
 in the Ex-
 chequer. So
 the Dug's
 Debter. Co.
 l. 9. f. 98. a.
 So of Ac-
 counts, ex-
 cept for the
 King.

M. 32 &
 33 *El.* in
com. ba. by
 three Judg-
 es, and 37
Eli. by all,
 as I find in
 my Report.
 But *Co.* l. 3.
f. 82. b. it is
 contrarily
 reported.
 3 *El.* Dy.
 196. De-
 murrer.
 9 E. 4. 51.
 10 H. 7. 8.
 15 E. 4. 16.
 22 H. 6. 13.
 39 H. 6. 186.

There
though a
common
Hostler or
Vicualler
trust his
Guest, he lo-
seth his Debt
by his death.
Co. 9. 87. b.
12 H. 4. 23.
But if the
sum be also
written on
it, they are
bound as by
a Deed.
28 H. 8.
Dy. 2. a.
Slade's Case.
Co. lib. 4.
Co. 1. 9. 87.
Pinchon's
Case.

2 H. 4. 14.

the Executor. But if the Testator se-
but unto a Tail or Tally with scotche
expressing a Debt, this is no such Spec-
alty as shall charge Executors. Yet in
some Cases without any Seal at all the
Executor is chargeable. But although
no action of Debt lieth against the Exe-
cutor upon such a simple Contract, yet
may the Creditor in that case maintain
an Action upon the Case, grounded
upon the Assumption implied, though
not expressed, as now standeth resolved
by all the Judges of all the Courts at
Westminster, though heretofore there
hath been much difference of opinion
thereabout. And indeed, thus the Exe-
cutor is charged in matter for a simple
Contract, though not in manner of
Debt, but as for breach of promise, mak-
ing recompence in Damages, in stead
of the Debt. And the chief reason for it
is, because the Testator could not have
waged his Law in this Action upon the
Case against himself, though in Debt
he might. Where the Testator retaineth
Servants in Husbandry, or otherwise,
and dieth, there being Wages due to
these so retained; the Executor is lia-
ble to an Action of Debt for the same.

by

reason that the parties were compelled by Statute thus to serve, and therefore the Testator could not have waged by Law : but in case of Servants not compellable, as Waiters or Serving-men, as we call them, no Action of Debt lieth against the Executor for their wages, though against the Testator himself it doth; for the Contract is sufficient to charge him who made it. See of *Account* after.

4 H. 6. 48.

So 2 H. 4. f. 14. Servitors in the War by Contract.

Where Executors shall be charged, without either Contract or Specialty.

WHere a Prisoner oweth money to a Gaoler or Keeper of Prison for his Diet or Victuals, and dieth, his Executors shall be chargeable for this Debt, because it is for the Commonwealth to have Prisoners kept, which cannot be without affording them Victuals. Also where one hath a Patent or Tally of the Exchequer, to receive money of some Customer, Receiver, or other Officer of the Crown, and delivereth it to him, he then having money of the King's in his hands; if he pay not the fine, but die, his Executors shall stand charged.

27 H. 6. 4.

15 E. 4. 16.

Co. lib. 9. f.

87. b.

No. n. br.

121. a. He

must have a

Liberate

also.

27 H.6.4. b.
 1 H.7.17.
 2 H.7.8. b.
 Clark of the
 Hamper.
 10 H.6.24,
 25.

No. na. br.
 82, 83.
 Westmin. i.
 c. 35.
 Lib. Intr.
 172. b.

Reg. orig.
 141.

11 R.2.16.
 P. 2.

chargeable with the payment thereof. for Arrerages of Account before Audi if more then one ; but this is Debt of cord in Law.

So if any Lord of free Tenants levy Aid of them for the marriage of eldest Daughter , and he die before be married ; she may recover this mo by an Action of Debt against his Executor: but this is by virtue of a Statute. There is a President in the Book of Entries an Action of Debt against the Executor an Heir , by which it seems that a binding himself and his Heirs , and giving *Assets* , the Heir taking the price becomes so a Debtor , that his Executor shall be charged. And in the Register there is a Writ against the Executor the Guardian of the Spiritualties of Arch-bishop of York , for the Debt of B , who died Intestate , and whose Goods came to the hand of the Guardian, viz. the Dean of York. allowance whereof, there is a Note added of the like Writ brought in K. R. his time , and that then a President was alledged of such a Writ in King Edw. his time against the Executors of Ordinary, and that they were inforced

answer unto it. So is the opinion of
ren, in the time of *Edward* the third. II E.4. Fit.
 Ex. 77.
 at *Ald.* opposeth him. Also the *Ratio-*
abili parte bonorum by custome in some See Co. lib.
 Intr. 564.
 aces is maintainable for the Wife and Such Actions
 in York-shire
 children against the Executor. But no
 ction of Account lieth against Execu-
 rs, except for the King. More hereof
 t. *Wrong*.

Of Covenants charging Executors.

WE have already touched upon
 Covenants in part, *viz.* where
 ey be expressly for payment of money, Inter Art.
 draws &
 Elserig, circa
 ceter 33 El.
 ewing them to be in Law-bonds, that
 , Writings obligatory, whereupon an
 ction of Debt may be brought as well as
 Action of Covenant, though the words
 the Deed bear the sound and phrase of
 Covenant. Yet in some Cases no Action
 Debt lieth upon a Covenant to pay
 money: as if *A* covenant that his Execu-
 or shall within a year, or such a time, af-
 er his death pay ten pound to *B*; now
 r that no Action of Debt was main-
 inable against *A* himself, it lieth not Pasch. 33 El.
 inter Bor. &
 Austin; in
 com. bar
 ainst his Executor, but onely an Action
 Covenant; as was held in the late

N

Queen's

Quæ. If both be to be done by the Covenantor, viz. ten l. if not five, such a day. So in *Penol's* Case. But where the Lessor did covenant to pay the Quit-rent, divers Justices thought the Executor, not named, was not bound; 1 & 2 F. & M. Dyer 114. Note the Case is *supra* in *marg. Pasch.* 3S El. in *ba. reg.*

Queen's time. So if the Covenant be conditional, as thus, that if *C* do not pay to *B* ten pound, then *A* will pay it: and so also, perhaps, if the Covenant be in the distinctive, viz. to doe such an act, or to pay ten pound: now if the Act be not done, yet no Action of Debt lieth for the money, but onely an Action of Covenant. But now let us come to the Cases meer Covenants, and see which of the will charge an Executor, and which not. a Lessee for years covenants to repair the Buildings, or to pay the Quit-rents issuing out of the Land let, there is little doubt but the Executor, to whom the Term cometh, must as well as his Testator perform that Covenant, although he did not covenant for him and his Executors. And yet of these Cases doubt hath been: and touching the latter, viz. of paying Quit-rents, divers Justices in Queen *Mary's* time were of opinion, that it was a thing so personal, that it died with the person and did not charge the Executors; nor there any contrary Opinion expressed in the Book. And since that time, viz. towards the end of Queen *Elizabeth's* Reign, in the Action of Covenant betwixt the Dean and Canons of *Windsor* and

and *Hide* touching Reparations, at the
 first much opinion was, that onely the
 person Covenanting was tied to this per- Col. 5. f. 24.
 formance; but after it was resolved, that
 that Covenant did run with the Estate, and
 both Executor and Assignee were bound
 to performance. But in that Case it was
 said by *Popham*, chief Justice, that if the
 Covenant had been to doe a collateral
 Act, neither the Executor nor the As-
 signee had been tied thereby: and there-
 fore where a Lessee for years covenants
 within such a time to build a new House
 upon the Land, and dies before that time
 expired, I doubt whether the Executor be
 bound to perform this or not; although
 it do concern the Land let, so as perhaps
 the Rent or Fine was the less, in respect of
 this charge of new Structure or Buildings;
 which is a great reason that the Execu-
 tor, though not named, should be tied to
 the performance. But if the Covenant
 had been to build a House elsewhere then
 upon the Land let, or to doe any other col-
 lateral thing, not pertinent to the Land
 let; it is clear the Executors were not
 bound to perform it. And yet in those
 cases, if there were a breach or non-
 performance in the Testator's life-time,

Resolved
 P. 39 *Eliz.*
 but not ad-
 judged till
 M. 43 & 44
Eliz.

Tr. 28 H. 8.
Dyer 14.
There the
House was
to be built
upon the
Land leased;
and yet *Baldus*
seemed
of a contra-
ry opinion.

M. 8 & 9
El. Dy. 257.
Intrat. M. 7
& 8 Eliz.
Swanno
Vest.
Strangham
& Searkes.

as that the time of performance were expired before his death, then it is clear the Executors were bound to yield recompence by way of dammages recoverable in an Action of Covenant, as both *Shells* and *Fitzherbert* agreed: and so also did the Lord *Popham* agree in the said Case of *Hide*, as I find in my own Report that Case; though in the Lord *Coke*, reporting onely the Point in question, there be not mentioned. Now let us consider of the Case where there is no express Covenant at all, so much as for the Lessee himself, but onely a Covenant implied or Covenant in Law, as we call it. As a Lessee for life make a Lease for year and die within the term, so as the Lessee be evicted by him in Reversion or Remainder. In this Case it was resolved in the late Queen's time by three Justices, *viz. Walsh. Brown* and *Dyer*, that by this Covenant in Law the Executors were not chargeable; and in the same Case, the Lord *Dyer* sets down another Resolution after to the same effect. But Master Sergeant *Bendloes* reporting this latter Case to be of a Lease made by Tenant in Tail *viz.* before the Statute of 32 H. 8. not warrantable by it, sets down the opi-

on contrarily, *viz.* that the Action was maintainable against the Executor. This may serve for instance, the like being in any other Case where the Lessor hath not a good and a firm Title, but perhaps subject to a Condition, or other Eviction, so that the Lessee cannot enjoy the Land according to his Lease.

But this must be so understood, that no Eviction or breach of Covenant is in the Title of the Testator himself; for if that be, there is no question but the Executor stands chargeable: and therefore if one make a Lease of Land by Deed wherein he hath nothing, this Covenant is perhaps presently broken; and though the Lessor die before an Action of Covenant brought, it will be maintainable against the Executor, though no express Covenant. This is usefull to be known, though in these days there be few Leases so made, without express Covenant, and the Executors also named. And where there is a special Covenant in express words, it doth multiply the Covenant implied: so as although words of demise and grant tie the Lessor to a general Warranty of the Title against all men, yet it being after covenanted that the Lessee shall enjoy against the

*Tr. 22 El.
rol. 459. in
ter Brode-
ridge &
Windsor.*

*Nokes and
Anders
Case.*

Lessor and his Heirs, or against all claiming under him or his Ancestors; now re-
eviction by or under any other Title giveth cause of Action, or bindeth the Lessor or his Executor to make recompence

Of Wrongs done by Testators, and whether Executors be liable to Amends.

ALthough Executors do represent the persons of their Testators; yet if the Testator commit any Trespass upon the Goods of another, or upon his Person or Lands, no Action lieth for this against the Executor; for *Actio personalis moritur cum persona*. So if a Sheriff, Gaoler or Keeper of Prison, suffer one in Execution for Debt or Damages to escape though hereby the party at whose Suit the Execution was be intitled to an Action, viz.. an Action upon the Case, against such Officer by the Common Law, and by Statute an Action of Debt; yet if he so suffering die, for that such difference was a wrong of the nature of a Trespass no Action lieth against his Executor for the same. And upon the same reason, as we presume, if one carry away his Corn and Hay, without setting out the Tenth, although

41 Aff.p.15.
40 E.3.Fitz.
Ex.74. Co.
lib.9.f.87.a.

ough the treble value be recoverable against him in an Action of Debt ; yet if he die before such recovery , the Action is gone, and lieth not against his Executor ; not although the Testator were a Lessee for years, so as his State came to his Executor.

Like Law in other penal Statutes : as, for arresting one at the Suit of *J S*, without his privy or assent ; or for not appearing as a Witness, being served with a *sub-pœna*, and having charges tendered, and many like ; yea, if a Lessee for years commit Waste and die , no Action lieth against the Executor for this Waste. For all these Cases are within the rule of *Actio personalis moritur cum persona*. And many other like Cases might be put , but these may suffice. Yet if a Parson, Vicar, or other Spiritual or Ecclesiastical person, do suffer a ruine or decay of the Houses or buildings upon his such Spiritual Benefice or Promotion, and dieth ; his Executors are liable, by the Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Law , to the Successor's Suit or amends, to the repairing of such spoil or decay. And because some used fraudulently to grant away their Goods, so as nothing shall be left to their Executors ;

13 *El.c.16.*

it was enacted *temp. Elizabethæ*, that such Grantees of Goods should be liable to the Successor's Suit for these Dilapidations as if they were Executors.

As for one other Case of this nature *viz.* where an Executor wasteth the Goods of his Testator, or an Administrator the Goods of his Intestate, and dieth, whether his Executor be subject to Action for this, or not; I adjourn the Reader to the place where I shall treat of such Wasting or Devastation by Executors.

Fitz. Ex. 77.

I conceive no difference between this and the other Cases *supra*.

Unto this Head not unfitly may be referred what before is said of Action against the Executors of the Debtor, Heir, and the Executors of the Ordinary for the Specialty binding to payment reacheth not to any of these: but because their Testators should have paid their Debts with the Goods or Profits of the Lands of the Debtor, and did not, but retained them to themselves; therefore for this, as a Wrong, are they suable, as take it. So also by the same reason are the Executors of an Administrator chargeable where he did neither pay the Debts, nor leave the Goods to the next Administrator, but otherwise disposed of them. Yet an Executor is not chargeable in an A-

Action.

on of Detinue, nor of Account, (except
the King) for the Testator's detaining,
and not paying or answering things recei-
ved, or under his charge.

And the reason why, after Account
made before Auditors, and the Bailiff
or Receiver be found in Arrerages and
Arrearages, that in this case his Executor is
chargeable, is, because the Auditors are
made Judges by the Statute *Westm. 2. cap.*
10 to this Arrerage which they have
judged is a Debt by Record.

But if the Case be put on the other
side, *viz.* that the Bailiff or Receiver
be found in Surplusage upon his Ac-
count, *viz.* that he hath laid out more in
his Lord's or Master's business than his Re-
ceipts amounted unto, and then his Lord
or Master dieth; now shall not he have
any Action against the Executors for the
Surplusage, because it is out of the purview
of the said Statute.

2 H. 4. 13.
He may by
admit. Co. l.
11. f. 88.
3 H. 6. 35.
Con. for Ar-
rerages of
an Account
before Au-
ditors.
11 H. 5. 64,
91, 92.
9 H. 6. 11.
13 Ed. 1.

Co. lib. 9. f.
87. a.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Order and Method to be used by Executors in payment of Debts and Legacies, so as to escape a Devastation charging of their own Goods.

WE have gone through and dispatched the two first proposed parts, *viz.* 1. Touching the being of Executors, and the manner of their being; 2. Their having, and the manner of their having. We come now to the third part, *viz.* Their doing or disposing of the Testator's Estate.

Now this consists principally in the issuing of Money, though partly also in delivering or assenting to the execution of Legacies, not being Money, but other Goods or Chattels bequeathed.

Money is to be issued by Executors four ways ordinarily.

About the Funeral of the Testator.

About proving his Will.

In paying of Debts.

In paying and satisfying of Legacies peculiarly.

As for the first, Burials be as of necessity for two respects, *viz.* 1. Of Charity to the dead, that he may be Christianly and seemingly interred 2. to prevent and avoid annoiance to the living, so by the very view of the dead Carcasses would both be affrighted, and within a few days distasted at the nose. We know that under the Law the touching of a dead Carcass made a man unclean, and to need purifying: nor can we easily forget what the Sisters of *Lazarus* said to our Saviour touching their Brother, when he had been dead three or four days, *viz.* that the taking of him then out of his Grave must needs bring a noisome favour. Hereabout therefore some expence is necessary, and that not onely in Fees to be paid, which in *London* amounts to a considerable sum, specially for such as are to be buried within the church; but also otherwise, *viz.* for the Pall or Herse-cloath, the Ringing, &c. As for Feasting and Banquetting, it seems not to be congruent to the sadness and solemnity of the action in hand. But howsoever that be, yet where the Testator leaves not sufficient Goods to pay his Debts, Festival expence is to be forborn,

ex=

except the Executor will out of kindne
bear it with his own purse ; for dead
Debtors must not feast to make their li-
ving Creditors fast. I mentioned a consi-
derable amount of funeral Fees payable
in *London* : and surely (to let my thoughts
fall back upon it a little) it is worth con-
sideration, whether in that kinde, and e-
specially for those who dying there are
yet carried into their Countries to be bu-
ried, the Exaction be not either unjust al-
together, or too onerously excessive : so
also for much Ringing, contrary to the
Canon made at the Convocation in the
first year of King *James*.

The next thing mentioned to justify
and occasion expence is the proving of
the Will. But this way a greater dis-
bursement (except for riding charges, or
by reason of opposition by a *Caveat* put in,
or the like) will not stand allowable, then
is prescribed by the Statute made in the
time of *Hen. 8.* whereby the Fees of Or-
dinaries, and their Scribes, Registers and
Officers be limited. And it is strange
that these bounds have been so much and
so frequently broken and transgressed ; the
rather, for that long before, in the time of
K. Edw. 3. by an Act of Parliament it is
pro-

21 *Hen. 8.*
cap. 5.

13 *Ed. 3.*
cap. 4.

provided, that the King's Justices should,
as well at the King's Suit as at the partie's
request, enquire after such Oppressions or
Exactions, for so they be called; yea, *St.*
Cr. who was no stranger to the Civil
and Canon Law, as appears by his Book,
showeth, that the Ordinary ought to take no-
thing for the Probate, if the Goods suffice
for Funeral and Debts; but he means
only that Conscience is against it.

Do. & Stu.
l. 2. cap. 10.

Now we come to the third occasion of
Disbursement, *viz.* payment of Debts,
which is the main part of our business.
We have before seen what Debts lie up-
on Executors, having *Assets* to pay them;
we are now to see in what order they
must pay them, as well *ut sint fidei dispensa-*
tes, as for their own indemnity, *ne quid*
ex sua capiat detrimenti. To put our selves
to the better order or Method of hand-
ling these things, we will sort our Debts
into their several kinds, thus.

They are of these three sorts, *viz.* either
Debts of or upon Record;
Or, Debts by Specialty;
Or, Debts without Specialty.

The Debts upon Record may be again
divided into four sorts or kinds, *viz.*

Debts to the King or the Crown.

Debts

Debts by Judgment, or Recovery
some Court of Record.

Debts by Recognizance.

Debts by Statute-Staple, or Statute
Merchant.

Amongst these, the Debts of the Crown
are to have the first place of precedence
so as if there be not come to the Execu-
tor Goods of greater value then will suf-
fice for the satisfaction of these, he
not to pay any Debt to a Subject; and
if he be sued for any such, he may plead
the Bar of this Suit that his Testator died
thus much indebted to the King, shewing
how, &c. and that he hath not Goods suf-
ficient mounting the value of that Debt. Or
if the Subject's pursuit be not so by way
of Action, as that the Executor hath de-
clared in Court to plead, but be by way of suit
Execution, as upon Statute-Merchant
or Staple; then is the Executor put to his
Audita querela, wherein he must set forth
this matter. And there is great reason
why the King's Debts should thus be pre-
ferred before any Subject's, viz. for that
the Treasure Royal is not onely for sus-
tentation and maintaining of the King's
Household, but also for Publick services
as the Wars, &c. as appears by the Sta-
tute

M. 33 & 34
Eliz. the
Lady Wal-
singham's
Case in com.
ban. & Tr.
39 Eliz.

10 *Rich. 2. cap. 1.* And therefore it
as I conceive, that *Bracton* saith of the *Lib. I.*
asures or Revenues Royal, *Roborant*
onam, they do strengthen or uphold
Crown. And for the like Reason, as
think, did God inact touching the
essions of the Crown, that if they
re given to any other then the King's
n Children, they should revert and
ne back to the Crown the next Jubi-
, which was once in fifty years. *Sed de*
satis. But this priority of payment
he King's Debt before the Debt of any
bject, is to be understood onely of Debts
or upon Record due to the King, and
of other Debts. If any ask how the
g should have any Debts which shall
be of Record, since by the Statute
of King *Hen. 8. chap. 30.* it is in-
ed, that all Obligations and Specialties
ken to the use of the King shall be of
e same nature as a Statute-Staple: To
s I answer, that there may be sums of
oney due to the King upon Wood-
es, or sales of Tin, or other his Mi-
rals, for which no Specialty is given;
also for Amercements in his Courts-Ba-
n or Courts of his Honours, which
not Courts of Record; the like of
Fines

21 E. 4. 21,
22. So must
it be plead-
ed *M. 33* &
34 *Eliz.*

Fines for Copy-hold states there ; the money for which Strays within King's Manors or Liberties are sold. so, as the Law hath lately been taken ruled in the Exchequer , even Debts Contract due to any Subject are by Outlawry , or Attainder, forfeitable to the Crown. Yet neither these, nor those due to such person out-lawed or attained by Bond, Bill, or for Arrerage of Rent on Lease , are or can be any Debt of Record, untill Office thereupon found ; although the Outlawry or Attainder be upon Record , yet doth it not appear any Record, before Office found, that such Debt was due to the person outlawed or attainted. Thus are not these Debts to the Crown to have priority of payment before the Subject's Debts, though the King's Debts of Record are so to have. So that if a Subject to whom the Testator was indebted by Specialty sue for that Debt, the Executor must plead, that the Testator died indebted thus much to the King by Record, more then which he has not Goods to satisfy ; if the truth of the Case be so : for if there be sufficient to satisfy both , then the Subject Creditor is not to stay for his Debt till the King's Debt be paid.

And must plead the Record in certain, as was held in the Case of the Lady *Walsingham*, *M. 33 & 34 Eliz.* But it sufficeth to say, by a Record of the Exchequer, as was held *Tr. 39 Eliz. in ban. Reg.*

Debt be levied. And if the Subject Creditor sue Execution upon a Statute, so that the Exec. hath no day in Court to plead the Debt to the King, then is the Exec. due to an *Audita querela*, wherein he must set forth that matter, and so provide for his own indemnity. But what shall we say of Arrerages of Rent due to the King? Surely, where it is a Fee-farm Rent, or other Rent of Inheritance, I see how it can come under the title of Debt, since for it no Action of Debt is maintainable so long as the State continues in him to whom it grew due; and I find by the *L. Dyer, M. 14. Eliz.* said, that the King could but onely distrain for his Rents, and not otherwise levy them of Lands or Goods; and that the King by his prerogative may distrain in any other Lands of his Tenant, our Books tell us, but no more. Yet I know it hath been otherwise done of late in the *Exchequer*, which must have been the ancient and frequent use of the *Exchequer* it will stand as Law, though unknown to the *L. Dyer*. Now Rent upon a Lease for years differeth from the former, since for the Arrer. thereof an Action of Debt lieth. But how can either of these be Debts of Rec. when the not payment may

O

be

be either in the Court of *Exchequer*, or to the Receiver general or particular? and how then can there be any certain Record of the not payment, so as to make any certain Debt upon Record? We know Statutes have been made to make the Lands of Receivers subject to sale for satisfaction to the Crown; and besides that some ancient Patents direct the payment of Fee-farms into the hands of Sheriffs. The Stat. of *Westm. 1. cap. 19.* provides a remedy for the King against Sheriffs not answering the Debts of the Crown which they received: so as the King's Farm or Debtor may have paid his Rent, or other Debt, and the Crown have not yet received it. Of Fines and Amerciaments in the King's Courts of Record, there is no doubt but they are Debts of Record.

Come we now to the Debts of Subjects, and first those of Record. Touching which I shall not be able to hold so good a Method, and so well to handle things by parts as I would; for that the parts so stand in competition one with another for pre-eminency, as that they must of necessity thereabout conflict and interplead one with the other, and contest one against another: yet for the Reader's better ease, and
 abil.

ality to find out that which may concern him in his particular case, I will, in the best sort I can, single out these things into several parts, and place them in several rooms or stations. First considering how it shall stand between one Judgment and another, had either against the Executor or Testator. Secondly, how between Judgments and Statutes or Recognizances. Thirdly, how between Recognizances and Statutes. Fourthly, how between one Recognizance and another. Fifthly, how between one Statute and another. Adding to each some Observations incident.

Now, next to the Debts of the Crown, as Judgments or Debts recovered against the Testator to have priority or pre-eminency in payment, as being of an higher nature or more dignity then any other: so that Statutes and Recognizances, though they make Debts upon Record, yet as they begotten but by voluntary consent of parties; whereas in every Judgment there hath been a course and work of Justice against the will of the Defendant is presumed, and this in a Court of Justice, and the Records of such Judgments are entred in publick Rolls, not kept or

Co. l. 5. f.
281. So *Wray*
and *Gaudy*,
inter *Bond*
and *Bales*,
28 El. vel
circiter.

Yea though
a Writ of
Error by the
Exec. to re-
verse the
Judgment,
yet suffering
a Stat. to be
executed,
must pay of
his own.
Read and
Beachlock's
Case, P. 43
Eliz. Barre.
So held in
Read's Case
sup. a. Vide
12 H. 7. Kel.
24, 25. to
like pur-
pose.

Co. lib. 4. f.
59. So *Peri-*
am in com.
ba. inter
Charnock &
Winsley,
34 *Eliz. vel*
circiter.

carried in Pockets or Boxes, as Statutes, as
untill Inrollment Recognizances are.
Therefore Executors must take heed that
Judgments against their Testators, (before
Debts any other way) if they have not suf-
ficient for both, be first satisfied, lest they
draw the burthen of this Debt upon their
own backs. Now their way to help them-
selves, being sued or pursued for othe
Debts, is the same before delivered touch-
ing Debts upon Record to the Crown, viz
by Plea, where they may plead, as in *Scir*
facias upon a Recognizance, or Suit upon
Band; and by *Audita querela*, where they
cannot plead, as when Execution is sue
upon a Statute. And if they had no war-
ning in the *Scire facias*, but upon *Nib*
returned the Judgment passed, there all
the Exec. may be relieved by *Audita que*
rela; because there was no default in him
that he did not plead, or set forth the
Judgment upon the Suit in the *Scire facia*
Nor will it be any Plea for the Creditor b
Stat. to say, that his Statute was acknow-
ledged before the Judgment, and so
more ancient; for a latter or more puis-
Judgment is to be preferred before
Statute in time precedent. But if the
Judgment be satisfied, and it onely kept

a foot to wrong other Creditors, or if there be any Defeasance of the Judgment yet in force; then the Judgment will not avail to keep off other Creditors from their Debts. And thus much touching Debts by Judgment, *viz.* how they stand in priority before other Debts by Statute or Recognizance. Now to see how they stand among themselves, let this be observed, *viz.* that between one Judgment and another had against the Testator the precedence or priority of time is not material; but he which first sueth Execution must be preferred, and before any Execution sued it is at the election of the Exec. to pay whom he will first: yea, if each bring a *Scire facias* upon his Judgment, the Exec. may yet confess the Action of which he will first, notwithstanding the *Scire facias* was brought by the one before the other. In this *Scire facias* the Defendant may plead generally, that he hath fully Administred before the *Scire facias* brought, without shewing that he did administer in payment of Debts of as high nature; yet that must be proved upon the Evidence, else the Trial will fall out against the Exec. Thus have I delivered the most material things, in my apprehension.

Co. l. 5. f. 28.
Co. l. 8. f. 132.
So held in
15 & 16 El.
So in the
Scire Faci as
by Bond 2-
gainst Bales
it was held

hension, touching Debts by Judgment; yet thereabout I will add, for the better information of the Reader not studied in the Law, these few things. First, that which hath been said is onely to be understood of Judgments against the Testator, and not of any against the Executor himself for of those, being but Debts of Special at the time of the Testator's death, we shall speak after. Secondly, what is said of the Testator, in case of an Executor immediate, is likewise to be understood of the Testator's Testator, in case of a Testator of an Executor: for where *A* makes *B* Exec. and *B* makes *C* Exec. the Goods which came from or were left by *A*, be not in the hands of *C* liable to Judgments had against *B*; nor, on the other side, are the goods of *B* in the hands of *C* subject to the Judgments had against *A*. And the like is to be understood of Statutes, Recognizances and Bonds, as elsewhere is somewhat touched. Thirdly, Recoveries or Judgments by meer confession, without defence, are yet of the same nature, and to have the same respect, as other Recoveries upon Trial or otherwise; for although they may seem to be but of the nature of Recognizances, which be *debiti*

9E.4.14,15.
Quere, of
 Arrerages of
 Account be-
 fore Audi-
 tors with-
 out Suit;
 for the Exe-
 cutors are
 charged by
 Judgment of
 the Auditors
 by Stat. 17.2.
 Judgment of
 Record.
 10 H.6.24,
 25. Bre. det.
 183.

reco

recognita; yet do they differ from them, that here a Debt is demanded by a Declaration which is intended true, and that therefore the Defendant cannot deny it; but in case of a Recognizance it is not so, for there usually no Action is entred, nor Debt demanded. Fourthly, the foreshe-
d respect to Debts by Judgment is not to be inclosed within *Westminster Hall*, and is restrained to the four Courts there, but may and must extend it self to Judgments in other Courts of Record, *viz.* in Cities and Towns Corporate, having power by Charter or Prescription to hold Plea of Debt above forty shillings, as in London, Oxford, &c. For although there Execution cannot be had of any other Goods then such as be within the Jurisdiction of that Court; yet if the Record be removed into the *Chancery* by *Certiorari*, and thence by *Mittimus* into one of the *Benches*, so Execution may be had upon any Goods in any County of *England*. Fifthly, in Case where the Testator was bound in a Recognizance, and a *Scire facias* brought against him, and thereupon Judgment given; although this Judgment be not, *quòd recuperet*, as in case of Actions of Debt, but, *quòd habeat executio-*

Quere of Judgment in a Writ of Annuity for Arrearages after.

nem; yet since Execution is the life, fruit and effect of all Judgments, this may now well stand for a Debt by Judgment, as take it.

Of Recognizances and Statutes.

NExt unto Debts by Judgment are those by Stat. or Recognizance to be regarded by the Executor. And because I find no difference of priority or precedency between these two, I therefore rank them together: Yet one reason of preferment given to Judgments before Statutes in *Harrison's Case*, viz. that the one remains a Record upon a Roll in the King's Court, whereas the other being carried in the pocket of the Conusee is more private; this, I say, should give priority also to Recognizances before Statutes: As also another reason, for that Statutes are not properly Records, but Obligations recorded; yet do I not find that this makes a difference for priority of payment. And indeed the Stat. is the more expedite remedy, since thereupon Execution may be taken out without a *Scire facias* or other Suit, which cannot be in the case of a Recognizance: for there, if a year be past after the Acknowledgment, no Execution can be sued out against the

part

ty himself acknowledging it, without *Scire fac.* first sued out against him; and if he be dead, then though the year be not full, yet must a *Scire facias* be sued, and thereupon the Executor Defendant may plead some Plea to hold off the Execution for a time. But, this notwithstanding, the Executor may satisfy the Recognizance before the Statute, at least if he do so before Execution sued thereupon; for they standing in equal degree, it is at his election to give precedency and preferment to whether he will. Neither is it material which of them were first or more ancient; nor between one Statute and another doth the time or antiquity give any advantage as touching the Goods, though as touching the Lands of the Conusor it is so; but as for his Goods in the hands of his Executor, whosoever first getteth hold of them by his Execution, shall have the preferment. And before suing of Execution, the Executor may give precedence or preferment to whom he will. But now some may object, that there is no course nor Writ of Execution for any such Conusor against the Executor; and if so, then Statutes-merchant and of the Staple are in vain spoken of, and it is true that Master

Before *Sci. fac.* not after voluntarily, but if levied by Writ of Extend. is good.

Brook,

Bro. No. c.
294. & Stat.
Mer. 43.

Co. l. 5. f. 28.
b. H. 30
El. rot. 119.

P. 32 El. rot.
235. in co. b.

Brook, after Chief Justice of the *Common Pleas*, in his New Case, professed that he knew not any remedy for the Creditor out of the Goods of the Conusor after his death. But if this should be so, the Law were very defective, since the substance of many, especially of Merchant for and among whom the Statute-Merchant was provided, consisteth usually more in Goods than Lands: besides, the Plea of *Harrison*, Administrator of the Goods of *Sidney*, in Bar of *Green's* Action of Debt upon an Obligation, viz. that the Intestate stood bound in a Statute-Sample to *J S*, and *Green's* Reply thereunto, that there were Indentures of Defeasance, no Covenant whereof was broken, and the Resolution of the Judge, that the said matter in the Replication was good to avoid the Defendant's Plea, all this, I say, (and the Resolution of the Judges of the *Common Pleas* in that Case, and in the Case between *Pemberton* and *Barram*, as also in the *King's Bench* between *Popham* and the rest of the Judges, that Executors must satisfy Judgments before Statutes, and Statutes before Obligations) had been idle, and favouring of grosse ignorance, if no Execution a

could be had against the Executor of See *Co. lib. 5.*
 bound in a Statute; and then should 91. Executi-
 have demurred upon the Plea of on against an
Warrison, and needed not to have pleaded Exec. upon
 at other matter: but none of the Judges a Statute.
 Serjeants ever conceited any such mat- *Semaine's*
 . That which there was replied, *viz.* Case.
 at the Statute was not forfeited, is here *Co. lib. 5. f.*
 be remembred as good matter both 28. So if sa-
 against Statutes and Recognizances; and tisfied,
 at whether the Recognizance have a De- though not
 afance, or a Condition not broken, so discharged.
 at the Recognizance is not forfeited. In
 one of these Cases is the Executor hin-
 dered from payment of Debts by Spe-
 cialty, nor can he be justified or excused if
 by colour thereof he refuse so to doe: and
 indeed else might Creditors be exceeding-
 ly defrauded by Recognizances for the
 peace and of good behaviour, &c. and so
 by Statutes for performing Covenants
 touching the enjoying of Lands, if these
 should keep off the payment of Debts; and
 yet themselves perhaps never be forfei-
 ed, nor the sums become payable.

Of Debts by Specialty.

NOW come we to Debts due by Specialty, viz. Bond or Bill, (of which nature the greatest number of Debts are.) Let us then see what course the Executor must or may hold for satisfaction of these, admitting that the Testator stood not indebted by any Record, or that no forfeiture is of any such Debt, or that there be Goods in the Executor's hands above the Amount of such Debts by Record. This, I say, *dato*, then, according to the Rule, *Proximus quisque sibi*, the Executor may first satisfy himself of such Debts as the Testator by Specialty owed him: for such Debts are not released by the Creditor's taking upon him to be Executor to the Debtor; though, on the other side, if the Creditor make his Debtor Executor, this is a Release of the Debt. Although it be given out or commonly spoken in the general, that an Executor may first pay himself; yet is it to be understood with this caution or condition, viz. That the Debt to him be of equal height or dignity with the Debts to others, according to the Rule, *In aquali jure, melior est conditio*

possidentis : for if his Testator were indebted to other men by any Statute, Judgment or Recognizance, and to him whom he maketh Executor onely by Bond or other Specialty ; then may he not first pay himself, that is, by paying of himself leave him unpaid whose Debts are of an higher nature ; but if there be sufficient for satisfaction both to them and himself, then is it not material which he first paid. Now touching the Debts to other men, the Executor hath power to give preferment in payment to whom he will: so that if the Testator left but 100 *l.* being indebted to *A* 100 *l.* and to *B* 100 *l.* by several Obligations ; the Executor hath power to pay his whole Debt, and to leave *A* altogether unpaid any part of his Debt, so as he have not commenced any Suit before payment to *B*. But yet herein this difference is to be taken and observed by Executors, That if the time of payment upon the Bond of *B* were not come at the time of the Testator's death, then may not the Executors, before the money to *B* become payable, pay him, and leave *A* unpaid, whose money was presently due. Yet if *A* forbear to demand or sue for his Debt till the Debt of *B* become also payable ; then is

28 H.8. Dy.
22. Doct. &
St. ca. 10. p.
78.

Do. & St.
p. 78.
Quere, if
then he may
not plead
this Judge-
ment *post*
ult. contin.
against *A*,
as he may
plead it a-
gainst other
Suits after
commenced.
Co. lib. Intr.
148, 269,
149. a.

is it at the will of the Executor to pay
whether of them he will ; so as the other
may lose his whole Debt , if the Good
will not suffice to pay both. What if
have onely by word demanded his Deb
and not by Suit, before the Debt to *B* be-
come payable ? whether doth that hin-
der that the Executor may not now, when
the money to *B* is also payable, pay him
and leave *A* unpaid ? And hereunto
Germ. answereth negatively, making the
verbal demand to be idle and of no va-
lue : yet he addeth, that if *A* have com-
menced Suit before the Debt to *B* become
payable , yet if the Executor can delay
the Suit till the Debt of *B* become pay-
able, so that *A* can get no Judgment be-
fore that time, and before *B* hath com-
menced Suit upon his Bond, then may
the Executor confesse his Action, and
pay his Debt, leaving *A* unpaid. But
of this I make some doubt, for that I
find in 9. of King *Edm.* 4. some Admit-
tance, that if *A* having a Tally, Patent
or other Warrant from the King, for re-
ceipt of money of or from a Customes
or Receiver, where other had like War-
rants before him, but *A* maketh the first
Demand ; now must the Officer first pay
him,

or else himself shall become Deb-
 to him, if he first pay others whose
 Demands were after made, though they
 Warrants before *A*. Likewise there
 is as to me seems, some Admittance
 in the same Book, that the very Demand
 made by a Creditor of his Debt from an
 Executor, who hath then *Assets* in his
 hands, doth intitle the Creditor to reco-
 ve damages against the Executor out of
 his own goods: which if it so be, then
 doth even the verbal Demand lay some
 sort of obligation upon the Executor for
 payment. But hereabout I lay down
 nothing peremptorily. We partly may
 discern by the Premises how the Execu-
 tor is to guide himself, in the case where
 there be divers Debts by Specialty all due
 and payable at the Testator's death, be-
 fore any Suit commenced for any of
 them: for in that case clearly the first
 verbal Demand gives not any precedence,
 all being due, and so standing in equal
 degree. And this is implied in many
 books, making the commencement of
 the Suit onely that which intitles to pri-
 vity of payment, or at least restrains
 the election of the Executor. Yet, admit
 that one Creditor first doth begin Suit, if
 others

41 E. 3. Fitz.
 Ex. 68. 6^o 7
 El. Dy. 232.
 Vide 21 H. 7.
 Kelw. 74.

5 Hen. 7. 27.
 So *Walmsley*
 Just. P. 39
Eliz. in
 Error a. Ser-
 jeants Inne.
Co. li. Intr.
 286. such a
 Recovery by
 Confession
 is pleaded
 against a-
 nother, and
 admitted
 good, & f.
 148, 149.
 Do. & St. p.
 78. b.

others also after sue before he be paid
 or have Judgment; now cannot the Ex-
 ecutor pay him first who first commenced
 Suit, but he who first hath Judgment
 must first be satisfied. And the Exe-
 cutor may herein yield help to one before
 the other, viz. by Essoigns, Emparlar-
 ces or dilatory Pleas to the one, and a
 quick Confession to the other's Action;
 for he is not bound against his will to
 stand out in Suit, and expend Costs, where
 the Debt is clear: nor is this Covin, but
 lawfull Discretion, which Conscience will
 also approve, some good consideration
 inducing. Nay, after Suit commenced,
 yet untill the Executor have notice thereof,
 he may pay any other Creditor, and
 then plead that he hath fully administered
 before notice. Nor is the Sheriff's re-
 turn of Summons or Distress sufficient
 cause of notice; for the Summons might
 perhaps be upon his Land: but if it were
 to his Person, it is notice sufficient; and
 then, to save himself, he must say, that
 he was not summoned till such a day, be-
 fore which he had fully administered. Yet
 doubtless the Executor may be arrested
 at the Creditor's Suit in some sort, which
 yet shall be no sufficient notice of the
 Debt.

debt. As for the purpose, if he be sued by
attit out of the *King's Bench*, this, sup-
 posing a Trespas, gives no notice of a
 debt, so also of a *Sub-pæna* out of the *Ex-*
quer; but the Original returnable in the
Common Pleas expresseth the Debt, and
 in some sort doth the Process there-
 on. And there it seems by some Books,
 that if it be laid in the same County
 where the Executor dwells, he must take
 notice of it at his own peril. But this I
 take not to be Law, nor is there any great
 opinion that way: and although, to make
 more clear, the Executor in *King Hen.*
 the fourth his time, estranging himself
 from notice of the Suit before payment
 others, did alledge, that the Action
 was laid in a forein County; that is no
 great proof, that if his abode had been
 in the County where the Action was
 brought he must have taken notice; but
 thus it was clearer, and a little surplusage
 hurts not.

Now between a Debt by Obligation and
 Debt for Rent or Damages upon a Co-
 venant broken, I conceive no difference,
 nor any priority or precedency; but it is at
 the Executor's discretion to pay first which
 he will, as if all were by Bond. So also

So also was
 it said Tr.
 29 Eliz.

of Rents behind and unpaid, as I conceive; but touching them, principally intending Rents upon Leases for years, divers considerations are to be had, and some Distinctions to be made. As first, between Rent behind at the time of the Testator's death, of which that before said is to be understood, and that which groweth behind after, next between Suit for the Rent by Action of Debt, and Distress and Writ of *Wovry*. As to the first difference, if the Rent grew due since the Testator's death, then is it not accounted in Law the Testator's Debt; for onely so much is in Law accounted *Assets* to the Executor, as the profits of the Lease amounted to over and above the Rent; so as for that Rent so behind the Executor himself stands Debtor, as hath been resolved, and therefore he is not suable in the *Debet* and *Detinet*: whereas for Rent behind in the Testator's life, and for all other the Debts of the Testator, he must be sued in the *Detinet* onely. Hence it must follow, as it seems, that an Executor sue for Debt upon Bond or Bill cannot (except in some special Cases) plead a payment or recovery of Rent grown due since his Testator's death; though of Rent behind at the time of his death it be otherwise. And

ye

here again another difference or distinction is to be taken, *viz.* where the Profits of the Lease exceed the Rent, and where the Rent is greater then the yearly Profit of the Profits; for even there, as elsewhere is shewed, the Executor, if he have *Assets*, is tied to the holding of the Lease, payment of the Rent, and consequently doth so much of that Rent as exceeds yearly Profit stand in equal degree the Testator's Debt, with other Debts by Specialty. And yet again to re-consider this point, what if the Debts of the Testator by Specialty payable presently at his death, before the time that any Rent can grow upon this Lease, shall amount to the value of the Testator's Goods; may not the Executor, though he do not pay the Debts before the Rent-day, (for that would make the Case clear) wave them? for if he may, then haply if he cannot so; but shall by payment of any of the Rent want Goods to pay any part of the Debts by Specialty, it may lie upon himself and his own Goods, as happening by his own default. But on the other side it may be said, that he could not wave it so long as he had *Assets*, because thereby he should be equally liable to pay that Debt, be-

ing once due, as the other Debts by Specialty. On the other side it may be said that though the Debts for Rent and up Bond shall be admitted to be in nature equal; yet the Case being put of Rent due at the time of the Testator's death, was not then a Debt nor Duty, where Bond makes a present Debt and Duty though not presently payable, the day of payment being not yet come; so as this is discharged by a Release of Debts and Duties, and so is not the former. So to leave that Point unresolved, let us next see whether in some case, though the Rent exceed not the yearly value of the Land, yet even that payable after the death of the Testator may not stand in most part, if it is wholly, upon the Testator's score, as a Debt, as well as if it had been payable before his death. *Posito* then that the whole or half year's Rent is payable at the *Annunciation* of our Lady, and that the Testator dieth two or three days or so like short time before that Feast; now certainly should the Law be unreasonable, it should lay this Debt upon the Executor's shoulders, in respect of those few Winter days profits which he took. But surely since the taking of the Profits induce

the Law to lay the Rent upon the Executor as his own Debt; therefore, as where the Executor had the Profits for the whole year or half year, except some few days incurred in the Testator's life-time, those few days will be unregarded, according to the Rule, *De minimis non curat Lex*, and the whole Rent shall lie upon the Executor as his own Debt; so on the contrary part, when the whole year or half year's profit, except some few days, incurred after the Testator's death, the Rent, becoming payable so instantly after the Testator's death, must in reason lie wholly upon the Testator's Estate, as to me it seems. What if to this I add, that the Testator's cattle wherewith the ground was stocked do depasture and devour the Profits all the time after the Testator's death, till the day of payment of the Rents? Nay, if the Rent were payable at *Mich.* and the *Annunc.* and the Testator dies a few days after *Mich.* the Rent being of or near the value of the Land, it will then be hard that the Exec. shall for this Winter-profit pay the Rent out of his own purse, especially if the whole year's Rent be payable at that one day, as in some Cases it is; or if the whole year's Profits were taken in

the Summer, as in case of a Lease of Tithe. It is so also of Meadow-grounds, usually drowned in the Winter. So if the Lease be then to end, not having a Summer half-year to succeed and make amends for the Winter: or if the Winter half-year be the latter half, the Lease beginning at *Lady-day*, so that there is but one Summer for each Winter following, and not any for the Winter passed. Of little consideration with these is the case of a Lease of Woods for a Rent, which being sellable but once in eight or nine years; now if, the Lessee having made the full Sale and Felling before his death, the Lessee should cast the Rent upon the Executor's own Estate for the time future, it should lay loss upon him; which is against Reason, and contrary to the nature and disposition in the Law, even in this particular, as appears by this, that she enables the Executor to pay himself before any Debts of equal nature, so as she more tends to an Executor's indemnity than any other Creditor's. Therefore I think that with and upon the differences above specified, even Rent grown due after the Testator's death may in some cases be the Testator's Debt, payable equally with Debts

Ind. But here I conceive, that if the Executor were in such case of destitution of Assets as might justify his waving of a lease over-rented, he then may wave the term's residue; because for the future the profits will come short of answering the rent, though at the first, and so in the total, the Profits did exceed the Rent. And for want of waving where he might his Rent fall upon him, the payment thereof would be no excuse against another Creditor, nor as to him be a good Administration; for *Ignorantia Juris non excusat*. This is pertinent to our present consideration, which Debt may with safety be paid, leaving another unpaid: and the hazard of Executors by ignorance of the Law hath been a principal motive to my writing these Discourses in *English*. Hitherto we have onely considered, as I think, of Rents as they be recoverable by Action of Debt. Now let us see if there may not be somewhat different considerations touching distraining for Rent, and coming to recover it by Avowry. Put then the case that an Executor hath already administred in payment of Debts by bond, and after the Lessor or Reversioner cometh and distraineth for Arrerages of

Rent due in the Testator's life; can the Executor in bar of the Avowry plead Fully administred, as he might have done if Action of Debt had been brought for the Arrerages? Doubtless, I think no; nothing shall hinder the levying of the Rent upon the Land, so long as it is enjoyed under the title of the Lease, except the Land come to the King, upon whose possession no Distress can be taken. I think therefore that the Executor, who pay'd out of his own purse to the value of this Lease (for so I intend the Case, and else could he not have fully administred, as in the Case was put) should have abated in the price and valuation of the Lease as well the Arrerages of Rent, as the Rent futurely payable, both being equally leviable upon the Land; and if he so have done, he is no loser by payment of this Arrerage: but if, trusting to the power of an Executor as to the Plea of Fully administred, he did not so, but disbursed, in respect of the Lease, to the full value without such abatement, he must bear the loss of his own ignorance. He might also another way have helped himself, *viz.* by payment of that Arrerage, leaving other Debts by Specialty unpay'd. And what if Suits were
pro

resently commenced upon the Testator's
death, before he could make payment of
the Rent behind? whether might the Exe-
cutor then plead this Debt for Rent, as
might a Debt by Judgment or Statute?
Surely methinks it's probable that he
might, because it is a Debt from which he
cannot be freed by payment of the other
debts sued for by Specialty. If the Rever-
sioner would also commence Suit before
Judgment had for the Creditor by Spe-
cialty, then might the Executor help
himself by confessing his Action first:
but this perhaps the Reversioner would
not conceive safe for him, since that way
the others might get Judgment before
him, and so he might lose both his Suit
and his Debt; whereas holding himself to
the course of Distress, the Lease continu-
ing, he hath Land at the stake for his Debt.
What if he distrain and avow? may not
now the Executor pay him, or at least
confess his Action or Avowry, so as he
after having Judgment may first be sa-
tisfied? Surely after Suit commenced I
see not how the Creditors by Bond can so
be prevented, at least without Judgment
had for the Rent, yea though such a Judg-
ment be had: yet because the Judgment in
that case is not, that he shall recover
the

the summe due for Rent, but onely th
 he shall have a return to the Pound
 the Cattel distrained for the Rent, it
 questionable whether the payment there
 upon of the Rent shall prevent the Jud
 ments after had in the Suits upon Bond
 But I think it shall; because although
 be not an expresse Recovery of the Ren
 yet it is such a Judgment compulsory fo
 the same as makes the payment inev
 table and of necessity. And where be
 fore we have made the question onely be
 tween the said Rent-debt and the Deb
 by Obligation; let us now put the Cal
 between the Rent-debt and the Debt b
 Statute or Judgment. If then the Less
 after death of the Lessee, distrain for th
 Rent behind part of the Testator's Cattel
 and after there come a Writ of Execution
 upon a Judgment or Statute of the Testa
 tor's; whether shall these Beasts in th
 Pound for Rent be delivered in Execution
 or not, admitting that without them
 there be not Goods sufficient for satisfac
 tion of the Judgment or Statute? And
 surely I think they cannot be delivered
 in Execution. First, for that they are in
 the custody of the Law, as in *Stringfel
 low's Case*, though there the King's Pre
 rogative

See 13 R. 2.
 Bro. Pledges
 31. Attain
 der of the
 party di
 strain'd shal
 not take a
 way the Di
 stress. *Vi. Dy.*

negative overtopped that point. Yea so think, though they be replevied, for that they are to be returned to the pound, if Judgment pass for the Avowment, to which purpose Security is given; as they are but in the case of a Prisoner bailed, who still is in some sort in custody. Secondly, for that this Rent incident to and descendable with the Reversion breeds a Debt of a real nature, and so of more dignity and worth than debts personal. Thirdly, for that the land let (as in a sort Debtor) stands chargeable with this Distress from the very time of making the Lease, as either by Contract real of *quid pro quo*, or rather by an operation of Law or Legal constitution, or ancient Custome of the realm, without any Contract of persons. Lastly, for that the Lessor doth not distrain the Cattell therefore, or in that respect, for that they are or were the Goods of the Testator, but for that he found them levant and couchant upon the Land which must afford his Rent, or a Distress for it if behind: so as if they had been any Under-tenant's or stranger's Cattell, they might have been distrained. Some may perhaps object
this

this reason why these impounded Cat should be delivered in Execution, *viz.* that where otherwise the Creditor by Statute or Judgment should lose all or part of his Debt, yet by this Relief done to him shall not the Lessor lose his Rent, for that he may at any time after distrain a Goods or Cattell found upon the ground at any time during the continuance of the Lease. But here, besides the point of delay and stay for this Rent, which many is the sole means of maintaining their Households and Families, this farther is considerable, that perhaps the Lease may be near expiring, perhaps so highly racked and rented even to or above the value, as that the Executor having his Testator's stock taken from it and his by Execution, will not stock it any more, and so the Land lying fresh, if the Lessor shall lose the benefit of his former Distress he shall be perhaps without remedy for his Arrerages of Rent. And if the case were of a Distress for Rent behind after the Testator's death, I conceive, though not so strongly, for most of the reasons above said, that the Law would be all one as in the other Case: for though in this Case respect shall not be had to the Executor

is upon whose Goods the Law casts this Debt, though not the other ; yet here the point of loss must fall either upon the Lessor losing his Distress, or upon the other Creditor by Specialty or Record losing wholly or in part his Debt. And in respect of this local tie upon this Land for payment of the Rent, whereto even the Fealty of the Lessee and Tenure of the Land bindeth him, I think no act that the Lessee can doe by entring into Bonds or Statutes, or having Judgment against him, can hinder the Lessor or Reversioner from taking his remedy upon this leased Land for the Rent therefore due ; but rather any other Creditor shall be a loser in his Debt. Doubtless, if in bar to the Avowry for this Rent due either before or since the Testator's death the Executor will plead, that the Testator was indebted 1000 l. by Statute, Recognizance, or Judgment, which is more then all his Goods amounted unto ; it will be no good plea, but may be demurred upon. What he plead so much Debt of Record to the Crown ? Surely I doubt whether this plea will be allowed in any other Court then in the *Exchequer* : yet if these Arrears of Rent shall be levied upon the

*Vide Bro.
Pledg. 31.*

the Land, so as either the Executor must pay it, or lose the Cattel distrained by a Return irreplevisable, and the shall not have sufficient to satisfy the Debt to the Crown; I see not how he shall well escape, when pursued in the *Exchequer* to make up this Crown-debt out of his own purse, which is hard. For this we may pitch upon as a Maxim and Principle, that an Executor, where no default is in him, shall not be bound to pay more for his Testator then his Goods amount unto. Again, it is a rule that where nothing is to be had, *viz.* justly to be had, the King loseth his right and our Books tell us, the King's Prerogative must not doe wrong. *Potestas est, non injuria: nam potestas injuria non est Dei, sed Diaboli.* On the other side, it may be said, that if Land leased come to the King by Grant, Outlawry, or otherwise, the Rent reserved cannot be distrained for; and therefore it is not very unreasonable nor incongruent that the King's interest for his Debt should make the Distress of a Subject stand by and give place. This therefore among other of the Premisses do I leave as a *Quære*: nor is it altogether unprofitable

So Braſton.

ple either for an Executor or Creditor know what ways and passages, what ways and contingents be doubtfull and tedious. And if in these unbeaten paths, where our Books and Relations have held forth no light express or particular, I have erred in mis-resolving, or missing to solve; I hope I shall without difficulty obtain pardon.

Now let us consider of Assumptions or promises made by the Testator upon due consideration; the performance thereof, or making recompence and satisfaction for not performing, doth lie upon an Executor, as before is shewed. These therefore are to come behind, and to be placed unto all the former; so as an Executor this way or for these sued may be paid Debts by Specialty, Rent, &c. amounting to the whole Goods. And yet these Debts by Contract or Assumption express are to be satisfied before Legacies be to be had. First, because by the Common Law of the Land those are recoverable and so are not Legacies. Next, because, as our Books speak, it concerns the Soul of the Testator to have *as alienum*, all his Debts and Debts to other men, satisfied before the Debtor's voluntary Gifts or Bequests.

Co. lib. 9. fo. 88. b. Doct. & Stu. lib. 2. cap. 10 & 11.

quests. Also these Debts by Assumpsit or simple Contract are to be satisfied for the reasonable part of the Wife Children, to which by Custome in some Counties they are intitled. See 21 *Ed.* 21. and 2 *Ed.* 4. 13. and 2 *Hen.* 6. 16. And note that in such an Action upon the Contract it is not of necessity to lay or set forth the Declaration that the Defendant hath *Assets* to pay all Debts by Specialty, and this also : but if there want, the Defendant must alledge that in his excuse, else it shall be presumed that he hath *Assets*. So also in an Action upon a Contract grounded upon the Executor's own Assumption to pay his Testator's Debt : and yet, as the L. *Coke* conceives, and upon good reason, as to me it seems, if the Executor so promising had not *Assets* sufficient in his hands to pay this Debt promised, he pleading *Non assumpsit*, may give that in evidence ; for then the consideration faileth ; as also if there were no such Debt due, since the Plaintiff could not have recovered if he had sued, and his forbearance to sue was no valuable consideration.

Co. l. 9. fo. 90. b. *Pinchon's Case* ; and fo. 94. *Dane's Case*.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Devastation or Wasting.

That which St. *Paul* of Dispensers Spiritual (who are as it were the Executors of the last Will and Testament of our Saviour *Christ*) doth say or enjoyn, *viz.* that they must *be found faithfull*; the same is required of these les or inferior Dispensers, the Executors of mens Wills: and hereof they are to be readfull, not onely in respect of escaping damage to their own Estates, but more especially in respect of an Oath which divers of our Books mention to be taken by Executors. And in one of the Books of Relations of Cases in the twentieth year of *Edw. 7.* his time, there is an expression of three things whereto the office of an Executor tieth him. 1. To doe truly, and whereto are they sworn, saith this Book. To be diligent, *viz.* with sedulity to attend the discharge of the trust. 3. To be lawfully; nor well can this latter be without knowledge what is lawfull

Q

or

or required by the Law. Now what formerly said of the right Method and order of payment of Debts, discovereth much part how and by what ways an Executor may waste and mis-spend his Testator's Goods, and consequently incur Devastation, and so make his own Goods liable. But of that more fully and particularly by it self. And herein we will consider of these parts.

1. What shall be said to be a Wasting or Devasting, and how many ways this may be done.

2. Who shall by this Act be charged to yield recompence.

3. Who shall take the Benefit or Advantage of it.

4. How far or in what measure the Advantage shall be taken.

5. What way or by what means this shall be had.

As to the first: this Wasting is done divers ways. 1. By the Executor himself plain, palpable and direct giving, selling, spending or consuming the Testator's Goods after his own will, leaving Debts unpaid. 2. By paying what is not to be pay'd; which yet is to be understood where there are Debts payable, and unpaid.

pay'd. 3. By the way formerly discours'd of, *viz.* the not observing the right method and order of payment. 4. By as-
 —
 signing to a Legatee's having a thing be-
 beathed, Debts being unpay'd. 5. By sel-
 —
 ling Goods of the Testator's at an under-
 value; for (be the Appraisement what it
 all, and let him sell for what he will) he
 must stand charged to the best and utmost
 value towards the Creditors. Yet if upon
 Judgment against the Testator or the
 Executor the Sheriff sell some of the Te-
 —
 stator's Goods at an under-value, this is
 a Vastation of the Executor, for this differ-
 —
 ence *Hody* chief Baron makes. But since
 the Executor may haply prevent this act of
 the Sheriff, by paying the due sum upon
 sale of the Testator's Goods at the best va-
 —
 lue or otherwise, he is to be blamed to
 leave it to the Conscience of the Sheriff or
 Under-Sheriff rather. 6. And lastly, this
 may be done to the Executor's smart by
 undue, *viz.* not legal, discharging of any
 debt or Duty pertaining to the Testator,
 and that divers ways requiring heedful-
 —
 ness. As if an Executor upon a Bond of
 two hundred pounds forfeited for pay-
 —
 ment of 100 l. accept the Principal, or
 perhaps also some Use, Costs, or Damage,

12 E. 3.
Fitz. 91.

Yet on the
other side, if
an Executor
by payment
of a 100 l.
get in a for-
feited Bond
of 200 l. it
shall be an
Administ.
but of 110 l.
27 H.8.6. P.
Fitz. inst.

and give a Release or Acquittal of the whole forfeited Bond, or of all Action or upon Record acknowledge Satisfaction upon Judgment had; this is a Waiving so much as the penal sum is more then received, and so far his own Goods shall be liable to Creditors not satisfied: and doubtless is it, if he do but give up the Bond, having no Judgment upon it though he neither make Release, nor acknowledge Satisfaction. But his verbal Agreement to require or sue for no more or his giving a Note of receipt for so much as he hath received, or delivering of the Bond into a friend's hands or into a Court of Equity in way of Security to the Debtor, that he shall not be sued for more, is no Devastation, since still the rest in Law remains due and suable. So this sets no more upon the Executor's score then he received. But let him take heed of Releasing, except he be sure there be no other Debts demandable. Nor onely is there danger in Releasing of Debts, but of Trespasses or other causes of Action also. As if one take away Goods from the Testator, or from his Executor; if the Executor make him a Release, this is a Devastation, and makes his own Goods liable to the

the whole value of the Goods released :
 as appears by *Russel's Case*, where the
 Release of an Infant, Executor to one who
 had taken and committed to his use Jew-
 els and Goods of the Testator, being plea-
 ded, the Release was therefore held void
 in respect of Nonage; for that if it should
 have stood good, it had amounted to a
devastavit, and made the Executor's own
 Goods liable; which, his Infancy con-
 sidered, had been hard. Another way of
 discharging dangerous to Executors is,
 committing matters of Debt or Duty, or
 touching Goods taken away, to Arbitra-
 tors. For if by the award of the Arbitra-
 tors the Debtors or Wrong-doers be dis-
 charged or acquitted without making full
 recompence, the rest of the value will (as
 other Creditors) sit upon the Executor's
 shoulders, because it was their voluntary act
 thus to submit it to Arbitrators. Thus may
 Executors fall under prejudice, not onely
 by wilfull Wasting or unfaithfull miscarri-
 age, (wherein they are not to be pitied)
 but through incogitancy and unskilfulness
 also. Nay, I may say truly, that it is very
 hard for Executors in some cases to walk
 safely: for besides that, to find out all Judg-
 ments and Recognizances by or against
 their

their Testators is of some difficulty more than for Statutes, whereof by search in a Office descry may be had ; yet with this difference, that Statutes-Merchant and Statutes-Staple may be and stand effectually against Executors, though not inrolled albeit against Purchasers of the Conusor Land they be not of force, if neglect of Inrollment within three months. But where Statutes or Recognizances lie for performance of Covenants upon Sale or Lease of Lands, Marriage, Agreement or otherwise ; how hard is it for Executors to know whether any Covenant be broken or not ? how hard to be sure they find out all Bonds, Bills, Covenants and Articles in writing, made and kept by others, whereby any money is due and payable before Debts by Contract or Legacies as also all Promises or Debts by Contract payable before Legacies ? For the Law hath prescribed no time for their claim and demand : and whether some such thing or mean of publication were not fit to be enacted, let the judicious consider. To attain to this knowledge of the Testator's Debts, I remember that it is by the Lord *Brook* reported, that in King *Hen.* the 8 his time Sir *Edmund Knightly*, being Executor

cuton

tor to Sir *William Spencer*, made Pro-
clamation in certain Market-Towns, that
the Creditors should come by a certain
day, and claim and prove their Debts ; but
for this was committed to the *Fleet*,
and fined. For that none may make Pro-
clamation, saith the Book, without War-
rant or Authority from the King, except
Mayors and such like Governours of
Towns, who by Priviledge or Custom may
doe. But the dangers are onely where
there is not sufficient of the Testator's
Goods and Chattels to satisfie both
Debts and Legacies. For where there is
the Executor is not in any such hazard
aforesaid. This descry of Danger may
need Caution; and *Qui timent cavent*,
vitant.

As to the second, we shall have in con-
sideration two sorts of persons, *videlicet*,
his Executors, there being many times
several Executors, and the Waste or Deva-
stated done but by one; 2. the Execu-
tor's own Heirs, Executors and Admini-
strators, *viz.* whether, he dying, this act
shall fix upon them like charge and bur-
den for satisfaction, as upon himself should
have lien in case he had lived.

Touching his Companions, though all

Lib. Intrat.
fol. 327.

Kelw. rep.

fol. 23.

So 11 H. 6.

38. 2.

4 El. Dy. 2.

10. 2. the

Writ so is-

sued against

the Waster

only.

F. 4 H. 8.

rot. 303.

Tr. 34 Eliz.

Pas. 36 Eliz.

together make but one Executor, yet mis-doing of one shall not charge the r nor make their Goods liable to reco pence ; as both appears by the Book Entries, and was also held in the time Henry the seventh, *Ann.* 12. of his Rei Yea of the same opinion were the Jud twice in the late Queen's time, viz. fi in a Case between *Walter* and *Sutton*, the *Common Pleas*, and shortly after the *King's Bench*, in a Case betwe *Hankeford* and *Metford* ; though th two Cases be not reported in Print. A surely this stands with rules of Reason Justice, that each should bear his o burthen : If it were otherwise, ma would decline and abandon Execute ships, as very dangerous to the most h nest and faithfull, in case they were subje to racking by the miscarriage of the Collegues.

As for the Executors or Administrato of the wasting Executor dying before I have born the burthen of this mis-doin I have found contrary opinions, even the late Queen's time. For first, in th *Exchequer* it was conceived to be as Trespass dying with the person, as comin within the Rule, *Actio personalis moritu*

persona. But in the said case of *Walter Sutton* the Court of Common Pleas
 of contrary opinion, viz. that this
 is not escaped by the death of this Mis-
 er, but the Law would pursue his Execu-
 tors or Administrators, and lay upon their
 backs the burthen of Recompence or Satis-
 faction; for that the Testator or Intestate
 doing this wrong had made himself to be
 debtor in the first Testator's stead, and
 therefore they who represent his person
 must with his Goods make amends and
 supply. And this later opinion was some-
 times in time after the former. Also be-
 tween these two times was there an opi-
 nion in the said Court of Common Pleas
 agreeing in part with this later: For
 where a Judgment being had against an
 Executor, and the Sheriff upon the *Fieri*
facias returning that there were no Goods
 of the Testator in the Executor's hands,
 and then this Executor dying, a *Scire*
facias upon a suggestion of Devastation
 by the said Executor deceased was awar-
 ded against his Executor, and that upon
 good debate, and shew of a Precedent
 first, and reported by M. *Jennour* in King
Hen. 8. his time. And it was then said to
 have been clear, that if a Devastation
 on

Mich. 31
 & 32 Eliz.
 Tr. 34 Eliz.

Tr. 34 El.

Mich. 32 &
 33 Eliz.

on had been returned in the life-time of the said wastfull Executor, his Executor then should have been charged. All doubt was, for that here that was done in his life-time; yet at last affirmatively (as above is shewed) the Resolution was.

Touching the third Point, *viz.* whom the advantage of Wasting should accrue, or who by reason thereof should charge this wasting Executor: Put in the case the Testator stood indebted to *A* by Statute, and to *B*, *C* and *D* by Specialty not of Record, as Bond, Bill, &c. and the Executor having no more in Assets then onely an hundred pound, and this all being due to *D*, he payeth him the whole hundred pound, not having any thing left to satisfie any of the rest of the Creditors: hereby wrong is done to none but *A*, who was a Creditor by Statute, and therefore he onely shall make this Executor to pay the like summe out of his own Goods, since as to him onely this is a Devastation, or that it was at his election to pay off the other Creditors, which he would, no Suit being commenced by any of them, consequently no wrong was done to *B* nor *C*. And if no such

Debt had been by Statute, but all been Creditors by Specialty, and *A* y had commenced Suit, and that own to the Executor; now if after he ad all to *D*, He stands onely as to *A* li- in his own Goods, and not to *B* nor . But if the Executor had onely paid a acy or Debt by Contract, leaving no- g for satisfaction of the Debts by Spe- ty, then had he stood equally liable each of the other Creditors. *Capiat qui ere potest*, viz. He who first could re co-, or by the voluntary act of the Exe- or could obtain payment, must be eferred, if the summe would reach n farther. For it shall by this mispay- nt, or misconversion, stand with the Executor as if he had not payed it nor eported from it at all upon the matter: ad therefore I doubt not but it is free for m to give the advantage of this his er- ur to which Creditor by Specialty he will, as he shall stand free from all the rest, o surplusage remaining, nor any Creditor Record being. For if there be any Debt on Record, the Executor sued by a Cre- itor upon Bond may, notwithstanding his his Wasting, plead in bar of this Suit, at there is such a Record of a Debt not sa- tisfied,

If upon Fully administred pleaded to one, *vel aliter*, he have the advantage of this Vastation, taking up the whole Sum wasted, *Quæ*. how the Executor shall relieve himself against another.

tisfied, and that he hath no more t
that Debt amounts unto, and so ad
so much still in his hands as he hath n
administred, though in kind it be no
his hands, but mis-spent, or unduly pay
as aforesaid. And what is before shew
of the Statutes precedency before Bon
in taking the advantage against an Exec
tor for devasting or wasting, the same is
be understood of precedency of Jud
gments before Statutes, and of Debts to
King before Judgments, &c.

As touching the fourth Point, *viz.* Ho
far the Executor thus wasting shall inc
damage or make his own Goods liable
Doubtlesse; no farther then the value
the Testator's Goods wasted or mis-a
ministred. Therefore if one have a
vantage thereof to the full summe,
other after shall; for he is no farther
Trespasser or Wrong-doer, nor is the Te
stator's Estate any farther or deeplie
damnified. And as Damages for Trespa
are to be proportioned to the value of th
Wrong done and loss sustained; so al
so in this case the Executor by his mis
doing doth not draw upon himself hi
Testator's whole Debts, but so much onely
as the Goods amounted to which he did
mis-

administer, and which should have
 be to the payment of the Testator's
 Debt, if he had not so misguided himself
 in the office of Executorship; which de-
 fault he must repair or make good. And
 a proportion seems to me proved by
 the Case in *K. Edm. 3.* where the value or 41 E.3.31.
 quantity is found, especially of the Goods
 administered wrongfully, though there by a
 wrongfull person: and in *Sutton's Case* it
 was expressly held, that each Executor
 should answer for so much as he wasted.

Now for the fifth and last Point, *viz.*
 how and in what manner Relief shall be
 had upon this point of Wasting, for him to
 whom it pertains: First, this is to be ob-
 served, That in case where the Verdict
 is directly against the Plaintiff, no
 Devastation can come in question, for
 that no Judgment being for the Plaintiff,
 no Writ of Execution can issue; and there-
 fore, if upon the issue of Fully admini-
 strated it shall appear that there hath been
 Devastation, which causeth *Assets* to fail,
 then must the Jury find that the Defen-
 dant hath *Assets*, and not find a Devasta-
 tion, as was resolved in the *King's Bench*
 in the late Queen's time between *Hanke-*
rd and *Metford*: for there the Jury find-
 ing

Plas. 36 El-
in 6. reg.

ing a Devastation, viz. a Surrender of Lease for years left by the Testator, was held void and nugatory, and was not regarded by the Court, which said that it must come in by the Sheriff's Return, viz. upon the *Fieri facias*. Thus *Assets* being found in the Executor's hands, Judgment is given for the Plaintiff to recover the Debt, and to have it levied of these *Assets*; nor is this finding of them by a Jury against truth, though they be wasted, as so not to be had in kind; for the Executor hath them in right, since he hath not rightfully parted from them; according to the Rule, *Pro possessore habetur qui dolo (in injuriâ) desit possidere*. As in the Case first put this Wasting cannot come in question for want of a Judgment for the Plaintiff; so also where the Judgment it self extendeth to the Executor's own Goods by reason of some false Plea, whereof we shall after consider: for since that the consequence and effect of a Devastation is but to make the Executor's own proper Goods liable to the Debt of the Creditor, this is altogether needless where the Judgment it self hath laid hold on his Goods. But now in case where the Judgment extends onely to the Testator's

Good

Gods in the Executor's hands, let us find
 a way to relieve the Creditor, in case the
 Testator's Goods be wasted by mis-admin-
 istring or otherwise; for hereabout the
 right way hath often been missed, and a-
 gain easily may be. In the latter end of the
 12 Qu. time, this course was taken, viz.
 The Sheriff returning generally, that the
 Executor had no Goods, a Surmise was en-
 tered, that the Executor had converted to
 his own use the Testator's Goods, where-
 upon a Writ was awarded to the Sheriff
 to enquire thereof by Jury or Enquest,
 which he did, and returned, that it was
 found that the Executor had wasted the
 Goods; and thereupon a *Scire facias* was
 awarded against the Executor, to shew
 cause why Execution should not be of his
 own Goods; and upon two *Nihil*s return-
 ed, Execution was so awarded: but a Writ
 of Error was hereupon brought. And
 though it were said, for defence of that
 course, that it was usual in the *Common*
pleas, and more favourable then the o-
 ther course, where the Sheriff onely re-
 turneth the Wasting, or is sole Judge
 thereof, whereas here it was found by
 an Inquest of Jurors, and thereupon a
scire facias awarded; yet did the Court
 resolve

45 El. Pet-
 tifer's Case.
 Co. lib. 5.
 fol. 32.

resolve the contrary, and reverse this Execution as erroneous : for it was said, t upon the Sheriff's return of *Nulla bo. viz.* that there were no Goods of the Testator to be found, the Plaintiff sh^o have a special Wait of *Fieri facias*, w^o ling the Sheriff to levy the sum recovered either of the Goods of the Testator, or if it could appear that the Executor had wasted the Testator's, then levy it of his own Goods. And this w^o as was said, the Executor hath good remedy by Action against the Sheriff, if without just cause he levy it of his Goods but the other way, *viz.* when Inquest is thereupon taken, the remedy fails since neither the Sheriff doing according to the Inquest can be punished, nor Jurors finding falsly are subject to an Attaint, it being no Verdict upon Issue joyned, but an Inquest of Office, which excludeth also all challenge of Jurors. And whereas that Book mentions the Sheriff's subjection to Action onely in case of his mis-feasance or doing wrong, conceive that he is likewise suable for omission or non-feasance in this case, viz. for not levying the Debt upon the Executor's own Goods, where proof is made

So 9 H.6.
f. 9.

See Paston,
11 H.8.16.
36. upon
surmise that
A hath wasted, a *Fieri facias* may
issue against
his Goods
onely, if so,
d^oc.
So lib. Int.
fol. 11.

his Wasting. And where the Book mentions this *Fieri facias* to be in this manner upon the Sheriff's return in a *Sci-facias*, doubtless the Book therein is mis-printed, and should be a *Fieri facias*; for in a *Sci. fac.* the Sheriff can return nothing but that he hath warned the party, that he hath nothing whereby he may be warned. This then is the course there prescribed, that first a general *Fieri fac.* go out, and that thereupon the Sheriff return generally, that the Defendant hath no Goods of the Testator's, and that thereupon the said special Writ is to issue. Yet at the beginning of the late Queen's time, when the Verdict passing for the Plaintiff upon the Issue of Fully administered, the Sheriff was not permitted to make such a general return of no Goods to be found of the Testator's, but was enforced by the Court upon good advisement either to levie the Debt, or to return a *Devastavit*: and so it was done at last by the Sheriffs of London; much against their mindes; and thereupon went out a Writ to levie the Debt of the Executor's own Goods, first in London, and after into *Devonshire*, upon a *Testatum* that the Executor had no Goods there. And it was there said, that

2 El.D. 185.
VWoodw.
and Chichester's Case.

if no Goods could be there found, th
 the Plaintiff might have a *Capias* to ta
 the Executor's Body in Execution, or
Elegit for the moyety of his Lands. B
 certainly I cannot finde (except with
 difference) how this course of inforci
 the Sheriff to doc one of these two can
 just; as neither could Justice *Fultho*
 in the time of K. *Henry* the sixth appro
 it. For a Jury of one County may fin
Assets in another County, as was reso
 ved in the time of K. *Henry* the 8th, whi
 yet was understood of Goods moveab
 and not of Lands. This then thus being,
 a Jury of *Kent* find *Assets* which be
London or *Essex*, how can the Sheriff
Kent, where the Action was laid, lev
 the Debt recovered by or out of the
 Goods? or, since he cannot, why shou
 he be compelled to make a false Retu
 of a Wasting, when the Goods rema
 unspent and unwaisted in another Cou
 ty? Why rather should he not be su
 fered to return according to truth, th
 there is nothing within his County o
 Bayliwick whereof the Debt may b
 levied, since even his Oath tieth him
 make a true Return? Nor is this contrar
 to the Verdict, finding *Assets* generally

II H. 6. f.
 28. 28 H. 8.
 Dy. 3. Y. a
 Co. lib. 6. f.
 47, 48. Af-
 sets in Ire-
 land, or
 elsewhere
 beyond the
 Sea, may be
 found by the
 Jury where
 the Action is
 laid.

For the Pl.
 may, if he
 will, suggest
 the being of
Assets in a
 forein
 County, and
 this is usual-
 ly done.
 See lib. intr.
 II. a. Action
 upon the
 Case for a
 false Return
 of Devastat.
contra sacra.
pro debitum;
 23 H. 8.

and this so returned upon a *Testatum*, the process may be directed into the right County. But in the said Case it was replied to the Plea of Fully administered, that there were *Assets* in *Essex*, the Action being laid in *Middlesex*; and yet, as it seems by the Book, the Trial was to be by Jury of *Middlesex*, which, saith the Book, may find the *Assets* in *Essex*: but there the Plea was demurred upon, and held a good Plea; which proves, that although the transitoriness of the *Assets* makes them subject to the notice of a foreign Jury, yet it is not like an act transitory, and not local, nor that must be pleaded to be done in the place where the Action is laid, though in truth not so. But had Issue been joyned upon the point, methinks it should be tried in *Essex*, where the *Assets* be laid; the rather, for that perhaps they may be real Chattels, viz. Lands leased to the Testator, or other Lands of him appointed to be sold for payment of Debts, which, as heretofore hath been held, a Jury of another County cannot finde. Besides, although such a foreign Jury may finde other movable *Assets*, yet is it at their election, they are not thereto compellable, as elsewhere is holden. Here then

2 *Ma. Bro.*
Attaint 104.
Co. 10 El.
Dyer 271.
 Because lo-
 cal & fixed,
 otherwise
 held, 3 *Fac.*
in com. ba.
Co. lib. 6. f.
 46, 47.
 22 *E. 4. 9.*
Co. 2 Ma.
Bro. Att.
 104. 18 *H. 7.*
Kelw. rep.
 51. a. So held
 P. 31. *El.*
in Scaccar.

may be the difference, *viz.* That if the *Assets* be found to be in the County where the Triall is, there the Sheriff of that County cannot return *Nulla bona*, without adding, that the Executor hath wasted: but if there be no Verdict at all touching *Assets*, Judgment passing against the Executor upon a Demurrer, Confession, *Nihil dicit*, or the like; there may the Sheriff make such a Return of *Nulla bona Testatoris*, without returning any Devastation and so also where the Verdict either findeth *Assets* generally, not finding in what place they be; or expressly findeth them to be in another County, as a little before we found may be done by a Jury of London of *Assets* in Essex.

In King Henry the 8th his time, a little after the said Chichester is by the Lord Dyer reported, the Sheriff returning upon the *Fieri facias*, that the Executors had no Goods of the Testator's, did add in the same Return, that one of the two Executors had wasted, and thereupon a *Sci. fac.* was awarded against him; & upon *Sci. feci* returned, & Default made, Execution was adjudged, and awarded against his Goods only. And this course of *Sci. fac.* both the L. Dy. (as elsewhere I find it reported) & *Prisot temp. H. 6.* approved. But

I an

So if the
Process for
Execution
go into ano-
ther County
then where
the Verdict
found, as the
difference
was held in
Scac. 31 El.
28 H. 8. Dy.
30. b.
Plf. 4 H. 8.
rot. 303.
4 El. Dyer
210.
But *3 H. 6.*
12. without
any *Sci. fac.*
upon the
Devast. re-
turned, a
Capias was
awarded by
the Court;
and see *9 H.*
57. Bro. Ex.
57. b. Lib.
mir. 320.
A *Fieri fac.*
absolutely
and without
condition.

I am perplexed with doubt what Plea the Executor coming in upon the *Scire facis* could plead; for except his deniall of Wasting might be pleaded contrary to the Sheriff's Return, and put in Issue, so as to cause a new Triall after a former, perhaps preceding, Judgment, which I think would not be admitted, then his coming in is to little purpose, for ought I can conceive. Here again it must be observed, that in the Case of *Chichester* the Judgment was had upon triall of Folly administred; but in the other Case in the time of King *Henry* the eighth it was upon Confession; which is all one, as I take it, with condemnation upon Demurrer, or *Non sum informatus*, or Triall upon *Non est factum*, to the Bond, or a Release to the Testator, or the like. Now between all these and that of *Chichester* there is a broad difference: for there the Defendant being convinced by Verdict to have *Assets*; which if they continue not in his hands in kind must be answered out of his own Goods as wasted, therefore the *Fieri fac.* to levy the Debt of the Testator's Goods, if any found, or in default thereof out of his own Goods, is very agreeable & pursuant; but in none of the other Cases is there any such Trial or conviction of the Defen-

So 9 H. 6.
49, 50. A
manuscript
report.
36 H. 6. 3.
And Mor-
dant, 12 H.
7. Kelw.
rep. 24. But,
Favafor
Just. and all
the other
Serjeants &
contr. 2 El.
D. 185,

dant's having *Assets*, so as it rests *æquidubium* whether they have *Assets* or not and therefore it may seem somewhat hard and harsh to send out such a Writ in the Case; and so should I have thought, if had onely seen the Report of *Pettifer* Case. But looking into the Record, & finding the Condemnation there to be by *Nihil dicit* in effect, I cannot uphold any distinction of course in respect of the said difference of Cases. Nor indeed doth the course there directed presume that the Executor either hath *Assets*, or hath wasted them, but commands that if *Assets*, &c then the levying shall be one way; if Wasting, then another way: so if neither *Nihil fiend*.

Co. lib. 5. fo.
31. Mic. 41
Eliz. rot.

2. 4.

Co. lib. intr.

266. b. A recovery of

Debt precedent was

pleaded: Pl.

replied *Nul*

tiel Record,

and Defend.

would not

maintain his

Plea. *Ideo*

condemp. If

neither, he

must so re-

turn, and do

nothing.

CHAP. XIV.

Of an Executor of his own wrong.

TO begin with some definition or description of this man; He is such a man as takes upon him the Office of an Executor by intrusion, not being so constituted by the Testator or deceased, nor for want

ant of such Constitution substituted by the Ordinary to administer. Touching whom we will consider in these parts, and with this method, viz.

1. What acts or intermeddlings of such one, not being Executor nor Administrator by right, shall make him to become an Executor by wrong. *Vide* five more, *per Stat. 43 El. cap. 8.*

2. In what manner and by what name such shall be sued, specially when another then he is Executor or Administrator, or himself after such act becomes Administrator.

3. How far he becomes liable to Creditors, and how, and to whom.

4. What acts done by him shall stand firm as if he had bin an Executor by right.

5. See a late Stat. 43 *El. cap. 8.* hereabout.

As to the first, it was in the time of Queen *Mary* doubted, and not resolved, whether the onely seising and taking into one's hands the Goods of the deceased did make one Executor of his own wrong, without any farther act. And in the beginning of the late Queen's time the *L. Dyer* said, that the possession and occupation of or meddling with the Goods is that which gives notice to Cre-

I. Point.

I. & 2 F. &

M. Dy. 103.

b.

I El. Dyer

166 & 167.

So also Bel-

kn. 50 E. 1.

3. 9.

ditors whom they are to sue as Executors. But doubtless Creditors must look farth before Suit; for else can they not know whether he so intermeddling be Executor or Administrator; nor consequent how to found their Suit rightly and safely for good success; since a Suit against an Executor as Administrator, or against an Administrator as Executor, will prove ruinous, and fall to the ground. Yea when an Administrator sued as Executor did not plead that Administration was committed unto him, but generally denied that he was Executor, or administered as Executor; the Lord *Dyer* held that it must be found for him, yet left it doubtfull: but the clear and safe way had been to have pleaded the Administration, &c. And in the former Case the Lord *Dyer* said, that one intermeddling only about the Funerals and laying out money therefore, as Overseer or Conductor, or he who hath Letters of the Ordinary *ad colligend. viz.* to get and keep the Goods in safety, and one who intermeddleth by virtue of a Will truly made, but controlled by a latter Will after found and proved, may free himself from being an Executor of his own wrong, by specially pleading

13 & 14 El.
Dy. 305, 306

1 El.D. 166,
& 167. See
Lib. mtr.
322. b.

leading how or in what right he inter-
 meddled, and traversing his Administring in
 other manner : and that this Traverse need
 not, nay may not be, was held in the time
 of King *Henry 6.* and *7.* for that such
 amounts not to any Administring at
 all ; and where no Administring at all
 is confessed, such a Traverse of not Ad-
 ministring in other manner is dissonant,
 and not legal. But let us look back upon
 these severall points exempted by the
 Lord *Dyer*, and we shall see some cau-
 ses necessary touching them and their
 entertainment. First, as touching the
 point of Burying the dead, it must be un-
 derstood to be with some expence of the
 deceased's Goods, and so it is expressed in
 the said Book of *Hen.* the *6.* his time : else
 it is a man out of Charity to lay out of his
 own money (not intermeddling with the
 Goods of the deceased) to bury a friend,
 with little colour to involve him so do-
 ing in an Executorship by wrong. Tak-
 ing the Case then, that such person laies
 out or expends of the deceased's Goods
 money upon his Funeral, heed must be
 taken touching the measure and propor-
 tion whereabout. Though I can give no
 particular and distinct limit, yet doubt-
 lesse

12 H. 6. 28.
 10 H. 7. 28.
 Yet *Lib. in-
 tra.* 321. b.
 where he
 confessed a-
 bout Funer-
 all, he tra-
 versed *aliter.*
Lib. intra.
 321. where
 by Letter *ad
 collig.* he
 traversed,
*Absq; hoc
 quod &
 Exec.*

21 H. 6. 21.

lesse either meer necessity, viz. Church duties, &c. or at least decent Sutable to his quality, must be the bound. And herein to speak as I think, this latter must either be utterly excluded, or held within very narrow compasse: what reason that a Knight or man of higher quality, leaving (though perhaps entailed Lands of good value) yet Good not sufficient to pay his Debts, should have an hundred pounds or more of that which should satisfy Creditors spent in pompous interring of him for his Worth and reputation? Next, Overseers may onely be excused for seeking to preserve and keep the Testator's Good not in case they expend or dispose thereof. So also for him who is authorized by the Ordinary to collect; for if he or dispose of any, (though Goods otherwise subject to perishing) it makes him an Executor by wrong, as was resolved in the late Queen's time, notwithstanding that by the Ordinarie's Letters was expressly directed or warranted so to doe; for it was said, the Ordinary himself could not so doe. As for him who administred by virtue of a Will after approved, or controlled by a Letter,

Lib.int. 322.
8 & 9 *Eli.*
Dyer 255,
256. He sold
blended
Corn, but
there he
pleaded not
the special
matter.

It not doubtlesse stand free for the
 Goods before administred, but either
 rightfull or wrongful Executor stand
 liable to the Creditors. Nor doth every
 intermeddling by one out of all these
 causes and evasions as would be an
 administration, make one an Executor
 by wrong. If one do but take an Horse
 of the deceased, and tie him in his House
 stable, this makes him not an Execu-
 tor, saith *Paston* a Justice, or like
 to intermeddlings; as he that delivers
 the Wife of the deceased her Apparel,
 at least if it be no more then is conveni-
 ent to her degree. But if she take, or
 rather deliver, more then such to her,
 or he becomes an Executor by
 wrong. But now let us come to a dis-
 tinction, where there is a rightfull Execu-
 tor, and a Will by him proved, or Ad-
 ministration committed; for there such
 intermeddlings shall not
 make one an Executor by wrong, as
 where there is no other of right to be suc-
 ceeded. As if one take Goods wrongfully
 from such a right Executor or Admini-
 strator, this (though he convert them
 to his own use) makes him not an Exe-
 cutor by wrong, but a Trespasser to the
 right-

1 & 2 P. &
 Ma. Dy. 185.

21 H. 6. 28.

33 H. 6. 32.
 1 Eliz. Dy.
 166.

Tr. 37 Eliz.
 by Fenner.
 Just. If one
 doe any
 such act as
 pulls the
 Property
 out of the
 Executor,
 he is become
 an Executor
 by wrong.

If the Goods be aliened by fraud, he who takes them after the Executor's death is an Executor by wrong. *Tr. 37 Eliz. D. 5 E. 4. 72. a.*

rightfull Executor or Administrator, w even for these Goods, once *Assets* in hands, stands liable to Suits of Creditors they being neither lawfully evicted nor rightly administred: but in case there had been no Executor at that time, or no Will proved, nor Administration committ then such taking of the deceased's Goods into a strange hand had made an Executorship by wrong. And thus was the difference lately resolved, as is reported by *L. Coke* in the Case between *Read* and *Carter* in the *Common Pleas*.

Tr. 2. Jac. in com. b. Co. lib. 5. 53 & 54.

1 Eliz. D. 160. b.

7 H. 5. 20.

Yet this farther difference was then held, *viz.* That although there be an Executor or Administrator by right, yet if a Stranger take upon him to receive Debts and make Acquittances, or to pay Debt claiming to be an Executor, he is sual as an Executor by this Act: and so was in the late *Q.* time was held by 6 Just. touching the receipt of Debts and making Acquittances; but the Book mentions not whether any other Executor then were, not. But in the point of bare payme of Debts *Frowick* makes another difference, *viz.* If a Stranger do with his own money pay the Debts of a Friend deceased, and not with the Debtor's; this

an Act of Charity, and makes him not
 an Executor by wrong : otherwise, if
 with the Debtor's money. Yet to this a-
 nother difference must be added, *viz.* That
 he thus paying with his own money,
 have taken into his own hands Goods of
 the deceased ; then is his payment pre-
 sumed as by or out of the value of these
 Goods, and so makes him an Executor by
 wrong. Contrarily, if he have no such
 Goods in his hands. And in the point of
 meddling with and disposing of the
 Testator's Goods, where another Execu-
 tor is, this farther difference is to be ad-
 ded or understood, *viz.* That where the
 Goods so taken never came actually to
 the Executor's hands, but were in a re-
 mote place, there this taker becomes Exe-
 cutor. For as it were mischievous to the
 Executor, if he should by a possession in
 Law cast upon him stand chargeable with
 these Goods in remote places purloyned,
 as *Assets* in his hands ; so were it as mis-
 chievous to Creditors, if neither Executor
 or right, nor this Stranger as an Executor
 or wrong, should stand liable to Creditors
 for them. It is true, that the right Exe-
 cutor may sue and recover Damages for
 them, and that so recovered shall be
Assets ;

Assets ; but the Creditor hath no m
at the Common Law to inforce him
sue, and perhaps it may be a cold S
And with these Additions I think
late resolved difference may stand f
and sound. Yet in former times, with
such difference, the taking oneiy and p
fession of the Goods of the deceased
held to create an Executorship by wro
as *Belknap* said in the time of King *E*
the third ; and especially if the Act w
such as removed the Property of the ri
Executor , as Justice *Fenner* in the l
Queen's time said, *teste meipso*.

50 E. 3.
fol. 9.

Tr. 3. Eli.

*How and by what name Suit shall be
gainst such and the like.*

2. Point.

L. 5 E. 4.
72. Co. lib.
5. 30, 31,
or 32. b. 21
H. 6. 8.

TOuching the second Point, viz.
what manner Suit shall be agai
such : First, in general, this usurp
Executor is not in Suit to be distinguisht
by name from the right Executor, b
to be sued generally by the name of Ex
cutor of the last Will and Testament
the Defunct ; and then if he will de
himself so to be, he must plead that
neither is Executor, nor hath admin
fired as Executor. Then the Plaint
mi

must prove that he hath administered in
 the such or the like sort as aforesaid.
 And it hath been divers times held, that
 where there is a right Executor, and yet
 another doth administer by wrong, it is
 the election of Creditors either to sue
 them jointly together, or one or both of
 them severally and by himself. But if
 where Administration is committed, a-
 nother also administers by wrong, these
 cannot be sued together as Administra-
 tors; for though one may be an Execu-
 tor by usurpation or wrong, yet none can
 be to be an Administrator by wrong,
 since no other but such as receiveth that
 power from the Ordinary can so be :
 therefore in that case there is a necessity
 of suing him apart and by himself (who
 usurpeth Administration) by the
 name of an Executor.

So if *A* administer the Goods of *B*, not
 being Executor nor Administrator, and
 after his such doing, and disposing of the
 Goods, he obtaineth Administration of
 the Goods of *B*, but the Goods left or
 coming to his hands since the Administra-
 tion committed suffice not without the o-
 ther Debts received or released, or Goods
 sold before, to satisfy Creditors : now
 if

Co. li. in tra.
 154. But
 145. a. in
 the Verdict
 he is called
 Exec. de
injuria sua
propria. 39
H. 6. 45,
 46. 21 *H. 8.*
 8. 19. 9 *E. 4.*
 14, 15. 1 &
 2 *P. & M.*
Dyer 165.
 33 *H. 6.*
 38.

25 *H. 6.* 31.

R. 3. 20.

21 H. 6. 8.

If the Administration were committed before the Suit began, the VVrit shall abate, else not, as was of old conceived.

if any sue *A* by the name of Administrator, he shall have no farther Relief than according to the value or extent of the Goods left in or come into his hands since the Administration committed; and those be fully administered, he shall get nothing; if they remain unadministered but amount not fully to his Debt, he must wait so much of satisfaction; and if he will be relieved, or satisfied out of the Goods before disposed of, he must sue as Executor of *B*. And so was it ruled and resolved by *Gawdy* and *Suit*, Justices of the *King's Bench*, in the late Queen's time, viz. *Tr. 30 Eliz.* And if this next Administrator will plead in Abatement of this Action that Administration was committed to him, and demand Judgment if Suit shall be against him as Executor, then the Plaintiff must in the Replication, as I take it, set forth the special matter, viz. how the Defendant did administer before Administration to him committed. But if one to whom Administration is committed do devast, and this Administration is by Suit repealed, because he was not the next of kin, and Administration is committed to another; no Creditor who would be relieved out

the Goods wasted, must sue that first as Administrator, and not as Executor of his own wrong, said *Popham* Chief Justice, if he did rightfully administer for that *vid. 8. 185.*
 ne.

AS for the third, *viz.* How far this 3. *Point.*
 Executor of his own wrong becomes How far liable to Creditors.
 liable and obnoxious to Suit; consider these things.

First, he becomes subject both to the Action of the Executor, who hath right to the Goods wrongfully intermeddled with by him, though it were before proving the Will; and also to the Action of the Creditor, who hath right to the Satisfaction of his Debt,

Secondly, as touching the measure how far he is engaged, doubtless he is not by his wrongfull Administring become chargeable with the whole Account of the testator's Debts; but onely so far, and with so much thereof, as the Goods which he wrongfully administered amount unto. Yet he must look to his Plea, else by it he may draw all sued for upon himself; if he deny his being Executor or Administrator.) And this seems to me proved by the Case in the time of *Edward* and the third, where the Inquest found

§

not

Cō. lib. intro.
 144, 145.
Plus de hoc

not onely the Administring or intermeddling by the Executor wrongfully, found also, by direction of the Court, (if it seemeth) what the value was of Goods so wrongfully administred, which had not been material, if the Administring of a peny had made one as chargeable as the Administring of a pound. Besides, if it be so that a rightfull Executor wasting Goods of the Testator to the value of 20 l. shall be farther charged then that value, then doubtless so shall it be also in this case for both be wrongfull Administrations: onely this difference there is between them, that in one case the Administration is by a wrong person, and in the other case in a wrong manner. Nay, the Lord Dyer doth not stick to call him who administred wrongfully, or in undue manner, expressly an Executor by wrong, in the Case of *Steeles* against *Porter*, though he were rightfully Executor, because he did dispose or execute wrongfully.

1 El. Dy.
167. cap. 12.

4 Point.
What acts of
his. of for. e.

AS to the fourth, viz. What acts done to him or by him who is an Executor of his own wrong shall stand firm and good, as done by or to the right Executor

or : Suppose, first, that the deceased
 be indebted to him 20 l. who thus u-
 neth Executorship, whether may he
 himself or not? And this point was
 debated in the *King's Bench* between *M. 40, 41 E.*
Alter and one *Ireland*, Executor of *Hunt*, *Co. lib, 5, f.*
 ere it was strongly objected, that not-
 withstanding the rightfull Executor or
 administrator might punish him, and re-
 ver against him, for the Goods which
 administeth; yet another Creditor su-
 him as Executor generally, and so as-
 signing him to be, (for there is no special
 m of Writ or Declaration to distinguish
 Executor by wrong from a rightfull Ex-
 tor) he stands as against him in the
 e of a rightfull Executor, and therefore
 y first pay himself before he pay o-
 rs : and of that mind at the first were
aner and *Gandy* Justices ; yet did they
 nit that this payment should not stand
 od as against the rightfull Executor or
 administrator. And *Popham* and *Clinche*
 d strongly, that neither should it stand
 od against other Creditors ; for then e-
 vy man would rush upon the Testator's
 Gods, and be his own Carver in payment.
 And whereas it was said at the Bar, that
 the Lord *Anderson*, upon an Evidence at

Guild-hall had ruled it otherwise, *Pop* at another day of debate of the said *C* related, that the Lord *Anderson* did d that he ever so ruled, or was of that op on ; and farther informed, that both he Justice *Walmsley*, *Periam* and *Clark*, rons, did agree with *Popham* and *Clinck* opinion. After which, Justice *Gawdy*, also *Fenner*, if I mistake not, changing th opinions, and concurring with the r Judgment was given accordingly. In debate of this Case question was ma If such an Executor by wrong pay a D to another Creditor by Specialty, whet this shall not stand firm and good, since stands liable to Creditors so far as Goods by him administred do amou And it was agreed, by the better opin at least, that this should stand firm a good ; so as if the payment were out his own Goods, he might retain to him in lieu thereof so much of the Goods the Testator : for here he doth not, as the other Case, advantage himself by own wrong. Yet that opinion, allowi this payment to Creditors, must, as I thin be understood with this difference, *vi* that this payment shall stand as again other Creditors, but not as against t
rig

nt Executor or Administrator : for then
 y Stranger might usurp the Office of Ex-
 tor, and take from him that liberty and
 ction, to prefer which Creditor he will
 irst payment; yea, might take from
 Executor power to pay himself before
 er, in case there were a Debt due to
 , which were very unreasonable.

Addition and Alteration by the Statute
43 Eliz. cap. 8.

NE having considered what the Com- 5. *Point.*
 mon Law is and willeth in the
 emisses : let us now see what Alterati-
 or Addition a late Statute hath made.
 the last Parliament of the late Queen
 zabeth, consideration being had of sub-
 getting into mens hands Goods of an
 estate by Deed of Gift, or Letter of
 urny, from one of small or no ability, to
 om such subtile Contriver hath procu-
 Administration to be committed, and
 himself would stand free from the Suit
 Creditors, the Administrator himself
 er not being to be found, or not be-
 of any value to satisfie Creditors; it
 s therefore enacted, that every person
 eiving or having any Goods or Debts

of any Intestate, or any Release or Discharge of any Debt or Duty belonging him upon any Fraud, as aforesaid, or without consideration of or near the value, (except in satisfaction of some just and principal Debt, to the value of the Goods Debts due from the Intestate) shall be charged as Executor of his own wrong so far as the value of those Goods and Debts amount, deducting all principal just Debts to him due, and Payments to him made, which a lawful Executor ought to have paid. Here have we a touch of all the parts precedent, or at least three of them.

1. We have first a new Executor wrong, though intermeddling under the title of an Administrator.

2. We have a limit of the Charge to him incurred, suitable to our former expression.

3. Lastly, we have to him an allowance of Debts owing to himself, or due to him, or paid to others; which is more than we have conceived allowable to another Executor by wrong.

CHAP. XV.

*Pleas by Executors, and which be best,
which most prejudicial to them.*

Ince amidst the Pleas pleaded by Executors there is such difference, as at some induce one kind of Judgment, some another, some drawing more loss and burthen upon Executors then others: let us consider of the differences, so as right may be taken to chuse the safest or best for each case.

If an Executor do utterly estrange himself from the Executorship, saying, that he was never Executor, nor ever administered as Executor, (for that must be added) when if the Issue be taken upon the Plea, and be found against him, the Plaintiffs shall have Judgment to recover, not Damages only, but even the Debt it self, out of the proper Goods of the Executor, if none of the Testator's can be found to satisfy it. And this shall be thus not onely where it is found that the Defendant was made Executor by the Will, and proved it, and so could not chuse but know it; but even also

Plea denying the Executorship,
21 H. 6. 19,
20. Bro. 62.
2 E. 4. f. 4.
19 H. 7. 15.

Lib. int.
322, 333.
33 H. 6. 33,
34.

where he had never proved the Will whereof he was made Executor, nor ever Administred by virtue thereof: yea, though he did before the Ordinary refuse to be Executor of this Will, or to intermeddle with the Execution thereof; yet if another named Executor with him did prove the Will, or did not refuse to be Executor, let such other Refuser take heed in pleading that Plea. For truth is against the first part of his Plea, *viz.* that he never was Executor; and so the Verdict, which must be *Veritatis dictum*, must needs pass against him, and make his own Goods liable as well to Debts as Damgages. What if no other were made Executor but this one, who refused before the Ordinary? may he safely plead that he never was Executor? I think not, since he so was Executor before his Refusal, that he might have released all Debts due to the Testator, and given away all his Goods; therefore I think he must plead specially, shewing his Refusal and not generally deny his being Executor. Nay, admit he never was once named, made, or intended to be made Executor, yet having pleaded this Plea, that he never was Executor nor administred as Executor, if it shall be found by Verdict that he

He was liable as soon as the Testator was dead.

did administer or intermeddle as Executor, the same blow or burthen falleth upon him: for then the latter part of this Plea is found untrue, yea the whole upon that matter, for by this Administring he became an Executor of his own wrong, and the deniall of this Executorship by wrong or usurpation shall be as penall to him as the denial of a rightfull Executorship. The like Law, where the Executor reads a Release made to himself, or a payment of the Debt, or other performance of the Condition made by himself. Nay, we find in this latter Case the Judgment entered generally against the Defendant, and against another for his own Debt, notwithstanding he being Executor. And the reason why the Law makes these so penal to an Executor, because his Plea is not onely false, but the falshood thereof was wilfull, since it must of necessity be known to himself to be so. And lastly, for that all these Pleas, if they had proved true, had been perpetual Barrs, at least against the Defendant: the first indeed had not been a Bar against another, being in truth Executor or Administrator. But if the Executor had pleaded a Release made to his Testator, finding such a one among his Writings,

But if he did it as Administrator. it is otherwise; yet see that specially pleaded *Co. lib. int.* 148. a.

See *Co. lib. Intrat.* Judgment so entered. 145. b. Read and *Carter's Case.*

Co. lib. Intr. 29. a. not first *de bonis Testatoris si*, &c.

See *Bro. Ex.* 22. these reasons? for this diff.

33 *H. 6.* 23, 24.

which

So of other
perform. Co.
Lib. intr.
153. and
6 E. 4. 1. 7
E. 4. 8. See
Br. Ex. 22.
That the
Book con-
trarily re-
ported 34
H. 6. 22, 23.
is errone-
ous, as was
descried by
Fitz. & al.
23 H. 8.
the Record
being not so
as the Book
saith the
Judgment
was.

which yet was either forged, or new
both sealed and delivered by the Plaintiff
as his Deed; or if he plead payment
made by his Testator; neither of the
Pleas found against him shall cause the
Judgement to fasten upon his own Goods
so if he denied the Bond or Bill, where
upon the Suit is grounded, to be the Testa-
tor's Deed. For in all these Cases the
truth being not known to him, he might
honestly and reasonably conceive it to
be as he did plead. But what if he
plead Fully administered, and this be
found against him, which rested in his
own knowledge? shall not this false
Plea expose his own Goods, in defect
of his Testator's, to the satisfaction of
this Debt? No, it shall not, for that though
this were a false Plea, and that within his
own knowledge, yet was it not a perpe-
tual Bar; for if it had been so found as
was pleaded, yet *Assets* coming after to
the hand of the Executor, the Plaintiff
should then have Relief and Satisfaction
out of these since accrued *Assets*. If any
ask how *Assets* may after come, I will give
him two or three instances. First, it may
be by recovery of Debts before withhol-
den or of Damages for Goods taken away,

by voluntary payment of a Debt not before due, for that the time of payment is not come. Secondly, if the Testator, giving a Lease for twenty years, did demise the same to *J S* for the whole term, if he so long should live; if he were alive in time of the former Verdict, but now is dead, the term continuing; this is now *Assets*, which before was not, whilst it was but a possibility of a term. Other instances might be given, but these may suffice. If the Executor pleaded that the Testator stood bound in such a statute, or that there was such a Judgment against him of Debt to the King, beyond the satisfaction whereof the Goods would not reach; this is in effect a Fully admitted, though special, and not general; and the Law is alike (as I take it) in all these cases, as to the not making of the Executor's Goods liable. But in all these cases, though the Debt shall not be adjudged upon the Executor's own Goods, yet the Damages shall, in default of the Executor's Goods to satisfy them. And in these cases it is not material whether the Judgment passed upon Trial or Demurrer. Nay, if the Defendant Executor plead no Plea, but confess the Action generally,

Lib. intr.
148, 149.
This good,
though the
Judg. were
by *non sum*
inform. and
an averment
that it was
without Co-
vin.
Co. Lib. int.
152.
11 H. 4. 6.
There a *Cap.*
ad sat. was
awarded for
the Damma-
ges.

or

But he may, I think, forbear so to doe, and to the Judgment for partial, that when more *Assets* come, he shall have more. *Lib. Intrat. fol. 223.*

or be condemned by *Non sum informatus* the Judgment is the same, *viz.* to record the Debt onely out of the Testator's Goods, and the Damgages of the Executor's Goods in default of the Testator's. What if the Executor Defendant confess that he have *Assets* to the value of part of the Debt, not of the whole? There for so much as is confessed the Plaintiff may pray, and have Judgment presently without Damgages, and may maintain for the residue of the Debt, that the Defendant also hath *Assets* for the rest, and so goe to Triall; as appears both by the printed Book of Entries, and another Manuscript which I have. But what if this Triall pass against the Plaintiff? Shall he then have an additional Judgment for Damgages in respect of the former? I think he shall have Costs, which commonly run with or in the name of Damgages; but without a Writ to enquire of Damgages, none being found by Verdicts, the Court doth not usually adjudge Damgages. Yet in the Book of *Entries* I find 6s. 8d. Damgages assessed by the Court upon a Confession in a Writ of *Rationab. part. bonorum* against Exec. and this hath much affinity with an Action of Debt. Yea, in the very Action of Debt where the Jurors

ors for miscarriage after their departure
 om the Bar were fined, I find that the
 laintiff renouncing the Assessement of
 ammages by them made, and praying the
 ourt to assess the same, it was done ac-
 ordingly: but this was a special Case.

*M.28.H.6.
 Ro.2.321.
 Lib. Intrat.
 329.2.*

Whereas we before shewed that an
 executor denying his Executorship shall,
 it be found against him, pay the Debt
 of his own Goods for his false Plea; this
 hereabout occurreth to be added, *viz.* that
 that is onely where the immediate Exe-
 cutorship of the Defendant is denied.
 For if *B* be made Executor by *A*, and *B* dy-
 ing makes *C* his Executor; now if *C* be
 sued for the Debt of *A* as Executor of *B*
 Executor of *A*, and he denieth that *B* was
 Executor of *A*, which by consequence is a
 denial of his being now Executor of *A*;
 yet if this fall out in Triall against him, he
 shall not in his own Goods stand liable to
 this Debt, because it is possible that he
 might not know to whom his Testator
 was Executor. So if *A* made *B*, *C* and *D*
 his Executors, and *E* is sued as Executor
 of *D*, the surviving Executor of *A*, if *E* de-
 ny that *D* his Testator survived *B* and *C*,
 by consequence whereof he denieth the
 truth, *viz.* that the Executorship of *A* is
 de-

*See lib. Intr.
 322.*

devolved to him, yet shall not this, found against him, charge his own Goods; for he might be ignorant of this point in fact, *viz.* whether *B*, *C*, or *D*, lived the longest. And here he denied not his own immediate Executorship, but a mediate or more remote Executorship. And so, I think, is the Law, where *C* being sued as Executor of *B*, Executor of *A*, he pleads that *A* by a latter Testament made himself Executor, which is found against him; so as here he falsely pleaded, and pretended himself to be the immediate Executor of *A*, and so denied the mediate Executorship, *viz.* of *B* to *A*, and of him to *B*. Yet *Quære* of this: for why should not as well his false making himself an Executor immediate to the indebted Testator charge his own Goods, as well as his false denying of that Executorship; since both Pleas tend to the overthrow of the Plaintiff's Action, and each equally rested in the Defendant's knowledge? But this difference is between them apparent, *viz.* That the denial of Executorship, if true, is an utter and perpetual Bar to the Plaintiff, as against him so pleading; but the affirming of an immediate Executorship, where he was
sued

ed as Executor mediate, doth not so, if
ue, but directs the Plaintiff to a better
Writ or Action, *viz.* against him as im-
mediate Executor to the indebted Testa-
tor.

Whereas we have before touched upon
the coming of *Assets* futurely to Execu-
tors, I think it is not amiss to consider a
little the form and frame usual in Pleas of
fully administred, which thus run, *viz.*

Quòd die impetr. &c. plenè administravit Lib.int. 151.
omnia bona & catalla quæ fuerunt præd.
temp. mortis suæ, & nihil hab. de bo-
nis, &c. quæ fuer. præd. S. temp. mor-
is, &c.

Thus tying his denial upon the things
which were the Testator's at the time of
his death, what if then the Executor
died at the time of this Plea pleaded
Goods which were not the Testator's at
his death, but since accrued, as before
shewed; or perhaps a Lease for years
sold by the Testator, upon condition to
be void, if five hundred pounds not paid
at such a day, which happening after the
Testator's death, and Default made, the
Term returneth; or, if the Executor
by a Writ of Error reverse a Judgment
given against his Testator for two hun-
dred

7 H. 4. 39.
Bro. 50. This
Plea is not
good, *per*
Cur. because
some may
have since
accrued.

dred pounds, and so is restored thereunto? may the Plaintiff now reply generally, that he hath *Assets* which were Testator's at the time of his death? He can the Jury so find, when the truth is not so? Surely this case is not common, nor can I shew a Precedent of a special Plea therein. But in reason methinks should be specially, and not generally pleaded and set forth in the Replication. And in case where one sued as Executor denieth that he was ever Executor or administered as Executor, I find sometimes the Replication general, that he did administer, without shewing wherein how; and sometimes special, shewing what thing was administered, and when. Here note, that the Executor Defendant denying (as he must) two things, *vid.* 1. that he ever was Executor, 2. that he ever administered as Executor; the Plaintiff in his Replication is tied to maintain but the one of them, as the truth of the case is: that is, if in truth the Defendant were made Executor, but never did administer, now it must be replied that he was made Executor at such a place without speaking any thing of his Administration: on the other side, if he did

Lib. intrat.
322.a.b. but
a place must
be shewed.
So 11 H.6.
19, 20. Br.
62.

Administer, but was not made Executor,
 when onely the Administring is to be repli-
 ed. But if it shall be found that the Defen-
 dant had Administration to him commit-
 ted, and so administred by virtue thereof,
 then is the Verdict to passe for the Defen-
 dant, for this is no Administring as Exe-
 cutor; and upon a general denial there-
 of this may be given in Evidence, as the
 Lord Dyer reports to have been resolved.
 But if the Plaintiff do in his Replica-
 tion maintain both the Points, shall this
 make his Plea double? Methinks it
 should; yet I find it so replied, and no ex-
 ception taken for the Doubleness, *Tr. 17*
H. 8. Rot. 28.

A Sole woman being Executor maketh
 a Deed of gift of the Testator's Goods in
 trust, but continueth possession of them,
 and marrieth *J. S.*, who also hath posselli-
 on of the Goods, and in an Action of Debt
 by a Creditor Fully administred is plead-
 ed: now upon Evidence the Verdict shall
 pass for the Plaintiff; for this Alienation,
 being fraudulent, was void as to all Credi-
 tors, and so as to the Plaintiff the Goods
 continued the Testator's, and so *Assets* in
 the Defendant's hands, as was held in the
King's Bench. If Fully administred be
 T pleaded

So done *Co.*
Li. intr.
104. b.

Mich. 13 &
14 El. Dy.
30.

Lib. intra.
312. b.
Tr. 37 Eliz.

Yet *Finch*
 46 E.3. f. 9,
 10. held the
 contrary,
viz. that
 Judgment
 should be of
 the whole,
 but Executi-
 on onely for
 so much, and
 a *Scire fac.*
 for the rest
 when more
Assets.

See *Coke*
 1.8. fol. 134.

pleaded where the Defendant hath *Assets*
 for part, but not sufficient for all, and
 it is found; yet shall not Judgment be g
 ven for the whole; but for part presentl
 with a farther Award, that when mo
 shall come to the Executor's hand, t
 Plaintiff shall then have farther Judg
 ment for the rest: so as that false Pl
 doth him no prejudice, but makes him
 as good state (the charges of Trial exce
 ted) as if he had confessed himself to ha
 part. And I think the Plaintiff upon th
 confession of part may pray the li
 Judgement, without maintaining that t
 Defendant hath sufficient for the rest; f
 if that be not true, why should he be p
 to the charge of a Trial by Jury? Ye
 Sir *Edw. Coke* at the Bar *Tr. 36 Eli.*
 said, that where Fully administred is ple
 ded, the Plaintiff is not tied to mainta
 the contrary, but may presently pr
 and have Judgment to recover it wh
Assets shall futurely come to the Defe
 dant's hands: which was denied by som
 But truly methinks the Law should
 as he said, as well as in the former cal
 where for the part which the Defenda
 had not *Assets* to pay, it so was done, up
 Verdict so finding. But there, as I con

ive, it was not a present Judgment, but
Award that he should have Judgment
turally; so as after when *Assets* come to
the Defendant's hands, the Plaintiff must
have a *Scire facias* against the Defendant,
shew cause, not why he should not have
execution, but why he should not have
Judgment, as I take it: yea, where it is
found for the Defendant that he hath fully
ministred, yet was it held by all the Ju-
ces, 33 H.6.23,24. and by *Priset* 34 H.
24. that when *Assets* after come to his
hands, the Plaintiff shall have a *Scire*
facias to have Satisfaction out of them:
but there *Markham*, *Retverton* and *For-*
scue were of contrary opinion, and so
as the whole Court 4 H.6. fo. 4. And it
stands with great reason, that where, upon
Verdict fully found against the Plain-
tiff, Judgment is given *Quod nihil capiat*
per Breve, there he cannot have any Writ
to execute the Judgment for him, but is
put to a new Action of Debt: yet where it
is found that the Defendant hath *Assets*
for part of the Debt, but not sufficient for
the whole, there it is very congruous that
the Plaintiff have presently Judgment for
part, and after, when more cometh, then by
Scire facias against the Defendant obtain

So 19 H.6.
f.37. 8 E. 4.
fol.25. See
Judgment
so entred
Co. lib.intr.
151. b.

So 7 E.4.f.7.

Judgment and Execution for the rest : for here both Verdict and Judgment were for the Plaintiff against the Defendant, who Plea that he had no Goods was false , and so found by the Jury. And this difference was strongly avowed by Serjeant *Ham*, *Mich.* 33, 34 *Eliz.* and after approved by *Fenner* Just. 36 *Eliz.* none contradicting it : yet a Book was cited, that the Plaintiff recovering so much as was found in the Executor's hands , should be amerced for the residue ; which *Rolph* Chief Justice denied to be Law.

This 2^d H.
6. 4^o, 4^o.

CHAP. XVI.

Where Judgment shall be against the Executor's own Goods, though no Plea of Defendant nor Vastation do so occasion and of the several manners of Judgment in several Cases.

HOW by Wasting , called by us commonly a *Devastavit* , an Executor may draw down the Execution upon his own Goods , hath formerly been handled and discoursed of ; as also what kind

Pleas do make the Executor's own Goods liable to the Debt, and what not. Now let us see where without Misadmirring or Mispleading, yet the nature of the Action shall lay the whole Debt or being recovered upon the Executor's own Goods. And this we shall find in some few Cases. 1. Where an Executor is sued for Rent behind after his Testator's death, upon a Lease for years made to the Testator, and by him left to his Executor; here it shall be adjudged and levied upon his own Goods; for that so much of the Profits as the Rent amounted to shall be accounted as his own Goods, and not his Testator's; therefore is he to be sued as well in the Debt as in the *Detinet*, where in other Cases he is not, but in the *Detinet* onely, being sued as Executor. So if any thing delivered to or detained by his Testator come to his hands, and he still detains the same after the demand, and be thereupon sued in an Action of *Detinue*; for this is his own act. Nor in this case need he to be named as Executor, for he shall not answer Damages for his Testator's detaining. So if he assume to pay of his Testator's having *Assumpsit*, and be sued upon this *Assumpsit*, the which Debt is to be recovered in Damages,

5 Marie,
fol. 112.

Read and
Norwood's
Case.
Co. lib. Iny.
fol. 1, 2.

ges, and that upon or out of the Executor's own Goods; yet is this Action, and the Assumption, which is the ground thereof, founded in the Executorship, and he having *Assets*; for if either he had not been Executor, or if he had not *Assets* at the time of the promise, it had been *Nudum pactum*, and would not have bound him, nor given good cause of Suit, Nay, it goes farther, in the case of Assumption by the Testator, and Suit against the Executor thereupon, we find the Judgment in *M. Plowden's* Commentary given against the Executor generally, as if he had not been an Executor, not fixing it upon the Testator's Goods; yet there the very Debt itself is included in the Damages. But contrarily was it after in the seventh year of the late King, *viz.* Judgment given that as well the Damages as the Costs should be levied of the Testator's Goods, if so much in value of them were in the Defendant's hands; and if not, then the Costs only of the Goods of the Executor. And this surely is the righter and more just way: for there is no reason that upon a Promise, more than upon a Bond, the Law should cast the whole Debt upon the back and state of the Executor. But perhaps th

Two Judgments may be reconciled thus: the latter was given upon a Verdict, *Non sumpsit* being the Issue, and there the Jury assessed Damages in certain, viz. 53 pounds, with the Costs; so as here the Judgment was compleat and full, viz. to recover the said sum: but in the other case the Judgment was had upon a Demurrer, so as the Damages not being known, was generally that the Plaintiff should recover his Damages against the Defendant. *Sed quia nescitur quædamna, &c.* because it appeareth not to the Court what the Damages were, therefore a Writ was awarded to enquire of Damages, upon the Return whereof executed, the Judgment was fully and compleatly to be given of a summe in certain: which second Judgment it appears not by the Book in what manner it was entred, and therefore might perhaps be then agreeable with the other. And that the said first Judgment before Damages enquired of is not a plenary and full Judgment, but an Award of Judgment, hath been divers times resolved; and that therefore any defect and insufficiency in the Declaration may be shewed time enough after the first, and before the second Judgment. Yea,

Tr. 20 Eliz.
Pasc. 33 E.
in com.
banc.

if the Plaintiff die before the second Judgment, though after the first, the Action falleth to the ground: so if the Defendant die: otherwise of death after full Judgment. But this notwithstanding, and howsoever there were done upon the second Judgment, methinks it were righter and fitter that the first Judgment should express that the Damages should be had and levied out of the Testator's Goods for whom and in whose right the Executor is sued.

Another Case there is wherein the Judgment must be, as it seems, against the Executor's own Goods, *viz.* in an Action of Covenant for a breach of Covenant since the Testator's death: for so was it held both by all the Judges of *Common Pleas* except the Lord *Dyer*, and by the Prothonotaries in the late Queen's time; where the Case was of an House upon the Lea negligently burned in the Executor's time for which Damages onely were to be recovered. And sometimes where the Executor himself is so to bear the burthen, find the Judgment entred, that the sum recovered shall be levied of the Lands and Goods of the Executor.

So for Rent
behind since
the Testa-
tor's death.
Co. l. 5. fo. 31.
The Suit is
in the *Debet*
as for his
own Debr,
M. 14 &
15 El.

Lib. intra.
329. a. & b.
De terris &
catallis, &c.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Women-covert Executors.

Here being two kind of persons who have some disability upon them, *viz.* feme-coverts or married women, and Infants, touching whom we find in many places question and disceptation in our books, we will consider of them by themselves, or apart from others; yet not joyning them together neither, but each by himself separately.

First, therefore, of Feme-coverts; touching whom we will consider these three things.

First, whether they may make Wills and Executors with or without their Husbands assent; and how, whereof, and in what cases.

Secondly, whether they may be made Executors without their Husband's assent, or how their Husbands may hinder it.

Thirdly, what acts in execution of the Executorship they may doe without their
Huf-

Husbands, or their Husbands without them.

Sect. 1. A Woman married, or Feme-cove-
we know is *sub potestate viri*, *cui in vi-*
contradicere non potest, as saith the W
given by the Law to the Wife for recov-
ry of her Land after her Husband's deat
being aliened by him. Therefore
is that Judges, when a Woman is to ac-
knowledge a Fine of any Land, do exa-
mine her apart from her Husband, to
know whether she be willing, or com-
to doe it by the compulsion of her Hus-
band: It is therefore hard for her to have
freedome of will, and consequently free-
dome to make a Will. Besides, all her
Moveables or Goods personal, which she
had at the time of her Marriage, other-
wise then as Executrix or Administratrix
are by the Law totally devested out of her
and settled in the Husband as fully *ipso*
facto upon the very Marriage, as any o-
ther that were his own before. O-
these therefore she can make no dispo-
sition, no more then of other her Hus-
band's Goods. But in case she do by Will
bequeath them, although the Will and
Gift be void, yet if the Husband, as the
case was in the time of *Edward the se-*
cond,

Sola & se-
creta exami-
nata.

Debts ex-
cept, which
are not pro-
perly goods.

§ E.2 Fitz.
Devise 24.

and, do after his Wife's death consent
to his her Will and Gift, by delivering
the Goods bequeathed after her death,
assenting that the Legatee take them
in virtue of such Will and Gift; this ac-
counteth to a new Gift by the Husband.
If a Woman have a Lease, an Estate by
curtesy, a Wardship, the next Avoidance
to a Church, or other Chattel real; these
are not divested out of her into her Hus-
band by Marriage, but in case she over-
live him, they continue to her as before,
if no Alienation or Alteration having been
made by the Husband, who had power
to dispose of them by Gift in his life-time,
though not by his Will: yet such a Wo-
man in her Husband's life-time could not
sell or for these things, without her Hus-
band's assent, make an Executor or Will;
but if she dying before him, they would,
by the operation of Law, accrue to him.
And here then observe a Case, though
not frequent, yet full of mischief when
it happens: Suppose that a Woman in-
debted a thousand pounds, and having
Leases and moveable Goods to the value
of three thousand or four thousand
pounds, marieth with J S, and then
dies before the Debt be recovered a-
gainst

During her
life he is, but
not after.

But the Huf-
band may
receive them
or release
them.

12 H.7.f.22.
The Huf-
band was
fued in Spi-
ritual Court
as Executor
to his Wife.
So she is of-
ten to for-
mer Huf-
band and to
Father, &c.

gainst her ; in this case the Husband shall have and go away with all this value of his Wife, and is not in Law liable to pay one peny of her Debts, because he is neither her Executor nor Administrator. What the *Chancery* could doe, or rather what the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper would doe, in this case, I will not take upon me to say or determine. Another sort or kind of Goods, or rather Interests a Woman may have, *viz.* Debts or thing in Action, which, as the former, are not devested out of her by Marriage into her Husband, nor yet can she thereof make an Executor without her Husband's assent although they be one degree farther from the Husband then the said Chattels reals for that though the Husband do over-live the Wife, he shall not be intitled to them as to the former. But if his Wife make him Executor, as she may, or if after her death he take Administration of her Goods ; then, as he is thereby intitled to them, so is he liable also to pay her Debts out of the same, when he shall have received them.

Lastly, *Dato* that a Woman-covert is Executrix to some other person, and in that right hath Goods moveable ; these are

not devested out of her, because she
 hath them not meerly to her own use,
 but as representing the person of ano-
 ther: But whether then may she with-
 out her Husband's licence or assent, in re-
 spect of her being an Executor, and for
 continuation of this Executorship, make
 Executors, and consequently a Will, or
 not? Hereabout hath been much di-
 versity of opinion. Some Books gene-
 rally speak, that the Wife may make an
 Executor, but speak nothing of the Hus-
 band's assent, whether necessary or not.
 Elsewhere we find it mentioned, that if
 the Husband after the Wife's death coun-
 termand (some Books, false printed, say
 command) the proving of his Wife's
 Will, then it loseth all force, or becometh
 void and of no value: but in this case
 is no mention in what state this Wife
 stood, *viz.* whether she were Executor or
 not, no not so much as whether she had
 any thing in Action, or Chattel real or
 not, so as nothing in particularity can be
 grounded upon that Case. But there are
 expresse opinions, that the Husband's assent
 is absolutely necessary even in this case,
 so as without it the Wife's making an Exe-
 cutor shall be meerly void, and, conse-
 quently,

39 H.6.f.27.

34 H.8.f.8.
Bro. Testa-
ments 21.18 E.4.f.11.
Vavafor
Just.

quently, he to whom she was Executor shall now by her death be dead Intestate. And of this opinion was *Babington*, Chief Justice, in the beginning of *Henry* the sixth his time. Yet contrary hereunto was the opinion of *Fineux* Chief Justice in the time of King *Henry* the seventh. *viz.* that where the Wife is an Executor she may also make a Will and an Executor without any consent or assent of her Husband. And to this opinion doth Master *Perkins*, after consideration of the Books on both sides, incline. But some will say, that since all this, in the late Queen's time this hath been contrarily resolved, *viz.* in the case between *Andrew Ognell* Plaintiff, and *Underhill* and *Appleby* Defendants; in the end of which Case it is in express terms said to have been then resolved, that a Feme-covert or Married Woman could not make an Executor without the consent of her Husband. To this I answer, that this Case is to be construed with relation *ad materiam subjectam*, *viz.* to the matter and point in question and under consideration, which was that state of a Woman whereof we have before spoken, *viz.* one having things in Action and Debts.

4 H. 6. f. 31.

12 H. 7. 24. b.

Tit. Devif. f. 27.

Mil. 29 Eli.
in com. ba.Coke lib. 4.
31. b.

bts or Duties to her belonging, as there
 particular it was Arrerages of Rent due
 the Woman before Marriage. As for
 point of a Woman Executor to ano-
 er person; it was never in that Case
 der disceptation, no nor once menti-
 ed in the Debate or Arguments there-
 on. Now considering the very form
 d phrase of Judgments at the Common
 w, which are thus, *viz. Ideo conside-*
ratum est per Curiam, &c. not, *Adjudi-*
catum est, that is, It is considered by the
 ourt, not in expresse terms, that It
 adjudged; this, I say, well observed,
 as to me it seems very remarkable)
 ves us to know, that no more is adjudg-
 d then is considered of, the Judgment
 eing contained and clasped up in the
 ord *Consideratum est*. Wherefore since
 Ognell's Case the point of a Woman-
 overt's ability, in case where she is an
 executor, to make a Will and Execu-
 or, hath not been considered of, (the
 yes, tongues, nor thoughts of the Judg-
 s being once set upon it;) it can-
 ot be that that Point is there resolved
 r adjudged. Besides, even in a few
 words expressing, as to me it seems, the
 eason of that resolution, it appears
 not

not to have been the Intent of the Judges, that the same should reach or extend to this Case of a Woman-cov Executor : for it is added, (as the reason of the Judgment, in my conceiving that the Administration of the Wife's Goods doth of right belong to the Husband ; which amounts to this, in my understanding, *viz.* that where the Wife making of a Will, and consequently an Executor, may be prejudicial to the Husband, and prevent him of some benefit or advantage, or tend to his loss and disadvantage, there it shall not be available or effectual without his assent and therefore not in the Case of her who, having Debts or Duties to her debtors, would, by making another to be her Executor, exclude or preclude her Husband from that benefit which to him should pertain as Administrator of her Goods. Now as for the Goods, Debts or Credit due to her as Executor to some other pertaining, no benefit could redound to the Husband by having such Administration of his Wife's Goods, for those should go and be to the next of kin of the Wife's Testator, taking Administration *de bonis non administratis* of him, if she have no

Exec

Executor ; and therefore her making Exe-
 cutor as touching these brings no hurt
 prejudice to her Husband, and so is
 out of the reason of *Ognell's Case*. Since
 then it is so, and since the Law favoureth
 Wills, and it was by implication part of
 his Will who made her Executor, that
 she should have power to continue his
 executorship, by making another to suc-
 ceed therein after her decease, for per-
 formance of his Will ; why should the
 Law give to the Husband, who can re-
 ceive no prejudice thereby, power to give
 impediment thereunto ? for, *Frustra est*
inutilis potentia; even Reason it self frames
 and awards against him in this Case a
Quare impedit, or rather a *Non impedit*,
 as to me it seems. Wherefore to con-
 clude, I take it that the opinion of *Fi-*
neux is good Law in that Point of a Feme-
 covert Executor, though not in the other
 Point, where she onely hath Debts or things
 in Action to her self due : for therein the
 said Resolution in *Ognell's Case*, grounded
 upon good Reason, gives me satisfaction to
 differ from *Fin.* who, making no difference
 between the Cases, held the Husband's as-
 sent needless in both. *Posito* then that the
 Wife of *J S*, having Debts due to her self,

and being also Executrix to *J D*, make without her Husband's assent *J N* her Executor, and dieth; what shall we now say? shall we say, that as touching the Goods and Credits or things in Action to her as Executrix of *J D* pertaining, the Will stands good, and *J N*, as her Executor, may prove it, contrary to her Husband's will? and that as to the Credits to her self in her own right pertaining the Will is void, and thereof her Husband may take Administration? Shall she die both testate and intestate, with a Will and without a Will? shall she have both an Executor and Administrator? Why not to several purposes, as well as where an Executor is made onely for one particular thing or one place, the Testator may elsewhere die intestate? And so where the Executorship is divided, as before is shewed, and one to whom part is committed will prove the Will, but the other to whom other part of the Executorship is committed will not take it upon him; here must needs be a dying for part testate, and for part intestate.

As for the second Point, *viz.* Wives or Women-coverts being made Executors, and so having the office of Executorship
put

upon them against their Husbands will, 13 Ed. 1.
Fitz. Exec.
119.
 ere hath also been diversity of opi-
 ns. In the time of King *Edw. 1. Brab.*
 justice saith, she may be Executor with-
 out her Husband, and the Administration
 shall be delivered to her onely. And I
 think he meant that this might be without
 the consent of her Husband, or whether he
 could or not; for so it is said in the time
 of King *Henry* the seventh to be the Law 2 H. 7. 15. b.
 spiritual: and indeed in Courts Spiritual
 no difference is made between Women
 married and unmarried, for ought I can
 find. There a Wife sueth, and is sued,
 alone without her Husband; he inter-
 meddleth not, nor is intermeddled with-
 all, touching the things pertaining to his
 Wife. But at the Common Law it is o-
 therwise; and there, as *Brian* chief Ju- 2 H. 7. 13.
 stice saith, a Wife without the assent of
 her Husband cannot be Executor, he
 meaning thereby that the Husband may
 oppose and hinder it; for such a one may
 be named Executor in and by a Will, with-
 out the knowledge of her Husband. Let us
 then see how after the death of the Testa-
 tor the Husband can hinder her proving
 the Will, or intermeddling to Admini-
 ster, since it may be a matter both of much

trouble and danger to him to have the Executorship fasten upon his Wife, and consequently upon himself. On the other side, it may be a benefit and advantage to the Husband; and therefore we will also consider, whether the Husband may (though his Wife would refuse) assume the Executorship, and fasten it upon her. The Testator therefore being dead, and some or common bruit carrying it to the Ordinary, that the Wife of *J S* is made Executrix; if she come not in *gratis* or voluntarily to prove the Will, Process or Citation is to be sent out of the Spiritual Court against her, to enforce her coming in to take on her the Executorship. She coming may clearly, as well as any other person, (especially if her Husband concurred with her therein) refuse this office, trust and charge, so as if there be no other Executor named, the Ordinary must commit the Administration. If she should not come and appear, she should be Excommunicate, as I take it, notwithstanding any allegation or intimation by her Husband of his unwillingness to have her take upon her the Executorship. But suppose she doth come into Court, and offers her self ready to take the Executorship

ship upon her ; and on the other side
 her Husband expresth his dis-assent there-
 unto, praying that she may not have the
 execution of the Will to her committed :
 what will then be done ? This, I confess,
 pertains to another Learning, and not to
 that of our Profession. But forasmuch as
 I find, that in the Courts Spiritual a
 Wife stands in the same plight and state
 as a Woman sole, the Husband not in-
 termeddled withall in the affairs of the
 Wife ; therefore do I conceive, that in
 that Court the Husband's refusall will not
 be of force to hinder the committing of
 the Executorship to the Wife not refu-
 sing ; at least if there come not a Prohibi-
 tion to stay the Spiritual Court's such pro-
 ceeding. But whether a Prohibition be in
 such a case to be granted or not, as I find
 no resolution in my Books, so will I not
 take upon me to resolve. This stands clear
 in the Rules of the Law of *England*, that the
 Wife is under the Husband's power, & can-
 not contradict him in pleading and doing
 other acts, even touching her own Free-
 hold: nay, she cannot take Lands nor Goods
 by Gift or Conveyance without her Hus-
 band's assent, as the Law hath been, and, for
 ought I know, is taken. But if once the

33 H. 6. 31.
 43. 39 Ed.
 3. 1.

27 H. 8. 24.

Will be proved, and the execution thereof committed to the Wife, though against her Husband's mind and consent, I think will stand firm; and the Husband and Wife being after sued, cannot say that she was never Executrix. And I doubt whether the Wife administering without the Husband's privity and assent, although the Will be not proved, do not conclude her Husband as well as her self from saying after in any Suit against them, that she neither was Executor, nor did ever administer as Executor. Yet perhaps this Administration by the Wife against her Husband's mind will (as against him) be as a void act; else cannot I see how *Brian's* opinion before cited, *viz.* that the Wife shall not be an Executor without or against her Husband's mind, can be Law. On the other side, if the Husband of a Woman, named Executor, would have his Wife to take upon her the execution of the Will, and to prove the same, but she will not assent thereunto, (wishing, perhaps, that gain and benefit rather to some of her kindred by a way of Administration, than to her own Husband by her Executorship, as sometimes Wives accord not well with their Husbands;) in this case I think

11 H.6.4.
The Plea is, that the Feme did or did not administer, without speaking of the Husband,

33 H.6.31.
The Husband may administer, and prove the Will for his Wife.

ink the Court Spiritual will not fasten
 the Executorship upon the Wife against
 her will. But *dato* that the Husband,
 though the Will be not proved, doth Ad-
 minister as in the Wife's right, but against
 her mind and will; shall she be now here-
 by bound and concluded, so as after she
 cannot decline or avoid the Executorship?
 And surely I think, that during her Hus-
 band's life she stands concluded at the
 Common Law, for that there she shall not
 be nor can be sued alone as Exec. and then
 being sued with him, she must joyn in Plea
 with him, *viz.* that she neither was Execu-
 tor nor administred as Executor; and then
 this act of her Husband's given in evidence
 will, as I take it, cause that the Verdict be
 found against her: not so after her Hus-
 band's death; then she may refuse, as the L.
Dyer saith, and citeth as resolved. These
 things I thought good to offer to confide-
 ration, and so leave them without resolu-
 tion. Difference perhaps may be where a
 Woman so made Executor taketh a Hus-
 band after the Testator's death, before ei-
 ther proving or refusing to prove the Will,
 and where she is made Executor during the
 Coverture; as there in case of a discent of
 her Land to the Heir of a Disseisor; for

1 *Eliz. Dyer*
 166.b. there
 is cited
 3 *H. rot. 112.*
Nota per
Bill.

when there is upon her such a state of Election, she, marrying before her Resolution or determination, doth upon the matter deliver it into the Husband's hands not so where it first findeth and falleth upon her in the state of Coverture. If the Husband were indebted to the Testator this making of the Wife Executor is, as to take it, a Release in Law, as well as if she were the Debtor : but if after the Testator's death she do marry such a Debtor, it is a Devastation.

The third Point.

Touching the Administration or Execution of the Office of an Executor by a Feme-covert and her Husband.

WE will now come to admit the Execution of the Will assumed by concurrent consent of Husband and Wife, and the Will proved with both their likings in the Wife's name; and examine what acts the Wife of her self is able to doe, and what her Husband without her.

It hath been conceived by many of old, and by some of late, that if a Feme-covert or married Woman Executrix release a Debt

Debt of her Testator, or give away the goods which she hath as Executor, or deliver a Legacy bequeathed, it was firm and good; and on the other side, that her Husband's Gift or Release was of no value, for at the Administration or Execution of the Will is committed to the Wife only. And some have gone so far as to say, that she may sue or be sued without her Husband, (in the Courts of Common Law, I mean; for in the Spiritual Court it is true, the Husband is not joyned with the Wife in suit.) But the Law is doubtless in all those points contrary, as not onely some opinion so was of old, *viz.* in the time of *H. 7.* but also hath been in the late Queen's time resolved: for otherwise, if the Wife's Gift or Release should stand good, her act might exceedingly endamage her Husband, and make his Goods liable to the Creditors, the Testator's state being wasted by the Gifts or Releases of his Wife. Wherefore it was held in the said late Case, that unless due payment were made to such Women-covert Executors, their Releases or Acquittances be void, and so also their Gifts and Grants: yea, it was then held, that the Husband of the Wife Executrix may give goods, or make Releases of Debt, at his pleasure.

See 18 H. 6.
4. In Debt
the Plea
shall be, that
she hath fully
admini-
stred; and
Reply, that
she hath *Assets*, never
mentioning
the Husband.

33 H. 6. 31.

33 H.6.31.

pleasure. But doubtless by Marriage neither are the Goods (though personal) which the Wife hath as Executor devided out of her and settled in her Husband, as her own Goods are; nor, if she die, shall they accrue to the Husband, if no alteration were the Property, but shall go to her Executor, or to the next of kin, being Administrator of her Testator, if she have no Executor: and so was it held in the first year of Queen *Mary*. Yea, though for any other Goods which the Wife hath in her own right before marrying, the Husband alone, without naming the Wife, may maintain an Action of Trepass: yet touching such Goods as the Wife hath as Executor, the Action must be brought in the names of the Husband and Wife, to the end that the Dammage thereby recovered may accrue to her as Executor in lieu of the Goods. So also must the Replevin for those Goods be in both their names. But although the Husband be thus named with the Wife, yet principally is it the Suit of the Wife: and therefore in such Actions, or in Debts by Husband and Wife, she being Executor, if it come to Triall by Jury, the Husband being an Alien, yet shall he not have

M. 31 El. in com. ba. If the Husband be to avow, it must be in the right of his Wife, Executor, or Administrator. *Manfield's Case.* Doctor *Julier* his Case.

the Triall *per medietatem linguæ*, or *alienarum*, that is, by half Aliens, as in other cases where an Alien is party to a suit it is to be had. And where to a Wife the Executor power is given to sell the Land of the Testator's, she may sell to her own Husband, as was resolved in the time of K. Henry the seventh, where the cooffees (it being Land settled in use) were committed to the Fleet, for that they could not execute an Estate to the Husband according to the Wife's State. But of this I much marvel, since the Law intends the Wife so under the Husband's command and subjection, that it holds not her disposition of Land to him by Will free, nor therefore of force; and how shall this then be conceived to be but a partial Sale? Yet *volenti non fit injuria*, and he that will put such power into the hands of a Woman under Coverture, doth in a manner subject it voluntarily to the Husband's will. And it hath been held by some, that even an Infant's or Feme-covert's Conveyance in such case of necessity should stand firm and unavoidable, because of the Condition express or implied, that the State should be void if no such Conveyance made.

10 H. 7. 20.

Bro. Just.
Cui in vita
15. She may
sell to any
other, but
not to him.

Fenner Just.
in ba. reg.
Pasc. 37 El.
34 E. 3.
Bro. *cui in*
vita 15. No
prejudice to
them, that it
be good,

CHAP. XVIII.

*Touching Infants, and their making or
ing. made Executors.*

BEing now to consider of disabil-
by Age, for want of years in per-
making or being made Executors ;
us first take view of the several Ages
men and women, to several purposes ma-
terial in the Law, Judgment, and Re-
spect. And first, touching a Woman
35 H.6.41.b. *Wangford* in *Henry* the sixth his time
shews, and other Books approve, that
she hath six several Ages respected in ac-
1. by the Law. As first, the Age of 7 years
for her Father to have Aid of his Tenan-
2. to marry her. Next, nine years, to deserv
Dower, that is, that in case she be of th
Age at the time of her Husband's death
she shall be endowed : but not if she be
any thing under those years ; the Law
being Physically informed, that a Wo-
man at those years may conceive a child
but not under them. But of somewhat
different opinion was, as it seems, the Par-
18 Eliz. c.7. liament in the late Queen's time, when it
was made Felony to have unlawfull carna-
knowledge of any Woman-child under the

of ten years, it being then conceived, I think, that no such could consent. The Age of 12 years is a Woman's time assenting or disassenting to Marriage in more tender years had. For so it appears by divers Books; although Mr. *Stutton* have here no distinction between male and female. The age of 14 years is a Woman's time to be in Wardship, or not; as if she be any thing above those years at the time of her Ancestor's death, she escapeth Wardship. The Age of sixteen years is her time of coming out of Wardship, being once fallen under it: for although had she been full fourteen, she had escaped it; yet not so being at the time of her Ancestor's death, her Wardship lasteth till sixteen years, except the Lord shall sooner marry her. And lastly, the full Age of a Woman, whereby she is enabled firmly and unavoidably to make Grants or Conveyances, is 21 years, as well as for the Male; before which time, be it that she being sole make a Feoffment or other Conveyance, or being married alien her Land by Fine, and her Husband of full age joyn with her, yet is it infirm and avoidable.

Now of the Male, or Man, the first Age material, and settledly resolved on,

is

4.

5.

6.

1.

is twelve years; for at that time every Male is at the Leet, to swear his Fidelity to the King. This Women doe not, and therefore are they never said to be outlawed, but to be waved, because they have not this admittance into the Law which Males have. This hath been, as I think the ground of that speech, that *Women are lawless Creatures.*

2. The second Age of Males is 14 years accounted by the Law the Age of Discretion especially material to two purposes *viz.* First, that if one under that Age commit an act amounting to Felony, yet is he to stand free from the Attainder and Punishment incident to a Felon. Regularly it is thus, but, *Non est regula qui fall.* One of much less years, having attained ripeness of Discretion and discerning, shall incur the like Attainder as one of full age: as was resolved in the time of King *Henry* the seventh touching an Infant but of the age of nine years, who having killed another Boy of the like Age with his knife, and then hiding the slain Boy, and excusing the blood found upon him by saying that his nose had bled; it was held by the Judges, that he was to be hanged as a Felon,

3 H. 7. f. 1. 6.

son, his such Non-age notwithstanding. The other point, touching which is Age of fourteen years is especially material, is touching an Heir of Lands held by Socage: for in case such Heir be under that Age, he is to be in Ward to the next kin; but if he be of that Age, he is not to be in Ward at all, for that the Law leaveth him to be of Discretion at those years: and therefore a Gardian in Socage being in effect but a Bailiff accountable, he hath no need of such an Age, other then such as himself shall use.

The third Age in and touching Males material is fifteen years: for every Lord of a Mannor, or one having Free-holders in Socage or by Knight's Service, when his eldest Son cometh to that age, viz. fifteen years, is to have of them provided for the making of him a Knight, towards which every one holding by a whole Knight's Fee is to pay twenty shillings, and so ratably for more, more, and less, less; and each holding twenty pound Land in Socage is to pay the like sum, and so ratably for more or less.

3.

The fourth Age of Males is the full age

4.

age of 21 years, which maketh him free from Wardship, having Lands held by Knight's service descended unto him; and also makes him able to alien Lands or Goods, makes firm his Bonds, Statutes, Recognizances, &c. For although at fourteen the Law judge him of Discretion, yet doth it not hold him fully ripe till one and twenty.

5.

Oblitum.
Another of
60. to ex-
empt from
being com-
pelled to
serve by the
Stat. of La-
bourers.

23 E.3.c.1.
W.2. cap.38.
13 E.1. No.
na. Br. 165.

The last Age of Males respected by the Law is seventy years: at which time Sheriffs are to forbear to impanel them in Juries; and in case they do not, such old man may have a Writ to the Sheriff grounded upon the Statute for that purpose made in the time of K. *Edw. 1.* commanding such Sheriff to forbear the impannelling of him, and he may have an Action to recover Damages upon that Statute. This is called by most a *Writ of Dotage*; a word, perhaps, anciently taken in a good and favourable sense, *pro dotatatis*, viz. a Gift, Privilege or Exemption allowed to Age in favour thereof, and as a benefit. Having thus by way of ingredient or introduction taken view of these several Ages, let us now see wherein and how Age is material touching them who are to make or to be made

made Executors, and what Age is required
 hereabout. Master *Perkins* saith, that one
 of four years old may make a Will, and
 consequently Executors; and his reason
 is, because the Executors being to account
 before the Ordinary, it cannot be in-
 tended but that the Goods shall be dis-
 tributed for the good of his Soul. He
 speaks as if he only made an Executor by
 his Will, but did not bequeath any thing,
 but left all to the Executor's Conscience
 and Discretion; which is not usual, though
 feasible, as before I have shewed, or
 said at least. But admit it were so, and
 no Bequest at all contained in the Will;
 yet since at that Age an Infant hath no
 Discretion to elect a fit person to distribute
 his Goods, Money and other things, no
 nor to make continuation of an Executor-
 ship to another, to whom perhaps the
 Infant was Executor; I cannot see that his
 Will should be of any force: but if he be
 of the age of 14 years, being the Age of
 Discretion in the Judgment of Law, then
 I should hold him able to make a Will,
 although yet he be an Infant till 21 years,
 and can make no Gift of Land nor Goods
 which shall be of force. And *Babington*
 Chief Justice, to other purpose, makes

Devises f.
 97. No good
 reason, for
 one may
 make an ill
 Account,
 specially
 having a
 Child's di-
 rection for
 his doings.

9 H. 6. f. 6.

X

like

like distinction between an Infant of such tender years, and one come to the years of Discretion. So also, as before we shewed, is it in the case of Felony. And that way also sounds that which *Hanck* says in *Henry* the fourth his time, viz. that an Infant of 18 years old may be a Disseisor; as implying, that his years may be so tender, that, as *Candish* saith of an Infant in *Edward* the third his time, he is not to be intended able to know or discern between good and evil: methinks therefore he should be at the least of the age of Discretion, viz. 14 years, who should be able to make a Will, and consequently an Executor. And the Custom for an Infant of fifteen years old to bequeath by Will hath, as to me it seems, affinity with this Opinion, though there the Case was of Land in a Borough devisable by Custom. And that way reflecteth the Case in the time of King *Henry* the sixth, where it was said, that an Infant under fifteen years of age should not wage his Law, viz. take an Oath to acquit himself of a Debt, or excuse his Default in an Action real. And farther reason of this Opinion will arise out of the consideration of an Infant made an Executor.

Now

2 H. 4. 22.

40 Ed. 3. 44.

37 H. 6. 5.

11 H. 6.
f. 40. 6.

Now touching an Infant made Executor, how young soever he be, the making of him so is not void; but yet the Execution of the Will, which is the performance of the office of Executor, shall not be committed to him till he come to the age of seventeen years; by the Law Spiritual, and till then (for that he is not able to doe the part of an Executor,) Administration is to be committed to some other: yet if it be a Woman Infant who is so made Executrix, in case she be married to a man of seventeen years old or more, now is it as if she were of that age, and her Husband shall have the Execution of the Will; and if Administration were before committed during the Minority of the Woman, it shall now cease, as is said in *Prince's Case*. Yet I do a little marvel at these Opinions, considering that these things are managed in the Spiritual Court, and by that Law; and it intermeddles not with the Husband in the Wife's Case: now by that Law, and not our Common Law, comes in this limit of 17 years. And I have seen it otherwise reported in and touching the last Point.

Co. lib. 5.
fol. 29. p.

M. 41 &
42 Eliz.

Farther touching Infants Executors,
X 2 and

Co. l. 5. f. 29.
 But pay-
 ment is to
 be made to
 the Execu-
 tor, and not
 to the Ad-
 ministrator,
M. 15 & 16
El. in com.
b. Rep. 67.
Co. li. 5.
fol. 29.

Co. lib. 6.
fol. 67r.

and under the age of seventeen years, this is to be noted, *viz.* that such an one is not able as an Executor to assent to a Legacy, so as it may by virtue thereof settle in the Legatee. Also if Administration be during such Minority committed with special words of Restraint or limitation, *viz.* that it is done to the use or profit of the Infant-Executor, then no Sale of Lease or Goods, or assent to Legacy, by such Administrator, will bind or prejudice the Infant-Executor; but otherwise, perhaps, if the Administration during the Minority be committed generally. And if the Testator himself, making an Infant Executor, doth also appoint another to be his Executor during his Nonage, expressing it to be onely for the benefit and behoof of the Infant-Executor; I doubt whether this temporary Executor stand any whit restrained from what pertains to the power of an absolute Executor: for there may be, perhaps, difference between him to whom the Owner of the Goods commits the government of them, though but for a time and in special manner, and an Administrator so specially made by the Ordinary, another being presently by the will of the Owner or Testator to have

ave the Administration, in whom for a
 me legal defect is found. But now let
 s pass over this age of seventeen, and
 onsider of the Infant between that time
 f his being admitted to take upon him
 he Executorship, and his accomplish-
 ment of his full Age of one and twenty.
 First, then, suppose that he doth release a
 Debt due to his Testator; whether shall
 this be good to bind him, and to discharge
 the Debtor, as well as if the Executor had
 been of full Age, he now having proved
 the Will, and being by the Law Spiritual
 approved an able Executor? And this
 Point coming in question in *Russel's Case* H. 26 Eliz.
 in the late Queen's time, consideration
 was had of divers good Reasons for en-
 abling of this Release; as that an Exe-
 cutor represents the person of his Testa-
 tor, and in his right and power doth these
 acts, and not in his own, and therefore
 his Infancy, which is a state or condition
 of his own natural person, shall no more
 disable him then it doth the King, a
 Mayor, or other Head of a Corporation. 16 H.6.Re.
45. 21 E.
13. 24.
 Also divers Books were found to run that
 way, as well in the case of an Infant, as
 of a Feme-covert. But upon great
 deliberation in the *King's Bench*, and
 X 3 upon

Co. lib. 5.
fol. 27.

upon conference had with the Lord *Anderson, Manwood*, and other Justices, it was resolved and adjudged, that the Release of an Infant Executor, without payment of the Debt and Duty, would not bind or bar him. 1. For that if it should, it would be a Wasting or devastating of the Goods of his Testator, and so would charge his own Goods. 2. It would be a wrong, which an Infant could not doe by his Release. 3. It was no pursuit nor performance of the office or duty of an Executor, but the contrary. And upon this Judgment a Writ of Error was brought in the *Exchequer-Chamber*, where it was agreed by all, that the Release was not effectual nor binding, so as this Point now had the Resolution of all the Judges of *England*. But it was agreed, that if payment or satisfaction had been made, then the Infant-Executor might have made a good Acquittance and Discharge; and indeed, Payment it self, if proved, brings Discharge enough, except in the case of a single Bill. Note, that the principal Case adjudged was not a Release of any Debt or Duty by Specialty, but of Trespass in conversion of Goods found or taken in the Testator's life-time. But *posito* that this
Infant

Infant had assented to a Legacy, whether will this bind him or not? For in the Case of *Russel* it is said, that all things which an Infant doth according to the Office and duty of an Executor will stand firm; now it is part of his Office to pay and execute Legacies. Yet since this act amounts to a Vastation or wasting of the Testator's Goods as well as the other, in case there remain not Goods sufficient for payment of the Debts, and consequently here, as well as in the other Case, the Infant's own Goods would become liable to his Testator's Debts; I doubt, and incline, that it is not, nor can stand effectual: for except in the other we admit a want, or possibility of want, of *Assets* or Goods, the Release could neither hurt the Infant himself, nor do wrong to any other; and that admitted, this case is of like prejudice. Yet if these *Assets* should be void, so also would be his payment of Legacies: and how then were he an able Executor at the age of seventeen years, to sue and to be sued for Debts and Legacies? And if upon Suit it cannot be shewed that Debts will take up all, or disable the payment, then, haply, he may be forced to pay. *Quære*, notwithstanding, whether

these acts (though voluntary) stand no good upon *Bene esse*, or conditionally, *viz* if there be besides Goods sufficient, &c. or that else the non-aged Executor may have an Action of Accompt for the mony by him paid to the Legatee, and also avoid his Assent, where that is onely needful. But doubtless, neither the Assent of such Executor before his age of 17, nor any payment of a Debt to him, could be good, although such acts to or by another Executor before the proving of the Will would stand firm and good; for this Infant wants not onely proving, but also ability to prove, his Testator's Will; yea, the Will stands suspended, and the Testator as it were intestate, whilst the Administration stands in force, so as during that time nothing can be done by any as Executor: and therefore there is great difference between the Cases. What if payment of a Legacy be made to an Infant, can he make a sufficient Acquittance? This, I confess, is besides the Point in hand; yet because it concerns Infants and Executors, (though not Infant-Executors) it is not amiss here to cast some thoughts and words upon the Point, for that it many times perplexeth both Exec. and Legatees. First, therefore, in case the Infant be of the
years

years of Discretion, *viz.* 14, I hold it clear, that any Payment to him made will stand good, for that the Law at that age holds him able to govern and manage his own Lands held in Socage, and consequently to receive the Rents thereof: wherefore, whether he who makes such payment have any Acquittance or not, if he have proof of the payment, he is well enough acquitted from any second payment; and if without payment he get an Acquittance, it will not suffice, the Infancy of him who makes the Acquittance considered. Besides, if the Acquittance be, as most usually they are, but signed onely with the name of the maker, and not sealed, it is onely an evidence or proof of payment, and no pleadable Acquittance, because no Deed; so as it nothing differs from proof by Witnesses, save that it is not mortal, as they. But now if the Infant be under the years of Discretion, what shal we say to a payment to him, specially if he be but 3 or 4 years old, or thereabout? Here I think caution is to be used by the Exec. generally; and the surest way is, if he fear to keep it in any respects, to pay it into the Court where it is recoverable, *viz.* where the Will was proved: yet the Case so may be, as that this pay-

Notes of
Receipts,
called Ac-
quittances.

Quere.

payment may not be at all safe for the Executor. As put the case that he entred into Bond or Statute, to pay all Legacies by such a day to the several Legatees; here, I think, the payment into the Court Spiritual sufficeth not, for that must make the Receit to be with some Charge, which is in some kind an Abatement: there I think therefore, legally to secure the Executor, the payment must be to or in the presence of the Guardian, because of No-riture, *viz.* him or her who hath (though not as Guardian in respect of Lands) the Custody or education of the Infant; for otherwise, to pay it into the hands of such a tender Infant, separate from any Governour or Guardian, were to expose it to loss, both for that he is not able to count the sum, and for that he, yet not being come to discerning years, were like, with *Asop's* Cock, to part with Pearls or Coin for Plums and Trifles of no value. But in case no Bond nor other collateral Penalty lie upon the Executor, or in case the Bond or Statute be onely to perform the Will generally, which nothing alters the course of payment which by the Will the Law laies upon Executors; then is not the Executor put to any such payment,

nor

nor need pay without demand and Acquittance, as in case of payment upon a single Bill, or of Rent-seck, where no Distress can be taken, nor other Penalty incurred. Yet in that case, if Demand be, and Acquittance ready to be given, let the Executor take heed, in case he be bound to performance, that he stand not upon the invalidity of the Acquittance in respect of Nonage; for, as I have said, proof by Witnesses may supply a nullity of Acquittance, and much more the Weakness or Imbecility: payment according to the Testator's appointment being the matter which acquitteth the payer, and this the Executor may have testified under the hands of divers Witnesses expressing circumstances, so as all dying, he may continue safe from second payment as well as if an Acquittance had, the Witnesses whereunto are subject to mortality as well as the other. But herein Courts of Equity do often interpose helpfully for them who seek not evasion from payment, but onely security in paying. And of Infant-Executors, and, by occasion thereof, of Infancy in Legators or Legatees, thus much.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Legacies.

ALthough these be not recoverable at and by the Common Law, but most naturally at and by the Law Ecclesiastical; yet by Suits in Courts of Equity, as the *Chancery* and *Court of Requests*, they are often obtained, and of many things touching them the Common Law taketh notice, and hath manifold occasions so to doe. We will therefore consider thereabout these parts or Points, some whereof have been in part before touched upon other occasions.

1. Whether any Legacy in certain, and lying in preder, may be taken or had, without the Executor's assent, by the Legatee, or him to whom it is bequeathed.
2. When an Executor can or safely may pay, deliver, or assent to a Legacy.
3. Whether one Executor alone may doe it; and what if the Executor be an Infant, or Woman-covert.
4. What shall amount to an Assent of the Execu-

Executor, and what to Dissent or Disablement of assent.

How a Lease or Chattel real may be given to one for a time ; with remainder to another ; how not. 5.

Where an Assent to the first, or one part of the Bequest, shall imply or amount to an Assent for the residue. 6.

Of the manner of Assents, and therein of Assents conditional. 7.

What manner of Interest he in the Remainder of a Lease after the death of another hath during the life of that other ; and whether he may dispose of it during that time, and how. 8.

Whether this Remainder can be defeated by any act of the Devisee for life, or by the death of him in Remainder first. 9.

By what acts or accidents a Legacy may be forfeited or lost , and therein of Revocation, death before, &c. 10.

Whether the Executor's Assent shall have relation to the Testator's death , and shall make good a Grant before made by the Legatee. 11.

As for the first, we have before shewed the Assent of the Executor to be necessary before any Legacy can be had, for that Debts are first to be payd, & that the Executor
If the Exec. give it to another, the Legatee hath no remedy at the Common Law, per Prisot, 37 H.6.30.
 is

is to look to at his peril. But hereto adde a little out of M. *Swinborne*, a learned Civilian, who saith, that in case any Goods be in the hands or custody of *J S*, and the Owner doth bequeath them to him, then may he keep or retain them against the will of the Executor, so as there be other sufficient Goods in the hands of the Executor for payment of all Debts: but though thus (as it seems) it would stand in the Ecclesiastical Law, yet for that no Property is transferred to the Legatee without the Executor's assent, therefore, doubtless, the Executor may at the Common Law recover the thing withheld, or Damages to the value, against the Legatee detaining it. Another Case there is wherein, as the learned Civilian saith, the Legatee may take to him the thing bequeathed lying in prender, *viz.* Horse, other Beast, or piece of Plate, or other like thing known, and in being; and that is, where the Testator doth expressly so appoint by his Will. But herein, doubtless, the Common Law, at and by which Debts are recoverable against Executors, will oppose the Law Spiritual: for else by such appointment the Testator might cause all his Goods to be taken by Legatees, and that
none

none should remain to pay Debts. Yet if there be other Goods besides sufficient for payment of Debts; then indeed I see not how the Executor can hinder such taking, without violating his Oath taken for performance of the Will. If any say, that it is also a breach of Oath in the other case; I say, he observeth not that there that clause in the Will, being against the Law, is void, and, consequently, there is a Nullity upon it, and it is as if no such thing were in the Will, and so the Oath extends not to it. And as a Chattel shall not be transferred to a Stranger without the Executor's assent; so if the Devise be to the Executor himself till he elect to take a Legatee, it shall be to him as Executor, as appears by the strain and Argument of two Cases in *Plowd. Comment.* and more lately in the *King's Bench*, the Point being divers dayes argued, was at last so resolved by three Judges against one. And the reason of *Coke* at the Bar was very good, for here the Executor sustains two persons, viz. an Executor and Legatee; and so all one as where the Bequest is to another; for, *Quando duo jura concurrant in una persona, æquum est ut si essent in diversis.*

Welchden & Elkington, Paramour & Yardley, Portman & Simmes Case. Trin. 37 El. All but Gawdy so agreed.

As

2: El. Dyer
367.

Co. li. 3. f. 29.

As for the second Point, it may have these two parts : First, when the Executor is able to give such assent to a Legacy; and secondly, when he may doe it with safety. As for the first, he is able before Probate of the Will to assent unto the Execution of a Legacy, as elsewhere is shewed, and that although he be not of full age of one and twenty years: but if he be under seventeen years, so as he is not able to take upon him the office of an Executor, and therefore Administration is during that time to be committed to some other; here his Assent is not of force or effectual, as we find, in *Prince's Case*, to have been held in the Case of *Pigot and Gascoin*. As for the second part, till all Debts be payd, the Executor may not safely consent to put the Legatee into the Lease or Chattel devised; no more then he may pay money bequeathed, if there be not sufficient also to pay all Debts. Of these things more is said elsewhere. Yet because the Reader, or he that desires direction in these Points, will look for them under this Title, I thought not good here to be altogether silent touching them.

As for the third Point, *viz.* Whether the

the Assent of one Executor, where there be many, be sufficient; I see not how to doubt: since any one Executor may give away any Goods of the Testator's, or release any Debts due to him, therefore much more assent; which is no more or greater work, in effect, then an Attornment of one Lessee upon a Grant of a Reversion. And if there want to pay Debts, he onely who assented shall answer for it of his own Goods, and not his Companions. But if this Executor be either under the age of seventeen years, or under Coverture, *viz.* a Woman married, such is not able to give a good Assent to bind the others, no nor themselves, for then thereby the Infant might draw a Debt upon himself, and the Wife upon her Husband, by assenting to or paying of a Legacy, there not being sufficient Goods to pay all Debts. But the Husband's Assent is sufficient where the Wife is Executor; for his act, whom she hath chosen to be her Head, may prejudice as well her as himself; yea, though she were within Age, yet he being of full Age, his Assent will stand good. But if he or another Executor in his own right be above 17 years of age, or else under 21, I doubt whether now

6 H. 7. 5. If the Bequest be to one of the Executors, he may take it without assent of his Companions; yet if a Debt, his Companion may release. H. 48 E. 4. 14, 15. So held where but one of the Executors during Non-age assented, in the Case of *Rhetorick and Chappels* H. 9 Jacob. Rot. 87. in *ba. reg. C.*

See Co. Lib.
Int. 150. the
Executor
being Devi-
see for life,
said the o-
ther should
have it after
her death,
and he en-
tered, and
took Admi-
nistration, she
dying inte-
state, yet
held *Assent*
in him.
This M. 19
H. 7. Rot.
318. See Li.
int. 321. One
gave the
third part of
his Goods to
A, with
whom the
Executor
accounted
for the A-
mount, and
A sued for
that sum in
Deb; but no
Judgment
upon De-
murrer. Tr.
37 El. in ba.
r. Where
Bequests to
the Execu-
tor himself.

his Assent will be sufficient, at least except the case be put, that there be *Assent* sufficient, which perhaps there may be material, though not in the other. See more hereof after in the Title of Women-covert and Infants Executors.

As to the fourth Point: first, there may be an Assent and Election implied as well as express: for if in the Devise or Bequest the Legatee be appointed to doe some act as in respect of the Legacy, and the Executor doth accept the performance thereof, this amounteth to an Assent. So if the Devise be to an Executor for the Education of some Children, which he doth accordingly educate, this makes an Election to have the thing by way of Legacy, and not as Executor, as appears by the Case of *Paramour* and *Yardley*, Plowd. 543. So if an Horse be bequeathed, and one offering to buy him of the Executor himself, he directeth him to goe and buy the Horse of the Legatee, or if the Executor himself offer money to the Legatee for the Horse; this implieth an Assent that it should be the Legatee's by the Will: and so was it held in the Case between *Low* and *Carter*, where the Devisee of a Term did grant it to the Executor;

cutor; and this Acceptance of a Grant from
 him was held to imply the Executor's Af-
 sent, that it should be his to grant. But I
 see not well how that should be Law
 which in the latter part of the *L. Dyer* is
 found, *viz.* Where a Term was devised to
J. S., and he was made Executor, and after
 the death of the Testator entered and oc-
 cupied the Lands a whole year without
 proving the Will, that this was an Election
 to have it as Devisee, and not as Executor.
 For, first, he had good right to the Term as
 Executor before Probate, and so might
 clearly in that right have taken the Pro-
 fits, although it had not been devised or
 bequeathed to him, and that before any
 Will proved. Secondly, he could not by
 right have it as Legatee, without Assent of
 himself or some other as Executor. There-
 fore this general Acceptation can deter-
 mine no Election, as elsewhere is held. As
 for Dis-assent or Disablement to assent: As
 if the Executor do once declare his Assent
 that the Legatee shall have his Legacy, he
 may then enter into it or take it, notwith-
 standing the Executor's Countermand or
 revocation of his Assent after; so, on the
 other side, I think, if he fully and express-
 ly deny that the Legacy shall take effect,

Tr. 37 Eliz.
 If he by Will
 bequeath it
 to *J. S.*, this
 an Election
 to have it as
 Legatee.

he cannot after make a good Assent thereunto, for that Election once made must stand peremptory, be it Refusal to assent, or Assent. Yet *Quære* of this, for that the Refusal to assent may be checked by Sentence or Decree in the Spiritual Court or Court of Equity, and so an Assent be enforced. But if the power of Assenting be legally lost by the means aforesaid, *viz.* disabled, I see not how any legal Interest can be transferred by that compelled Assent, howsoever decreed. And what is said of a Legacy bequeathed to another, the same may be understood in case where the Bequest is to the Executor himself, and he makes his Election to have it as Legatee, or as Executor. But if where an Horse is bequeathed to A, the Executor after the Testator's death doth ride the Horse, or use him in the Coach or in the Plough, I do not take this to be any such Disagreement to the Execution of the Legacy, as that the Executor cannot after assent to the Legatee's having thereof, no more (though it be somewhat more) then where a Drinking-cup is bequeathed, and the Executor after the Testator's death doth use it to drink in: nay, if a Lease of Land be bequeathed to A,

So if the Executor take a new Lease, his Assent after is void.

Tr. 37 Eliz. Carter's

Case. 19 El.

Dy. 339.

and

and the Executor continueth the Departing of the Testator's Cattel therein; yet is not this any Disagreement to the Execution of the Legacy. But if this Lease-land were let out by the Testator from year to year, and the Executor dischargeth the Tenant, and taketh it into his hands at the year's end; this I conceive to be a Dis-assent to the Legacy: and so also perhaps may his taking or distraining for any Rent thereupon due after the Testator's death. Yet am I not resolute that the Dis-assent is so peremptory and unchangeable as the Assent, remembring the Case in *K. Henry the eighth* his time, where a Term being granted by a Lessee conditionally, so as the Assent of the Lessor could be had by such a day; though the Lessor's Assent were at one time denied, yet might it be yielded at another, so as it were at any time before the day. But yet there it was held, that if no time of Assent were limited, then one express Denial or refusal would be peremptory, so as the Refusal were expressed to the party to whom the Assent was to be given; otherwise, if it were but in speech to or amongst Strangers. This and the former Case 19 *Eliz.* give the best light to this Point that

14 H. 8. 23.

Dy. 359. After choice once made, no variation on.

I remember. Now for Disablement to assent, it was held in the forementioned case of *Low and Carter*, that where a Term is bequeathed to *A*, and after the Testator's death the Executor takes a new Lease of the same Land for more years in possession, or to begin presently; now by this was the Term left by the Testator surrendered and drowned, so as it could not pass to *A* by the Executor's Assent after.

As to the fifth Point, *viz.* In what manner a Lease for years or other Chatter real may be bequeathed to one for a time with Remainder to another; it hath been heretofore much doubted, when a Lease for years was bequeathed to one for life, or for so many years as he should live, whether the limiting of a Remainder thereafter his decease were of any validity in Law or not. And this Doubt had this ground: Any State for life in the judgment of Law is greater then any Term for years: therefore when a Termor hath by his Will given his Term or his House or Land which he so holdeth for years to one for life, or for so many years as he shall live; this Testator and Devisor hath not in the judgment of the

the Law any Estate remaining in him; and therefore it was thought very hard for him to give or limit a Remainder to another. But after many arguings and debates, it was in the late Queen's time resolved, that such a Remainder was good; and that if the first Devisee died before the Term expired, that then he to whom the Remainder was limited might enter and enjoy the residue of the Term. As for the giving of part of the years to one, and the residue to the other; viz. if the Term being twenty years, the Lessee bequeathed ten thereof to his Wife, and the Remainder to his Daughter; of this no doubt ever was but that it was good: for that after the first State limited, there remained a farther Term, viz. ten years more, in the Devisor, whereof he had power to dispose; whereas in the other Case, after the Term limited to one for life, there remained but a possibility that this life should not take up the whole Term. But now, put we the case a third way, viz. that the Termor deviseth or bequeatheth the thing in Lease to one Child in tail, with Remainder to another, and dieth, and the first entreth and dieth without issue; now

Plow. Com.
520 & 522.

whether shall the next in Remainder or the Executor of him so dying have the Term residue? And this Case came in question and was adjudged about the middle of King *John* his Reign in the *Exchequer*: for there, Master *Hamond* holding by Lease for years from the Crown the Manor of *Akers* in *Kent*, devised the same by his Will to *Alexander Hamond*, his eldest Son, and the Heirs-males of his body, with Remainder to *Ralph Hamond*, another Son, in like manner, and the like Remainder to *Thomas Hamond*, and made the said *Alexander* Executor, who after his Father's decease elected to take as Legatee, and after *Ralph Hamond* died, leaving Issue male, and making his Wife Executrix: *Alexander*, not having Issue male, granted the whole Term by Deed to *B* and *C* for the behoof of himself and his Wife during their lives; and after to the use of his youngest Daughter, whom Sir *Robert Lewkenor* married. Then *Alexander* dying without Issue male, the Wife and Executrix of *Ralph Hamond* entred, claiming the Term, and being kept out, sealed a Lease; whereupon an *Eject. firma* was brought, and a Jury appearing at the Bar in the *Exchequer*, found a special Verdict

Both *Alexander* and *Ralph* were Executors; but that makes no difference.

dict in effect *ut supra*. And in argument of this Case, first the main Question was, whether the Case were all one in Law with the former, where a Term was devised to one for life, with Remainder over, so as by the death of *Alexander Hamond* without Issue male the Term should goe to the next in Remainder, as in the other Case, by the death of the Devisee for life, dying within the Term, it should doe. And on the Plaintiff's part it was urged to be all one, so that by virtue of the Bequests *supra*, *Alexander* had an Estate to him and his Executors onely so long as there should be Heirs-males of his body; and he dying without such Issue, the Term remained to the Executors of *Ralph*, who had the Remainder in like manner, and left Issue male, which still lived, & so that State of *Ralph* yet had continuance. For it was admitted by the Counsel on that side, that the Term could not goe to the Issue male of *Ralph* according to the words and intent of the Will, since it was impossible to make a Term to descend without an Act of Parliament. This therefore they said the Law should work, which was nearest to the intent, *viz.* that after *Alexander's* death it should

goe

goe first to his Executors and Assigns, so long as Issue male of his body doth continue; and for want of such Issue, then to *Ralph*, his Executors and Assigns, so long as his Issue male should last: and therefore in this case, the Issue male of *Alexander* failing, the Executor of *Ralph*, whose Issue male faileth not, should enjoy the Term; and so Judgment ought to be given for the Plaintiff being Lessee of that Executor. On the other side it was said by the Defendant's Counsel, that this Case differeth much from the other Case, where the Term or Land held by Lease is given but for life to the first, with Remainder to another; which Case, as having been often resolved, was clearly admitted to be good Law; for in that Case the intent of the Testator might and did take effect. But in this Case, if the Land should goe to the Executors and Assigns of *Ralph Hamond*, it must goe against the intent of the Testator, whose mind and will was, as it appears by his word, that it should goe onely to the Issue male of one Son after another, and not to any Executors. Now then, since this intent was so contrary to the rules of Law, that it could not take effect, there-

herefore it must be void, and so all the words of Heirs-male standing void, the Will is to be construed as a sole and absolute Gift and Bequest to the said *Alex.* and consequently the Term must goe to his Executors and Assigns. And for this Point, resemblance was made to a Case resolved in the *King's Bench*; where a Lease was made by Indenture to *A*, *Habend.* to *A*, *B* and *C* for their lives: now because *B* and *C* could take nothing, it was resolved that *A* should not have it for their lives, but for his own onely. This Case was said to come very close in reason to the Case in question: For as here the intent of the Lease was that *B* and *C* should be estated for their lives, and, since that could not be, therefore the naming of them should be utterly void, and as if they had not at all been named, and their Lives shall not stand as a measure for the Estate of *A*; so in the other Case the intent of the Will being, that the Lease or Land leased should goe to the Heirs-males of the body, first of *Alexander*, and after of *Ralph*; since this cannot be, therefore the words and name of Heirs-males should stand for a mere Blank and Cypher, and not to mea-

Windsmore
and Holford
vel Holbord
M. 28 & 29
El. argued,
and Tr. 29
El. adjudg.

measure out any State to the said *Alexander* and *Ralph*, and their Executors and Assigns. Also it was said on the Defendant's part, that an Estate for life in the judgment of Law is of so short and uncertain continuance, that if *A* make a Lease to *B* for his life, and after makes a Lease of the same Land to *C* for years, now shall not this latter Lease be void absolutely for any part of the Term, but shall stand in expectance of the death of *B*, and, as soon as he dieth, shall take effect immediately : whereas if the Lease to *B* had been for ten years, or any like Term, then the Lease to *C* should have been void for so many years of his Term. Thus it appears that a State for life is very momentary in the judgment of Law, and not reputed of any certain continuance so much as for a day. But it is otherwise of an Estate-tail, so as if *A*, having given Land to *B* in tail, doth after (without Indenture which makes an Estoppel) make a Lease to *C* for 21 years, and then *B* dieth without Issue during the Term, yet shall not the Lease take effect, because it was utterly void at the first making. For an Estate-tail, being a state of Inheritance, may in the intend-

ment

ment and Judgment of Law have continuance for ever, as appears both by the Case of *Adams* and *Lambert*, where it is held within the Statute of Chanteuries, which speaks of Gifts to have continuance for ever. Therefore a Reversion upon an Estate-tail is no *Assets*, nor giveth cause of receipt; otherwise in all these Cases it is touching a Reversion expectant upon a State for life. Again, it was said by the Defendant's Counsel, that an Estate may be limited to *A* and his Heirs during the life of *B*, with Remainder to *C*, as in *Chudley's* Case was resolved: but if Land be given to *A* and his Heirs so long as *B* shall have Heirs of his body or Heirs-males, with Remainder over to *C*, this Remainder is utterly void. So as there is in the judgment of Law a great difference between the largeness and continuance of an Estate-tail and of an Estate for life. And if (which is worth the observing) a Fee-simple cannot afford a Remainder to be drawn out of it after such a Gift to one and his Heirs, during the continuance of an Estate-tail, or of the measure thereof; much lesse can a Term yield such large thongs to be cut out of it, as a Remainder after an Estate

as H. Dy:
fol. 7.

Estate to one so long as he shall have Heirs of his body, or Heirs-males, which is all one. And in this Case the Remainder was held void by *Baldwin* and *Shelly* though *Englefield* were of contrary opinion, as the Lord *Dyer* sheweth. Farther it was said, that if such a Conveyance by Will should stand good, it would raise a Perpetuity, not to be cut off by any Recovery.

But whereas the Case of *Hamond* hath been related before, so as by way of admittance it was argued as a Gift and Bequest to *Alexander Hamond* and the Heirs-males of his body, with Remainder in like manner to *Ralph*; the truth of the Case was, that the words of the Will were onely to *Alexander* and his Heirs-males; (not speaking of his body) and so to *Ralph*; which, as was urged by the Defendant's counsel, made the Case stronger against the Plaintiffs: for admit that the former way *Alexander* should have had but a State determinable upon the continuance of his Issue-males; yet here not so; since the reason why in Wills, such a Devise being made, the Law should supply the words (*of his body*;) is onely to make an Estate-tail to the Issues male,

According to the Testator's Intent. Now in this case of a Term for years so bequeathed, no Estate-tail could possibly be, though these words had been in the Will; and therefore the motive to the Law failing, no such supply will be made by the Law, since it would be to no purpose: consequently, here was neither State-tail, nor Issues or Heirs-males of the body, on whose continuance this State of *Alexander* should be determinable. Therefore it was an absolute and total Bequest of the Term to *Alexander* for ever, *viz.* so long as the Term should continue; for as a Bequest to one for ever is as much as a Bequest to him and his Heirs; so a Bequest to one and his Heirs is as much as if it had been to him for ever.

And this Case, after six Arguments on each side at the Bar, (if I much mistake not) was upon argument by the Barons adjudged for the Defendant by the Lord chief Baron *Tanfield* and Mr. Baron *Bromley*, Mr. Baron *Denham* (who onely heard, as I take it, one Argument on each side, made of purpose in respect of his coming into his place, after the former Arguments) being of the

the contrary Opinion : and the Judgment proceeded upon the Point formerly touched, that, as this Case was, the state of *Alexander* did not end by his death, and remain to the Executors of *Ralph*. Other Points were stirred, which will be touched upon in other Divisions after, in this Chapter. It will be observed that I do more fully express reasons and points inforced on the Defendant's part than on the Plaintiff's, wherefore let these two reasons be accepted. First, that I better could relate that than the other, being the first who argued for the Defendant, and hearing little of that which was by others said on either side after, nor hearing the Court's; *nec ad hoc conductus, nec pedibus fortis*. Secondly, the labour did lie on the Defendant's part, to prove that this Case differed from the common Case of Devise to one for life, with Remainder to another.

We are now come to the sixth Point, viz. that where House or Land held by Lease, or the Profits thereof, or the Lease or Term it self, which in a Will makes no difference, is bequeathed to *A* for life, or for some part of the Term, with the Remainder to *B*, and the Executor as-

sents

sents that *A* shall enjoy his Bequest, whether this shall enure to *B* also, since without the Executor's Assent no Legacy can take effect. And it hath been resolved that this Assent shall be effectual as well to all the Remainders as to the first Estate: and so, according to former resolutions, it was admitted in *Hamond's Case*, that *Alexander* his Assent to take as Legatee sufficed (if the Bequest had been good) for the Remainder to *Ralph* and others. And the reason of this doubtless is, because here the particular Estate and the Remainder are all but one Estate in Law; they make but one degree in a Writ of Entry, nor shall have but one year and a day to enter for Mortmain. And an Attornment to the Grantee of a Rent or Reversion for life with Remainder over doth enure also to the Remainder; which being Assent hath much affinity to that of the Executor; each tending to perfect the Grant of another man. Now then, whereas it was urged in *Hamond's Case*, that the State limited to *Ralph* should take effect, not as a Remainder, but as a new Estate to commence futurely, *viz.* when *Alex.* should be dead without Issue male: if it could be admitted to be so, then could

Plow. 545.
6. Co. lib.
10. f. 47.

not the Assent of the first State to *Alexander* have enured to this, since to *R* in Remainder it worketh as being one State with the first, which reason must fail the other way. This difference between a Remainder and new Estate future brings to my mind the Case of a Rent by way of new Creation, granted by *C* out of Land to *A* for life, or in tail, with Remainder to *B*. In like manner it hath probably been held, although this Limitation to *B* cannot be good by way of Remainder, because *C* had no Estate in the Rent remaining with him when he made the Grant to *A*; yet should it be good by way of a new Grant and Creation to commence futurely. But this doubtless cannot so be but with a difference. For if the Grant were by Indenture between *C* on the one part, and *A* onely on the other part, now *B*, being no party to the Deed, can take nothing by it, except by way of Remainder, but if he were party to the Indenture; or if the Grant were by Deedpoll, to which all men are alike parties, then it haply may enure as a future Grant to *B*. This is not impertinent.

Now as the Executor's Assent to one cannot enure to another, though of the
same

same thing, except by way of Remainder; so neither can it any way where the things are not the same, except in very special cases. As if a Testator bequeath a Rent to *A*, and the Land it self to *B*, the Executor's Assent that *A* should have the Rent is no Assent that *B* should have the Land: yet I think the Assent that *B* should have the Land doth imply the Assent that *A* should have the Rent. 1. For that the Restraint imposed by the Law against the passing of Chattell by a Will without the Executor's Assent being out of respect to the payment of the Testator's Debts, now if the Land shall pass to *B*, it is no more available to the Testator's Debts that it pass discharged of the Rent, then charged. 2. Since the Gift and Bequest was of the Land charged with the Rent, therefore if this Bequest shall take effect, it shall carry the Land according to the Testator's intent, viz. with this Charge upon it: for what else doth the Executor in this, but assent that the Will of the Testator herein doth stand and take effect? and consequently *B* must take the Term according to the Will, and not in any different or contrary manner.

Plow. Com.
521. in Bret
& Rigden's
Case. So of
Common, or
other profits.

Next we are to consider of the manner of Assents by Executors, which hath some affinity with the fourth Point. But here we shall consider onely of Assents conditional. Now to this purpose we will cast our eyes upon two sorts of Conditions, *viz.* precedent, and subsequent. As for the former, an Executor may to a Legatee absolutely give Assent upon a Condition precedent, as thus : I am content, that if you can get and bring in to me such a Bond wherein the Testator stood bound to *J* *S*, that then you enter upon the Term, or take the Corn or Cattel to you bequeathed. So of other like Conditions which may precede the Assent : as, If you can get the Assent of my Executor, or, If you will pay the Arrerages of Rent to the Lessor behind at the Testator's death, or, If you will pay the Wages already due to the Servants attending about the Cattel or Corn to you bequeathed. In this case, if the Condition be not performed, there is no Assent, and therefore the conditioning in this manner is good. But if it be on a Condition subsequent, as thus, I do agree that you shall have the thing bequeathed to you, provided that you shall pay so much yearly to me, or to such a Creditor of the Testator ;

tor ; now the Legatee entring into or taking the thing bequeathed, shall not lose it again by failing to perform the Condition afterwards ; for the Executor by his Assent cannot make that Legacy conditional which the Testator gave absolutely, no more then he can make the Bequest to be absolute which the Testator gave conditionally, except by a Release made of the Condition. As in other things, so in this, the Executor's Assent is like to the Attornment of a Lessee, which cannot be upon a Condition subsequent, where the Grant is absolute or without condition, though yet he may to his Attornment prefix a Condition precedent.

In the eighth place we are, touching the Bequest of Leases or Chattels real, to consider what manner of Interest one to whom a Remainder of a Term after the death of another is limited hath, and whether he may grant the same or dispose thereof during the life of the first. And as to that it is clear that he hath but a possibility of Remainder, for that possibly the whole Term may be spent in the life of the first, to whom during his or her life it is bequeathed : now a meer possibility is not grantable. Therefore was

9 Eliz. Ful-
sey's Case.

Lampert's
Case. Co.
li. 10. fo. 48.

it resolved in the late Queen's time, where he in Remainder granted or sold his State or Interest to another during the time of the first, that this Grant was utterly void, because a Possibility cannot be granted. But whereas some opinion in that Case was delivered, that this Possibility could not be released, no more then granted; it hath since been resolved, that he in the Remainder, by his deed of Grant or Release of the Devisee for life, may make his Estate, which before was determinable by his death, to be now absolute, so as it shall continue to his Executors, Administrators and Assigns, after his death during the whole Term. It may be that what was conceived, in the said Case of *Fulsey*, negatively of the validity of a Release by him in the Remainder, might be meant or perhaps expressed of a Release to him in the Reversion: but surely (methinks) though he could not surrender, yet his Release or Defeasance to him in Reversion or Remainder, having the Freehold or Inheritance, should dissolve or destroy this Term residue after the death of the Devisee for life, so as there the Freehold should be discharged thereof. But *Que-*

re, for I have not known this in question. As for the other Point of *Fulsey's* Case, it was in the said latter Case of *Lampet* confirmed and admitted for good Law, viz. that this Possibility of Remainder could not be aliened nor conveyed to a Stranger.

Now we are come to the ninth Point, viz. to examine whether any act of the Devisee for life can frustrate or defeat him in the Remainder of the Term, and whether the act of God, viz. by the death of him in the Remainder before the first Devisee for life, shall defeat it. As to the first, it hath divers times been resolved, that no Grant made by the first man can cut off or defeat the second, though formerly it were held otherwise: but according to the late Resolution was it also held or admitted by all in the said Case of *Hamond*, where was such a Grant. And as this cannot be done by any direct Grant or Alienation, no more can it by an indirect or implied, as by taking of a new Lease, which is a Surrender in Law of the old Lease, no more then by an express Surrender; nor doubtless by Outlawry, whereby the Term of the first Devisee is settled in the Crown. But

Plowd. 320.
Welchden
and Elking-
ton. 10 Eliz.
Dy. 277.
19 Eliz. D.
339. Con. 8
El. D. 253.
Or 33 H. 8.
Br. Chattels
23.

if we put the Case farther, of Wast committed by the Tenant for life, or breach of Condition by not payment of the Rent, or otherwise; these for the whole in the latter Case, and for the part wasted in the former, do so destroy the Lease, and put the Reversion *in statu quo prius*, as that all Remainders must needs fail: so of a Feoffment, or other like Forfeiture by Fine. As for the death of him in Remainder, it was urged in the Case of *Hamond*, that since it was but a meer Possibility, if it could not take effect, and become an Estate in the life of him to whom it was limited, it could not settle in his Executor: and to that purpose were cited the Case of the Rector of *Chedington*, and more expressly as resolved in the Point the Case of *Price and Aimore*. But the Court resolved, (and found former Resolutions in other Courts that way) that the death of him in Remainder did not hinder, but that it may settle as well in the Executors upon the death of the Devisee, as it should have done in himself, if he had over-lived the first Devisee for life. If the Lessor enter and levy a Fine, and the Devisee for life enters not, nor claims in five years; he in the Remainder

Welchden & Elk. *ubi supra*. But there the Point was never questioned, though such death was there.

der may enter, as having a Right futurely accrued.

In the last place we intermeddled onely with Leases bequeathed, wherein yet is to be understood, that what thereof is spoken is to be extended to and understood of all other Chattels real, as Wardship of Body and Lands, Estates by Extent upon Statutes or Judgments, Terms otherwise then by Lease, in Fairs, Markets, Rents, Annuities, Commons, Advowsons, and other Profits; yea, one single next Avoidance of a Church. Now we come to consider of Bequests personal principally, if not onely; *viz.* how such may be forfeited, lost, or revoked. First, then, we will consider of the acts of the Legatee; secondly, of the acts of God; thirdly, of the acts of the Testator. The Legatee, as from the Civilians I learn, may forfeit his Legacy by his miscarriage towards the Will: as if he use means to have it concealed and kept from being known, and consequently proved. So if he accuse it of Falsity. So, again, if he deface or destroy the Will. Also, if being by the Will appointed to be Tutor or Educator of a Child, he refuseth so to be. So saith Master *Swinborn*: but *Sylvester Prierius* seems

Of Forfeiture, Revocation and other loss of Legacy.

Swinb. de testam. 352, 353. Except as Tutor or Guardian he accuse it.

Sum. Sylv.
283.

seems to me opposite in that where he saith, *Si legatum fuerit aliquid eâ conditione ut facias aliquid, tale legatum non est conditionale, sed modale*; so as he takes away the force of a Condition from words conditional, whereas the other without words conditional raiseth a Condition implied. Lastly, if the Legatee presume too far upon the strength of the Bequest to him, so as he taketh the thing bequeathed without the consent of the Executor, thus also doth he forfeit his Legacy, saith Master Swinborn, unless the Testator did will and appoint he should so doe. The falling into enmity with the Testator will be considered of more fitly, as I take it, among the Acts of the Testator. In the next place, let us see what acts of God shall cause a Legacy not to take effect. First thus, If the Legatee die before the Testator, this Legacy is lost, and his Executor shall not have it. So also, saith Master Swinborn, if it be appointed to be paid after the death of the Executor, and the Legatee dieth before the Executor, it is lost. And so also if he die before the Condition performed, saith he. Let us come now to Time of payment, and Death before

De Testam.
252.

De Testam.
255.

before it. If there be a day certain limited for payment, and the Legatee die before that day, his Executor shall have the Legacy; contrariwise, if the payment were limited to be made when the Legatee should be married: but if it were only expressed to be towards the Marriage of the Legatee, and she die before Marriage, her Executor shall have it, saith *Swinborn*. Now put the case that a Legacy is bequeathed to *B*, to be paid when he shall be five and twenty years old, and *B* dieth before that age; it shall now be payed to the Executor, and that presently, without staying till *B* should have been of that age, saith *Priest*. Nay, saith *Swinborn*, if the words of the Will be so, viz. when he shall come to such an age, then if he die before, his Executors shall not have it at all: but if the Bequest be general, and farther it is added in the Will, that the Testator would have that Legacy paid the Legatee at such an age, there, though he die before such an age, yet his Executors shall have the summe bequeathed. The difference may seem very nice, yet haply it wants not some probable colour of reason. Now lastly let us come

Vide Bro. Devise 27 and 45.
There were divers days of payment, and the Devisee died before the last; his Executor shall have it. 14 vel 24 H. 8. 36 H. 8. 3 El. D. 59. See this difference.

Sum. Sylv.
283. According hereto, vide Dy. ubi supra, per majorem opinionem Justiciar.

As of the Testator.

to

Sum. Sylv.
285.

to the Testator's own act, who clearly hath power to revoke or countermand any Legacy, though he revoke not the rest of the Will. And here first of Revocation presumed. If there fall out *graves inimicitiae inter Legantem & Legatarium, Legatum caducum efficitur*, saith the Summist; *sed non propter leves*, saith he: & *si graves, si tamen redeant ad amicitiam, reintegratur Legatum*. That is, by grievous Enmity after arising, and never reconciled between the Testator and Legatee, the Legacy is dissolved; otherwise of a light breach or falling out, though it continue untill the death of the Testator. This I conceive to be rather fit for this place, as an act of the Testator, then to be reckoned or registred amongst the acts or Forfeitures of the Legatee; for that it is not by the Summist made material, or any point of difference, whether the Legatee gave just cause of offence, or that the Testator unjustly conceived displeasure, and so grew into causeless enmity. Therefore also do I hold it of the nature of a Revocation implied or presumed; for that although no Revocation be made, yet since the Testator hath ceased to bear good will to the Legatee, he cannot be intended to will him good,

good; nor consequently to be of the same mind touching the benefiting of him, as he was when he made his Will. Yet here again it is worth the consideration, whether the circumstance following may not make a difference in the case, thus; That where the Testator dieth shortly after the breach and enmity grown, and before he come to the place where his Will is, or at least to opportunity of perusing and reforming the same, there this very alteration of affection should make an alteration in the Will, and a Revocation of the amicable Bequest. But where he living a good space after, and coming to the place where his Will was, and specially if he do again peruse it, he yet doth not cross nor expunge that Bequest, here it may be presumed that either his enmity ceased, or that so far as to continue this Bequest, the Charity or other motives inducing him to make it stood unvanish'd and not extinguish'd by this breach of former Amity. For as the continuance of time and opportunity after the making of a verbal or nuncupative Will, without reducing it to writing, and causing it to be attested by Witnesses, though the Testator live divers years after,

after, doth strongly argue his intent not to continue, that what was done in an extremity should stand as his Will: so, on the contrary, the permitting of a Bequest expressed in a written Will to continue without any crossing, blotting or defacing, may argue, against contrary presumption, the Testator's minde, that it should continue as part of his Will. But now let us consider of more expresse Revocation, and to that purpose will I relate a late Decree in the *Chancery*, made by the Lord Keeper, according to the opinion of the Master of the Rolls, three Judges, and two Doctours, Masters of the Court, between *Robert Eyre* and *William Eyre* Complainants, and *Hester*, late Wife of *Christopher Eyre* their Brother, and now Wife of Sir *Francis Wortley*, Defendant: Thus was the Case. The said *Christopher Eyre*, 15 *Jacobi*, by his last Will and Testament giveth and bequeatheth to the said *Robert Eyre* his Brother an hundred pounds, and to the said *William* his Brother a thousand pounds, and gives to the said *Hester* his Wife all the residue of his Estate, and makes and ordains the said *Hester* his sole and onely Executrix, saving, for the per-

performance of his Will, he orders *Robert Eyre* and *William Eyre*, his said Brothers, and intreats them to joyn as Executors in trust with his Wife, for the better performance of this his last Will. Afterwards, *Jan. 5. 1624.* being sick of the Sicknes, whereof he died, he was moved by Master *Damport* and Master *Stone* to lettle his Estate : to which motion he yielded : and Master *Stone* and Master *Damport* did demand of the said *Christopher* what Friend he thought fittest to be his Executor, and to whom he would commit the care of discharging his Funerals, and performing his Will, whether he trusted any person more then his Wife to be his Executor. To whom he answered, That his Wife was the fittest person for that purpose, and therefore should be his sole Executrix. And then the Testator was moved by Mr. *Stone* to give and bequeath Legacies to his Father, to his Brethren, and to his Kindred : whereupon he answered, he would give or leave them nothing. And being farther put in mind to remember his Friends and others, gave and bequeathed to *Lionel Atwood*, his God-child, twenty or thirty shillings. And being there-

thereupon moved by his Wife to give his said God-son more, or a greater Legacy, or the like in effect, he said, Thou knowest not what thou doest, do not wrong thy self; twenty shillings or thirty shillings is money in a poor bodie's purse, or the like in effect: and the rest he left to his Wife's discretion or disposition. And the said Testator did speak the words aforesaid, or the like in effect, *animo testandi & ultimam Voluntatem declarandi*, as the Witnesses then present did conceive.

This Will was proved by the Oath of the said *Hester*, and this Codicill being pleaded as a Revocation of the said Bequests, the said Master of the Rolls, Judges and Doctors, were by the Lord Keeper and the Order of the Court desired to reduce the matter upon the Will and Codicill into a Case, and to certifie their opinions, whether the said Codicill were a Revocation of the Legacies given to the Plaintiffs, or not. And they, after Counsel heard at several times, *viz.* both common Lawyers and Civilians, and many hours spent in conference together, did finally resolve with one unanimous consent, that the Legacies to the Plaintiffs given

Ord. 27. Jun.
a. 2 Caroli
Regis.

given were not by the said Codicill revoked, and so certified under their hands. Upon reading whereof *November 25*, Decree being resolved to be made, if cause were not shewn to the contrary *Novemb. 27*; on which day the Defendant's Counsel, before the Lord Keeper, in the presence of the Master of the Rolls and the said three Judges and Sir *John Heyward*, alledging what they could in stay of the said Decree; it was by a general concurrence of opinion decreed, that the Legacies given to the said Plaintiffs should be to them pay'd on our *Lady-even*, with twenty Nobles in the hundred for the detainment thereof.

This case I thought fit to relate somewhat at large, because it pitcheth upon the point of Revocation, without plain, full and exprefs terms. And surely, as Wills are to be made out of disposing Memories and Understandings, so also with deliberate and advised Judgments; and therefore by like reason not to be countermanded or revoked by sick or slight expressions. And this seems to me very agreeable with the rule and reason of the Common Law. For as Reason it self doth dictate, that *Nilil tam consentaneum est æ-*

quitati naturali, quàm unumquodque dissolvi eodem modo quo conficitur; so hath the Common Law of *England*, in my understanding, resolved: as for the purpose, If the King present a Clerk to a Church, and he is thereupon admitted, and instituted thereunto; now yet before Induction may this be revoked as a Will may: yet if the King shall after, and before Induction, present another man to this Church, without an expresse Repeal or Countermand of the former Presentation, it shall not hereby be revoked. So if Lands were conveyed to certain Uses, with a clause or power of Revocation; the Sale of the same to another did not revoke the former: but if a State were meerly at will, then the Conveyance to another by the Common Law amounted to a Revocation. Therefore was the Statute made *tempore Henrici 8.* to redress this, *viz.* that where the King had granted Lands or other things to one during his pleasure, this should not be revoked by a Grant to another, without recitall of the former, and Declaration that the King had determined his pleasure.

Being now to consider of Relation in
the

To help this
was the
Stat. made
27 *El.c.4.*

6 *H.8.c.9.*

the Executor's Assent, it is meet, since these Discourses are principally intended for those who are not grounded Students in or Professors of the Law, that we shew what we mean by Relation, or what it is in Law. Thus therefore be it conceived, that Relation is a kind of fiction in Law, making a thing done at one time to be accepted and reputed, or to have its operation, as if it had been done at another time past. As for the purpose, *A* doth bargain, and sell Freehold Lands to *B* in *August* by Indenture, which is not inrolled till *October* following; yet this hath such Relation to the Date of the Indenture, that if *A* after that, and before the Inrolment, become bound in a Statute, or granted a Rent-charge, or made a Lease for years, or took a Wife, or committed Felony, yet shall none of these be of any force to charge or prejudice the State of *B*, for that the Law adjudgeth him now owner by Relation as from the time of the Date: yea, if a Servant departing in *August*, for some great breach with his Master, do kill his Master in *October*, this is in Law petty Treason, as if he had continued Servant when he did the fact; because

it relates to the malice conceived when he was his Servant. Now then having shewed that a Term or other Chattel real or personal passeth not, nor is transferred in property to the Devisee, untill the Assent of the Executor be thereunto had ; we now put the case that this Assent is not had till a year or some such good space after the Testator's death, and make our Question, whether this shall have Relation to the Testator's death, *viz.* to be in the Law's account as if it had then been ; or, perhaps, to some purposes so to stand, and to others not so. That this is usefull and material to be known, be it thus shewed. One bequeatheth his term of Tithes of an Advowson of an House or Land by him first leased to an under-Tenant for Rent, and dieth in *May*, the Executor assenteth to the Bequest in *October*, between which two times Tithes be set out, the Church becometh void, Rent groweth payable ; now if this Assent shall relate to the Testator's death, the Devisee shall have these, else not. The like Cases may be put of the brood of Cows, Mares and Ews, fallen between the death of the Testator and the Assent ; so also of Fleeces of Sheep shorn, &c.

Now

Now to come to the Point, it is reported by the Lord *Coke* to have been held in the late Queen's time, that this Assent shall, as between the Executor and the Legatee, have Relation to the Testator's death, yet so that if the Executor before his Assent to the Devisee of a Lease committed Waste, now the action of Waste shall be brought against the Executor in the *Tenuit* for the Waste done before, and not against the Devisee in the *Tenēt*.

Tr. 41 Eliz.
Co. l. 5. f. 12.
B. Sanders
Case. Vide
Plow. co. of
Trespas
against a
Stranger for
taking be-
fore Assent,
280. b.

But put the case that the Legatee before the Executor's Assent granted the term to *J S*, now if to any purpose this Assent shall have Relation, it shall certainly so be to make good this Grant, as making the Legatee to be estated, and consequently able to grant before the Executor's Assent: yet do I not find any opinion or resolution in the Point, but find it debated at the Bar in the late Queen's time between *Puckering* and *Egerton*, in the Case of Administration granted to *A*, after her Grant of a free Term left by her intestate Husband; but I find no Resolution therein, nor perhaps wants their material difference betwixt that Case and the other:

P. 25 Eliz.

48 E. 3. 15.

for there the Devisee had at least an inception of Title by gift of the Owner, wanting onely a circumstance of Assent to perfect it; but here this Woman till Administration had not so, unless, perhaps, the Statute 21. of King *Henry* the 8th, directing or enjoining Ordinaries to grant Administration, shall amount to a kind of Title *ad rem*, though not yet *in re*. But to return to the Point of *Assets*; Where a Reversion is granted by Deed or Fine, if the Lessee a good time after do atturn, this shall have no Relation to the time of the Grant; so as for Wast committed or Rent grown due between the Grant and Atturment, the Grantee can have no remedy. Therefore it is good for him who buieth, or hath any thing of the Gift of a Legatee, to have the Assent of the Executor before the Sale or Gift well testified; or if the Assent be not had till after, let him take a new Gift, that he may not rest in a doubtful case: for besides the Premisses, that great Legist Sir *Edward Coke*, when he was a practiser (to Mr. *Stubbs* of *Norfolk*) for his Fee, gave his Opinion, as I have been confidently informed, that where a Lessee for years being outlawed did grant his Term, and after reversed the

the Outlawry, this did not make good the Grant by Relation, it not being in the Grantor at the time of his Grant. And this hath much affinity with the principal Point; for there, if the Relation help not, the Grant is not good from the Legatee.

Divers Cases of Bequests considered and expounded.

IF a Termour of an House bequeath his House to *B*, without expressing how long he should have it, he shall have the whole Term and number of years. So of Land.

14 Eliz.Dy.
307. Cont.
in a Grant,
31 Eliz.

Also of the name of the House, the Orchards, Gardens and Backsides do pass: yea, if the House with the Appurtenances be bequeathed, thereby the Lands belonging to the House, or used with it, do pass, though yet they would not so doe by such words in any Lease, Deed, or Grant. Yet by some Civilians, or Canonists, the Orchard belonging to an House shall not pass by the onely Gift of the House, without some words shewing the Intent of the Testator so to

Sum. Sylv.
286.

be, or except one Gate or Door lead as well to the Orchard as to the House : but some other of them hold, that it doth pass without any such help of circumstance, so as it be adjoyning to the House.

If a Lessee for years give his Term by his Will to *A*, he shall have it without paying any Rent, for the Executors shall pay it for him, as I find in the Summist ; but against Reason, methinks.

Ibid. ut sup.

If one bequeath his Indenture of Lease, his whole state in that Lease passeth. So if one bequeath his Obligation or other Specialty, the Debt or Duty it self shall go to the Legatee ; and by the Canon or Civil Law the very Action it self passeth,

Ibid. ut sup.

viz. as I conceive, ability to sue the Debtor in his own name : but in our Law it is otherwise, the Suit must be in the Executor's name, for a Debt or thing in Action cannot be assigned, except by or to the King ; and onely at the Common Law is the Debt recoverable ; but the Spiritual Court may force the Executor to sue, or let his name be used in the Suit, for and by the Legatee.

Yet 48 E. 3.
12, 13. it is
admitted,
that such a
Devisee of
all Goods,
after Debts
pay'd, shall
have a Duty
resting in
account.

If one bequeath all his Moveables, Debts due to him are not bequeathed, nor Corn, nor Fruit growing on the ground,

ground, nor Stone, nor Timber prepared for Building, as the Canonists and Civilians hold.

On the other side, if one bequeath the moyety of all his Goods, the Legatee shall have onely the moyety of that which remains after Debts payed; for that onely is to be accounted the Testator's which he hath *ultra as alienum*.

By a Bequest of all Utenfils or Household-stuff; Plate nor Jewels are not given. *Quæ. 36 H. 8. Dy. 59. Dy. ibid. supra, Sum. Sylv. 286.*

If one bequeath to his Wife all her Apparel, she shall not have, as some Civilians say, her Ornaments of Gold or Silver; by which is meant, as I take it, Chains, Jewels, Bracelets, Rings, &c. But others are of contrary opinion, except they be such things as are not lawfull for her to wear.

If a Bed be given by a Will, *Venit ornamentum ejus*, saith the Civilian, that is, the Furniture thereof passeth, *viz.* not onely the Bed, Bed-stead, Bed-cloths, but also the Curtains and Vallans, as I take it. But I think that by gift of a Coach by Will, the Coach-horses pass not; yet perhaps the Furniture of the Coach-horses may pass as appurtenant to the Coach; for so I think they shall doe, rather then by Bequest of the Coach-horses without the Coach.

If

Ibid.

If one bequeath to *A* Meat, Drink and Cloathing, or *Alimenta*; he shall have, saith the Civil Law, also Lodging, Habitation, and all things necessary for the maintenance of life, viz. as I take it, Fire and Washing, &c.

Ibid. b.

If one bequeath to his Daughter ten pounds a year for her Apparelling, and she demandeth none in four years; now shall she not after that time have the Arrerages of this ten pounds by year for the time passed.

Ibid.

If a man bequeath one of his Horses or Cows, not naming which, to *J S*, he is to chuse which he will, so it be not the best of all, saith the Civil Law: and perhaps the mention of that exception grows out of respect to the Herriot, which the Lord should have, or the Mortuary, which the Parson should have.

Ibid.

A man bequeathed thirty pieces of twenty shillings to *A*, twenty to *B*, and ten to *C*, to be had in such a Chest or Casket, and it is found after his death that there be but thirty in all in that Casket or Box; now each shall be abated ratably, saith my Summist, so as *A* shall have fifteen, *B* ten, and *C* five: and this stands with good Reason and Justice; for
so

so each hath a proportionable part. And it were reasonable that it were by Parliament established for Law, that all, both Legatees and Creditors, should be pay'd in like proportion, where the State will not suffice for full payment of each, rather then that an Executor should have power to pay one all, and another nothing: yet if the Testator left sufficient to make good all those sixty pieces bequeathed, *Quære*, if that which is wanting in the Casket shall not be supplied and made up; for if the Cases following found with the same Authour be good Law, it should seem so to be.

If one, saith he, bequeathed to *J S* that which is another man's, and where- *Sum. Sylv.*
286. to the Testator hath no right; then ought his Executor to buy it, and give it to the Legatee, or else satisfie him to the full value; and this not onely by the Civil, but also by the Canon Law, and in *foro Conscientiæ*, saith my Authour.

Again, If *A* bequeath to *B* such an *Ibid.* 287. Horse by name, and after sell away that Horse, and dieth; now is his Executor bound to answer the value thereof to *B*: and if the Testator after his sale of that Horse had bought another, and called him

him by the same name as the first; now shall this latter Horse pass to B, saith the Book, except it can be proved that the Testator sold the former Horse of purpose to revoke his Will touching that Bequest.

Ibid. 286.

So again I find, that if one having but a moyety or one half of green Close, or of a Stack of Corn, or other Chattel, doth give the whole, so as the words be apparent to reach to more then his moyety, then must the Executor buy out the other's part for the Legatee, or give him the value: but if the words be but general, so as they may be reasonably satisfied with the Testator's part, no supply shall be made. So also if one, having Goods in pledge, bequeath them, it shall be construed to extend no farther then his right.

Ibid. 284.2.

A Bequest is made of an hundred pound to be pay'd at a future time, *viz.* divers years after the Testator's death; a Question is made by the Summist, whether the profit of the money in the mean time shall go to the Legatee, or the Executor: and he resolves with this difference, if the day were given in favour of the Legatee being an Infant, who could not safely receive it any sooner, then he shall have the profit; but if the respite of payment were

were in favour of the Executor, then shall the Legatee have but the bare sum, without any addition of mean profits.

If one bequeath all his Term or Goods to his Executor for payment of his Debts, or Debts and Legacies, it is a void Bequest; because it is no more then the Law would say, if he had said nothing. So if it be generally to perform his Will.

15 Eliz. Dy.
331.

Plow. Com.
545. b.

If one, seized in Fee-simple of Land, bequeath it to his Executor to pay Debts, the Executor hath no state of Free-hold: for if he should, then it must be either for life, which might end by his quick death before Debts payed; or in Fee-simple, which would carry away the Land for ever from the Heir, where perhaps a few years profits might suffice to satisfy the Debts; yea then by death of the Executor the Land should descend to his Heir, and not go to his Executor, who would be Executor of the first Testator.

Co. lib. 8.
96. a.

If one give or grant all his Goods, having Leases for years as well as Moveables, the Leases shall not pass, as was held in the time of K. Edward the sixth. And so also was it admitted in *Portman's Case*. For the word *Bona* comprehendeth onely Moveables, by the better opinion there.

By deed or word in life.
4 E. 6. Bro. Done, &c.
43. Tr. 37
El. in ba.
reg. Portman ver. Simmes, or Willis, divers times argued.

But

But the Point in that case was pertinent to this place, *viz.* a Bequest in a Will of all the Testator's Goods: and whether thereby a Lease for years passeth or not, was divers times debated, but not resolved, the Judges differing in Opinion in that Point; but in another Point, which made an end of the Case, all agreed. Yet the better Opinion was, as I find in my Report, that a Lease would pass by such words in a Will, though not in a Deed or Grant by word otherwise made; for the Legacies are demandable in the Spiritual Court, where *Bona & Catalla* are taken for all one. See also the Statute of *Marlbr.* giving an Action to the Successor, *Ad repetenda bona prædecess.* Yet an *Eject. custod.* hath been maintained thereupon. So also upon the Statute of Executors, *De bonis asportatis in vita Testatoris*, hath it been resolved, and where Administration is granted, it is onely *omnium Bonorum*, without speaking of Chattels; yet hath the Administrator interest in Leases as well as Moveables. On the other side, the Statute *de Prærog. reg.* mentioning onely Forfeiture *de Catallis*, is clearly extended to Moveables: so also in the Writ of Assize *De catallis quæ in eo capta fuerint*, and in the Writ of

Cap. 28.

4 E. 3. c. 7.
So the Stat.
§ R. 2. of
Forfeiture
of goods by
those who
go beyond
the Sea, ca.
16. In all
these Goods
are compre-
hended.

of Execution upon a Statute there is onely the word *Catalla*, and not *Bona* : and in the Case reported by *Kelway*, temp. Henry the 7th, it seems *Bona & Catalla* were taken for *Synonyma*, or all one. It doth not appear that these Statutes and Writs were alledged or considered of temp. *Edw. 6.* but in *Portman's* Case the most of them were.

13 H. 7.
Kelw. rep.
35. a.

If one will that his Wife, or any other, shall have, or hold, or enjoy the moyety of his Lease with his Executor, this implieth not that the Executor have the other moyety as a Legacy also, but otherwise as the Law casts it upon him; no more then where the moyety of Fee-simple Land is devised to the younger Son, this shall not make the elder Son to have the other moyety otherwise then by descent, as between *Low* and *Carter* was conceived. But there being a Proviso in the Wife's Bequest, that if she married from the House, then, &c. *Popham*, Ch. Justice, held, that if she married at all, this was a marrying from the House; for she was no longer Widow of that House, though she married with one of that Kindred, and who had no other House, but would dwell in the bequeathed.

Low & Carter's Case,
Tr. 37 El. in
ba. reg.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Executor of an Executor.

See *Florr.*
184. a Debt
against the
Executor of
an Executor.

I should be taxed of omission, if I should not shew whether the things forespoken of Executors immediate extend also to the mediate or more remote Executors. Assuredly, were I not by the Books otherwise informed, I should think it somewhat strange that the mediate Executor in the fourth, fifth, or farther degree, should not by the rules of the Common Law stand in like plight Executor to the first Testator, as the first and immediate Executor, as well as the Heir and Assignee in the third or thirteenth degree is capable of all advantages in like sort as the first and immediate Heir and Assignee. And indeed, we find both in the time of *Edward* the second and *Edward* the third Execution sued out upon a Judgment and Statute by an Executor of an Executor; and why he might not as well maintain an Action of Debt, &c. I see not. But
I must

19 *Ed.* 2. &
14 *Ed.* 3.
Fitz. Execu-
tor 87, &
103.

I must confess, I find both Books to the contrary before any Statute made in the point, and after an Act of Parliament to enable them to bring Actions, and to make them subject to Actions; yet the Statute speaks nothing of conferring upon them the Testator's Goods. Now if they had title to them before that Statute, and without the help of that Statute; it is strange if they should not be suable for Debts. But since that Statute, and at this day, where by a Will a special Trust is recommended to an Executor, as to sell Land, &c. this not performed in his lifetime shall not be performable by his Executor: contrariwise of an Interest, as to take the Profits of Lands for certain years towards payment of Debts and Legacies. And where the Statute *temp. H. 8.* gives remedy to Executors for recovery of Rents of Inheritance behind in the Testator's life, I doubt not but Executors of Executors are within the equity, as well as within the Statute *9 Ed. 3. cap. 3.* that the Executor who appears at the grand Distress shall answer alone. Yet the Statute *Westm. 2. cap. 23.* for Executors, was taken not to extend to Executors of Executors.

Quod non est lex. So as now in all cases,
 B b except

11 Ed. 5. &
 13 Ed. 3.
 Fitz. Exec.
 78.
 25 Ed. 3. c. 5.

19 H. 8. 9, 10.
 4 El. Dy. 201.
 32 H. 8. cap.
 37. So 32 H.
 8. 28. Leases.
 And 32 H. 8.
 cap. 33. Con-
 ditions. And
 13 El. cap. 5.
 & 27 El. cap.
 4. of frau-
 dulent Con-
 veyances.
 21 H. 8. cap.
 15. for falsi-
 fying Reco-
 veries.
 39 H. 6. 45.
 7 E. 3. 63.

except of special trust or authority, without the office of Executorship, the Executor of an Executor, how far soever in degree remote, stands as to the points both of Being, Having and Doing, in the same state and plight as the first and immediate Executor.

CHAP. XXI.

Touching Administrators.

OF these also, as standing in much affinity with Executors, it may be by some expected that I should have treated. But first, my excuse is, that these of Executors onely having grown to so great a bulk above expectation, I was unwilling to enlarge it farther.

Secondly, that which in the points of Having and Doing is before set forth and shewed touching Executors, may be applied to and understood of Administrators; though not what is spoken of Being and unbeing, or Revocation of Executorships, and other circumstantial points.

Lastly, I may, perhaps, if these find good acceptance, adde ere long that which

appertaineth to Administrators distinguished from Executors, or wherein they stand in different state.

CHAP. XXII.

Considerations in Conscience touching payment of Debts, Legacies, and the preferring or respect of persons.

TO the Advertisement, what course Executors are to hold in their payments, I thought good to adde this *in foro Conscientiæ*; That whenas it shall stand in the Executor's Will and Election to pay whom he will and as he will, in respect of equality in the dignity and degree of the Debts, all being for the purpose by the Specialty, and none of Record, and yet he hath not wherewith to pay or satisfie all, here he may have three ways or courses in his eye.

First, where there is equality in the honesty and Conscience of the Debts, there (except in the ability of the parties to bear loss the disproportion may otherwise occasion) methinks it should be most honest and just to pay every one proportion-

nably, and to let the loss of every one to be equal. And the justness of this is taught by the Law, which gives the *Audita querela* for equal contribution in bearing of loss by them who stand in equal degree : so of Legacies.

2. The poverty and inability of some, and the plenty of others, may *in foro Conscientie* justify the paying more to one, and suffering him to lose less, (if any thing) than another. For if the Widow's mite was a greater gift, so a greater loss then more out of abundance. Where Charity finds or may find place or nearness to place of giving, it may find greater motives of preserving from loss : so of Legacies.


3. The nature of the Debts, and so sometimes of Legacies, may be so different, as thence may spring a just motive to disproportion payments, to pay more to one than another, rate for rate, and so to suffer one to lose more than another. One Debt may perhaps be Use for money, or at least money lent for Use; another may be money freely lent; another Debt for Land or Inheritance bought; another Debt for a Lease, Chattels or Moveables, come to the Executor. The first merits the least respect, next the second, then the third
and

and the last the most. But where without any of these motives there is not equality held in the payment, *peccatnr* (as I think) *in Conscientiam*. But let every one stand or fall by or to his own, or to him who is greater then his Conscience. This equality Saint *Paul* in another case recommends to the *Corinthians*. And *Solomon*, whilest no inequality appeared in the point of right, shewed his disposition to have made an equal division of the Child between the Mothers, who were joynt Claimors and Competitors for it.

See more of Conscience, *Doct.* and *Stud.*

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